Feliciano v. Wayne Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation LLC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 2, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-05626
StatusUnknown

This text of Feliciano v. Wayne Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation LLC (Feliciano v. Wayne Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Feliciano v. Wayne Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation LLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED EDWIN FELICIANO, as Administrator of the DOC Estate of AMALIA FELICIANO, DATE FILED: _ 11/2/2022 __ Plaintiff(s), -against- 22 Civ. 5626 (AT) WAYNE CENTER FOR NURSING AND ORDER REHABILITATION LLC d/b/a WAYNE CENTE FOR NURSING AND REHABILITATION, ABC CORPORATION, ABC PARTNERSHIP, Defendant(s). ANALISA TORRES, District Judge: Plaintiff, Edwin Feliciano, as administrator of the estate of Amalia Feliciano, brought this action against Defendant, Wayne Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation LLC d/b/a Wayne Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation,’ in Supreme Court, Bronx County, alleging nursing home malpractice, wrongful death, conspicuous pain and suffering, negligence, and gross negligence. Pl. Mot. at 2 § 1 (citing Amend. Compl.), ECF No. 11. On July 1, 2022, Defendant removed the action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, arguing that: (1) Plaintiffs claims “‘arise under federal law” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441, and 1446, Notice of Removal §f 2, 19, ECF No. 2; (2) the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e, completely preempts Plaintiffs state law causes of action, see generally Notice of Removal: (3) Defendant “was a person acting under federal officers” under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), Notice of Removal §J 14, 36; and (4) “ymportant federal questions are embedded in the litigation of Plaintiffs [c]omplaint” under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 315 (2005), Notice of Removal § 24.

1 The other named defendants, ABC Corporation and ABC Partnership, are fictitious names because their identities and legal names are unknown to Plaintiff. Amend. Compl. f§ 11-12, ECF No. 2-2.

On August 1, 2022, Plaintiff moved for remand. Pl. Mot. On August 8, 2022, Defendant filed its opposition papers. Def. Opp., ECF No. 12. Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard The removing party “bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction is proper.” Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Loc. 272, 642 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2011). “Given ‘the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, as well as the importance of preserving state governments, federal courts construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against

removability.’” Berger v. N.Y. Univ., No. 19 Civ. 267, 2019 WL 3526533, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2019) (quoting Lupo v. Hum. Affs. Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1994)). “A district court must remand a case to state court ‘[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.’” Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). Generally, “a motion to remand is evaluated on the basis of the allegations as pleaded at the time of removal.” McCulloch Orthopedic Surgical Servs., PLLC v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 14 Civ. 6989, 2015 WL 3604249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015) (citing Vera, 335 F.3d at 116 n.2). “If the removing party cannot demonstrate federal jurisdiction by ‘competent proof,’ the removal was in error and the district court must remand the case to the court in which it was filed.” Hill v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 427, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

II. Application Plaintiff argues that removal is improper because Plaintiff’s complaint alleges only state law tort claims, the parties are not diverse,2 and the federal officer removal statute and the Grable doctrine are inapplicable to this action. Pl. Mot. at 1. Defendant contends that the PREP Act “is a complete

2 Defendant concedes that the parties are not diverse. Accordingly, the Court shall not address this argument. preemption statute that . . . displaces all state-law causes of action relating to the administration and use of covered countermeasures and provides an exclusive federal remedy in their place,” which “leaves no room for state-law causes of action . . . such as Plaintiff’s claims.” Def. Opp. at 2. Defendant also argues that federal question jurisdiction exists because “Plaintiff’s claims raise substantial questions regarding the meaning and application of the PREP Act” and that Defendant was “a critical private resource enlisted to help carry out the federal effort to treat and prevent the spread of COVID-19.” Id at 2–3. The Court concludes that remand is required because Defendant has not shown that removal is proper. The Court joins the chorus of opinions in this district holding that preemption under the PREP

Act, the federal officer removal statute, and the Grable doctrine in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic do not confer jurisdiction over state law claims like Plaintiff’s. See Rivera v. Eastchester Rehab. & Health Care LLC, No. 22 Civ. 2019, 2022 WL 2222979, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2022) (collecting cases); see also Rivera-Zayas v. Our Lady Consolation Geriatric Care Ctr., 2021 WL 3549878, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2021) (noting that “the PREP Act . . . does not create an exclusive federal cause of action” (citation omitted)). Defendant’s arguments that these courts “[m]isapplied the [d]octrine of [c]omplete [p]reemption” are incorrect. Def. Opp. at 14; see also id. at 9–23. The Court shall not contravene the overwhelming weight of authority on this point to accommodate Defendant’s misplaced reasoning. First, Plaintiff’s claims sound in state law. Plaintiff’s complaint brings nursing home

malpractice, wrongful death, conspicuous pain and suffering, negligence, and gross negligence claims against Defendant under New York law. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 186–281. None of these claims “arise under” federal law. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff’s ‘well-pleaded complaint’ raises an issue of federal law.”) (citation omitted). Second, the Court agrees with the “consensus among federal courts finding that the PREP Act does not completely preempt state law claims arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Rivera, 2022 WL 2222979, at *3. Third, Defendant has not shown that it was “acting under” a federal officer to establish federal officer jurisdiction. To qualify as “acting under” a federal officer, a party must have been involved in “an effort to assist, or help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.” Watson v.

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Related

Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.
551 U.S. 142 (Supreme Court, 2007)
State of New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation
686 F.3d 133 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Hill v. Delta International MacHinery Corp.
386 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D. New York, 2005)
Montefiore Medical Center v. Teamsters Local 272
642 F.3d 321 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Vera v. Saks & Co.
335 F.3d 109 (Second Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
Feliciano v. Wayne Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/feliciano-v-wayne-center-for-nursing-and-rehabilitation-llc-nysd-2022.