Feerer v. Amoco Production Co.

242 F.3d 1259, 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1548, 147 Oil & Gas Rep. 322, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 4142, 2001 WL 273277
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedMarch 20, 2001
Docket99-2231, 99-2146
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 242 F.3d 1259 (Feerer v. Amoco Production Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Feerer v. Amoco Production Co., 242 F.3d 1259, 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1548, 147 Oil & Gas Rep. 322, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 4142, 2001 WL 273277 (10th Cir. 2001).

Opinion

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves a dispute arising after settlement of class action litigation pertaining to the payment of royalties on carbon dioxide (C02) produced in New Mexico and sold in West Texas oil fields for use in enhanced oil recovery projects. Pursuant to a settlement agreement, Defendants/ working interest owners assumed all post-production costs associated with compression, dehydration and gathering, marketing fees, and part of the transportation costs, thus increasing the .royalties to be paid to the Plaintiffs/ royalty interest owners. When making royalty payments pursuant to the settlement agreement, however, Defendants withheld (recouped) from .the newly calculated royalty that portion of the New Mexico severance tax 1 attributable to the increased royalty value. In protest of the severance tax deduction, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement with the district court. 2 The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion, concluding (1) “the settlement agreement says nothing about a new method for severance tax calculations based upon differing values for royalty owners and for working interests;” and (2) under New Mexico law, “the ‘value! of the carbon dioxide for severance tax calculations is the same for royalty interest and working interest owners,” and therefore, “Defendants are not entitled to a further ‘deduction’ in the taxable value.” Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In the underlying class action lawsuit, Plaintiffs complained the Defendants had improperly deducted certain costs (including compression, dehydration, gathering, transportation and marketing costs) when calculating C02 royalties owed to them. A court-approved settlement agreement specified that Defendants would no longer deduct such costs and further specified a procedure through which Defendants would remit royalties reflecting the resulting- increase. However, Plaintiffs never received the full increase. Defendants deducted certain sums from the required settlement payments as additional severance taxes, reasoning that the “value” of the Plaintiffs’ royalty interest increased as a result of their being relieved by the settlement from sharing in certain post-production costs. 3

DISCUSSION

Defendants raise three issues on appeal, which condensed present the following question: Are Defendants entitled by state law or the terms of the settlement agreement to reallocate to Plaintiffs that portion of the state severance tax attributable to *1262 the increased value of the post-settlement C02 royalty payments?

We answer this question in the context of affirming or reversing the district court’s judgment granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. We review a district court’s decision regarding the enforcement of a settlement agreement for an abuse of discretion. See Heuser v. Kephart, 215 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir.2000). An abuse of discretion occurs, however, if the district court bases it decision on an erroneous conclusion of law. See Wang v. Hsu, 919 F.2d 130, 130 (10th Cir.1990). The question presented is one of law. We review questions of law de novo. See e.g., Dang v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir.1999).

New Mexico Law

New Mexico imposes a tax on the value of C02 extracted from the ground:

There is imposed and shall be collected by the department a tax on all products that are severed and sold, except as provided in Subsection B of this section. The measure of the tax and the rates are:
(6) on carbon dioxide, three and three-fourths percent of the taxable value determined under Section 7-29-4.1 NMSA 1978.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-29-4A(6) (emphasis added). “Value” as used in the phrase “taxable value” is defined as “the actual price received for products at the production unit, except as otherwise provided in the Oil and Gas Severance Tax Act”. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-29-2D.

As operators of the production unit, Defendants are charged with the responsibility of determining the “taxable value” of the C02 they extract. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-29-4.1, 7-29-6, 7-29-7. Then, because “[e]very interest owner shall be liable for the tax to the extent of his interest in [the C02],” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-29-4(C), Defendants withhold severance taxes from payments to a royalty interest owner “for his portion of the value of products from a production unit.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-29-6.

Defendants’ primary argument on appeal assumes the New Mexico statutes require or at least contemplate that severance taxes may be based on different “taxable values” for different interest owners. Specifically, Defendants would have us interpret “taxable value” to mean actual price received by each interest owner (ie., royalty interest owner versus working interest owner) as adjusted to. reflect the allocation of post-production costs, rather than “actual price received for products at the production unit.” This interpretation would justify Defendants’ attempt to calculate the taxable value of the Plaintiffs’ proportionate share of C02 based on its “tailgate” value (a sales price reflecting the benefit of compression, gathering, transportation and marketing), but to calculate the taxable value of the working interests’ proportionate share of C02 on the “wellhead” value (a lesser value reflecting a deduction of post-production costs from the actual price received). We reject Defendants’ interpretation.

“Value” as defined by the plain language of the statute does not reflect the price received anywhere by anyone, but rather that price received “at the production unit.” The New Mexico Oil and Gas Commission has defined “production unit” to mean the “wellhead.” N.M. Admin. Code tit. 3, § 18.1.7.5; see also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-29-2B. As Plaintiffs note, severance tax valuation at the wellhead is logical inasmuch as the C02 is severed from the ground at the wellhead. Moreover, it is only by valuing C02 at the wellhead that Defendants are entitled to deduct post-production costs from the severance tax calculation at all. Because there is no sale at the wellhead, no actual price is received for C02 at that location. Under these circumstances, the State permits operators to calculate the taxable or wellhead value by deducting costs for compression, dehydration, gathering, and transportation from the downstream sales price (such as a *1263 tailgate price) received for the product. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-29-4.2C; see also N.M. Admin. Code tit. 3, §§ 18.1.7.1, 18.6.7.

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242 F.3d 1259, 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1548, 147 Oil & Gas Rep. 322, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 4142, 2001 WL 273277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/feerer-v-amoco-production-co-ca10-2001.