1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
7 NO. 22-cv-5023 FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE 8 COMPANY, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 9 Plaintiff, JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION 10 v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
11 NICHOLAS M. WALL,
12 Defendant.
13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 This case is an insurance declaratory judgment action arising from an underlying auto 15 accident in which Defendant, Nicholas M. Wall, was operating a vehicle owned by his employer, 16 Hudson Holding Co., Inc. (“Hudson”). Plaintiff, Federated Mutual Insurance Company 17 (“Federated”), seeks a declaration that the Mr. Wall is not entitled to uninsured/underinsured 18 motorist (“UIM”) coverage under the policy that Federated issued to Hudson. Mr. Wall has 19 counterclaimed for breach of contract, asserting that he is entitled to coverage under the policy 20 based on his interpretation of Washington’s UIM statute, RCW 48.22.030. Currently pending 21 before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, and Defendant Nicholas 22 M. Wall’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 and supporting materials filed in support of and opposition to the motions, and the relevant legal 2 authorities, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion and DENY Defendant’s cross-motion. 3 The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 The parties agree that there are are no factual disputes in this case; there is only a legal issue 6 to be resolved. Joint Status Report 1-2, ECF No. 10; Pl.’s Mot. 2, 8; ECF No. 13; Def.’s Mot. 2, 7 ECF No. 15. In brief, Mr. Hall’s employer, Hudson, purchased an automobile insurance policy 8 from Federated. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1. Hudson completed Federated’s Washington Commercial 9 Auto Underinsured Motorists Option Form, which provided multiple options including buying UIM 10 coverage for all persons who qualified as an insured, limiting coverage to “directors, officers, 11 partners or owners of the named insured and family members who qualify as insureds,” rejecting
12 UIM coverage, and selecting coverage amounts if not rejected. Id. ¶¶ 15-17; UIM Form, ECF No. 13 14-3. Hudson rejected property damage coverage, selected bodily injury coverage up to $500,000 14 limit for directors, officers, partners or owners and family members, and rejected UIM coverage for 15 any other persons who qualify as an insured. See UIM Form. 16 Mr. Wall was operating a Hudson-owned vehicle on May 8, 2019, when he alleges being 17 injured in a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured motorist. Compl. ¶¶ 9-13. He filed suit 18 against the other driver in state court, and those issues are not a part of this case. Id. ¶ 12. Mr. Wall 19 is not one of Hudson’s directors, officers, partners or owners or a qualified family member. Id. ¶ 20 21. Therefore, Federated rejected his claim for payment of benefits under Hudson’s UIM portion 21 of the policy. Id. ¶ 27; Counterclaim ¶¶ 46, 55, ECF No. 6.
22 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Federated seeks a declaration from this Court that Mr. Wall is not entitled to Uninsured or 2 Underinsured Motorists coverage under Hudson’s policy in connection with the underlying 3 accident. Compl. ¶ 29. Mr. Wall asserts a breach of contract claim against Federated and seeks an 4 order declaring that he is entitled to all benefits of insurance available under the UIM policy and an 5 award of fees and expenses of this action. Counterclaim 6-7. Both parties have filed for summary 6 judgment in their favor. 7 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 “Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 9 to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the movant is 10 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zetwick v. Cnty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2017) 11 (quoting United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Account No. Ending 8215, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162
12 (9th Cir. 2016)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court has determined that this case is appropriate for 13 summary judgment as the legal issue involved may be resolved based on uncontroverted facts. See 14 Retuta v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Questions of law include not only pure 15 issues of statutory interpretation, but also application of law to undisputed facts.” (citation 16 omitted)). 17 IV. DISCUSSION 18 Mr. Hall contends that UIM coverage is mandatory in Washington and must be provided as 19 a component of any new automobile insurance policy issued in the state. Def.’s Mot 2 (citing RCW 20 48.22 et seq.). He argues that although RCW 48.22.030(3) permits full or partial rejection of 21 coverage, it does not authorize covered persons to be selectively excluded from the policy. Id. at
22 3. Federated argues that under RCW 48.22.030, UIM coverage is “purely optional.” Pl.’s Mot. 10. 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Federated contends that RCW 48.22.030(2) requires only that insurers offer UIM coverage, but 2 subsection (3) of RCW 48.22.030 allows rejection of all or part of the coverage. Id. at 10-11. To 3 resolve this issue, the Court will apply the traditional principles of statutory construction. 4 Under the familiar canon of statutory construction, “the starting point for interpreting a 5 statute is the language of the statute itself,” and “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention 6 to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety 7 Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). “The UIM statute is liberally construed 8 in order to provide broad protection against financially irresponsible motorists.” McIllwain v. State 9 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 133 Wn. App. 439, 446 (2006) (citations omitted). Consequently, 10 Washington courts consider contract principles, public policy, and legislative intent when deciding 11 UIM cases. Id.
12 RCW 48.22.030(2) requires every automobile policy issued in Washington State to provide 13 coverage to protect policyholders from injury or loss caused by uninsured motorists. Diaz v. Nat’l 14 Car Rental Sys., Inc., 143 Wn.2d 57, 61 (2001).
