Feise v. Cherokee County

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Feise v. Cherokee County

434 S.E.2d 551, 209 Ga. App. 733, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 996

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJuly 13, 1993

DocketA92A1504

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 434 S.E.2d 551 (Feise v. Cherokee County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Feise v. Cherokee County, 434 S.E.2d 551, 209 Ga. App. 733, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 996 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).

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Birdsong, Presiding Judge.

In Feise v. Cherokee County, 207 Ga. App. 17 (427 SE2d 294), we reversed a grant of summary judgment to the county finding issues of fact whether there was a failure of a duty on law enforcement officers [734]*734towards appellants, based on reasonable knowledge and foreseeability that appellees would be stalked by Scott Kramer according to his immediate threat to “carve up” Feise and her daughter, which was reported to the police. Scott Kramer did slash Mrs. Feise with a knife in the front yard of her home, on the day after his threats.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court remanded Cherokee County’s appeal for reconsideration in light of City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26 (426 SE2d 861). In that case the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officials have no duty to protect a citizen unless there is a “special relationship” which sets the individual apart from the general public and engenders a “special duty” owed to that individual. The standards to determine this question were established by that court’s adoption of these requirements: “(1) an explicit assurance by the municipality, through promises or actions, that it would act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality that inaction could lead to harm; and, (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured party on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.” Id. at 29.

There is evidence which satisfies the requirement of standard (2), knowledge on the part of law enforcement officials that inaction could lead to harm to appellees. But because of the officials’ inaction, standard (1), an explicit assurance by the law enforcement agency, “through promises or actions,” that it would act on behalf of appellees, and standard (3), justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured parties on the agency’s affirmative undertaking, cannot be satisfied. That is, the evidence shows that despite specific knowledge that inaction probably would lead to harm, the law enforcement officials in this case did nothing. Therefore, under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Rome v. Jordan, we must affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Cherokee County.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., Beasley, P. J., Cooper, Blackburn and Smith, JJ., concur. Andrews, J., concurs specially. Johnson, J., not participating. Pope, C. J., disqualified.

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Birdsong, Presiding Judge.

In Feise v. Cherokee County, 207 Ga. App. 17 (427 SE2d 294), we reversed a grant of summary judgment to the county finding issues of fact whether there was a failure of a duty on law enforcement officers [734]*734towards appellants, based on reasonable knowledge and foreseeability that appellees would be stalked by Scott Kramer according to his immediate threat to “carve up” Feise and her daughter, which was reported to the police. Scott Kramer did slash Mrs. Feise with a knife in the front yard of her home, on the day after his threats.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court remanded Cherokee County’s appeal for reconsideration in light of City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26 (426 SE2d 861). In that case the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officials have no duty to protect a citizen unless there is a “special relationship” which sets the individual apart from the general public and engenders a “special duty” owed to that individual. The standards to determine this question were established by that court’s adoption of these requirements: “(1) an explicit assurance by the municipality, through promises or actions, that it would act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality that inaction could lead to harm; and, (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured party on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.” Id. at 29.

There is evidence which satisfies the requirement of standard (2), knowledge on the part of law enforcement officials that inaction could lead to harm to appellees. But because of the officials’ inaction, standard (1), an explicit assurance by the law enforcement agency, “through promises or actions,” that it would act on behalf of appellees, and standard (3), justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured parties on the agency’s affirmative undertaking, cannot be satisfied. That is, the evidence shows that despite specific knowledge that inaction probably would lead to harm, the law enforcement officials in this case did nothing. Therefore, under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Rome v. Jordan, we must affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Cherokee County.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., Beasley, P. J., Cooper, Blackburn and Smith, JJ., concur. Andrews, J., concurs specially. Johnson, J., not participating. Pope, C. J., disqualified.

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434 S.E.2d 551, 209 Ga. App. 733, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 996, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/feise-v-cherokee-county-gactapp-1993.

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