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1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
7 NO. 22-cv-5023 FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE 8 COMPANY, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 9 Plaintiff, JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION 10 v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
11 NICHOLAS M. WALL,
12 Defendant.
13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 This case is an insurance declaratory judgment action arising from an underlying auto 15 accident in which Defendant, Nicholas M. Wall, was operating a vehicle owned by his employer, 16 Hudson Holding Co., Inc. (“Hudson”). Plaintiff, Federated Mutual Insurance Company 17 (“Federated”), seeks a declaration that the Mr. Wall is not entitled to uninsured/underinsured 18 motorist (“UIM”) coverage under the policy that Federated issued to Hudson. Mr. Wall has 19 counterclaimed for breach of contract, asserting that he is entitled to coverage under the policy 20 based on his interpretation of Washington’s UIM statute, RCW 48.22.030. Currently pending 21 before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, and Defendant Nicholas 22 M. Wall’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 and supporting materials filed in support of and opposition to the motions, and the relevant legal 2 authorities, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion and DENY Defendant’s cross-motion. 3 The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 The parties agree that there are are no factual disputes in this case; there is only a legal issue 6 to be resolved. Joint Status Report 1-2, ECF No. 10; Pl.’s Mot. 2, 8; ECF No. 13; Def.’s Mot. 2, 7 ECF No. 15. In brief, Mr. Hall’s employer, Hudson, purchased an automobile insurance policy 8 from Federated. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1. Hudson completed Federated’s Washington Commercial 9 Auto Underinsured Motorists Option Form, which provided multiple options including buying UIM 10 coverage for all persons who qualified as an insured, limiting coverage to “directors, officers, 11 partners or owners of the named insured and family members who qualify as insureds,” rejecting
12 UIM coverage, and selecting coverage amounts if not rejected. Id. ¶¶ 15-17; UIM Form, ECF No. 13 14-3. Hudson rejected property damage coverage, selected bodily injury coverage up to $500,000 14 limit for directors, officers, partners or owners and family members, and rejected UIM coverage for 15 any other persons who qualify as an insured. See UIM Form. 16 Mr. Wall was operating a Hudson-owned vehicle on May 8, 2019, when he alleges being 17 injured in a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured motorist. Compl. ¶¶ 9-13. He filed suit 18 against the other driver in state court, and those issues are not a part of this case. Id. ¶ 12. Mr. Wall 19 is not one of Hudson’s directors, officers, partners or owners or a qualified family member. Id. ¶ 20 21. Therefore, Federated rejected his claim for payment of benefits under Hudson’s UIM portion 21 of the policy. Id. ¶ 27; Counterclaim ¶¶ 46, 55, ECF No. 6.
22 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Federated seeks a declaration from this Court that Mr. Wall is not entitled to Uninsured or 2 Underinsured Motorists coverage under Hudson’s policy in connection with the underlying 3 accident. Compl. ¶ 29. Mr. Wall asserts a breach of contract claim against Federated and seeks an 4 order declaring that he is entitled to all benefits of insurance available under the UIM policy and an 5 award of fees and expenses of this action. Counterclaim 6-7. Both parties have filed for summary 6 judgment in their favor. 7 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 “Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 9 to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the movant is 10 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zetwick v. Cnty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2017) 11 (quoting United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Account No. Ending 8215, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162
12 (9th Cir. 2016)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court has determined that this case is appropriate for 13 summary judgment as the legal issue involved may be resolved based on uncontroverted facts. See 14 Retuta v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Questions of law include not only pure 15 issues of statutory interpretation, but also application of law to undisputed facts.” (citation 16 omitted)). 17 IV. DISCUSSION 18 Mr. Hall contends that UIM coverage is mandatory in Washington and must be provided as 19 a component of any new automobile insurance policy issued in the state. Def.’s Mot 2 (citing RCW 20 48.22 et seq.). He argues that although RCW 48.22.030(3) permits full or partial rejection of 21 coverage, it does not authorize covered persons to be selectively excluded from the policy. Id. at
22 3. Federated argues that under RCW 48.22.030, UIM coverage is “purely optional.” Pl.’s Mot. 10. 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Federated contends that RCW 48.22.030(2) requires only that insurers offer UIM coverage, but 2 subsection (3) of RCW 48.22.030 allows rejection of all or part of the coverage. Id. at 10-11. To 3 resolve this issue, the Court will apply the traditional principles of statutory construction. 4 Under the familiar canon of statutory construction, “the starting point for interpreting a 5 statute is the language of the statute itself,” and “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention 6 to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety 7 Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). “The UIM statute is liberally construed 8 in order to provide broad protection against financially irresponsible motorists.” McIllwain v. State 9 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 133 Wn. App. 439, 446 (2006) (citations omitted). Consequently, 10 Washington courts consider contract principles, public policy, and legislative intent when deciding 11 UIM cases. Id.
12 RCW 48.22.030(2) requires every automobile policy issued in Washington State to provide 13 coverage to protect policyholders from injury or loss caused by uninsured motorists. Diaz v. Nat’l 14 Car Rental Sys., Inc., 143 Wn.2d 57, 61 (2001). The statute provides, in pertinent part, 15 (3) Except as to property damage, coverage required under subsection (2) of this section shall be in the same amount as the 16 insured’s third party liability coverage unless the insured rejects all or part of the coverage as provided in subsection (4) of this section. 17 . . . 18 (4) A named insured . . . may reject, in writing, underinsured coverage for bodily injury or death, or property damage, and the 19 requirements of subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall not apply. 20 RCW 48.22.030. The plain language of the statute allows the named insured to reject “all or part” 21 of UIM coverage, provided the waiver is in writing. Id. Here, Hudson is the named insured. Hudson 22 rejected, in writing, part of the UIM coverage offered by Federated. See UIM Form. 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Mr. Wall argues that the statute does not allow for UIM coverage to be provided for directors 2 and officers, as here, but rejected for other employees. Def.’s Mot. 2-3. He does not offer any 3 authority to support his argument, and his argument is not supported by case law. See Galbraith v. 4 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 78 Wn. App. 526, 531 (1995) (“Washington law does not 5 require employers to provide UIM coverage for their employees.”). As a result, employees, such 6 as Mr. Wall, may be left without UIM coverage. See id. Mr. Wall also argues that public policy 7 does not support an interpretation of the statute that allows for UIM coverage to be waived on the 8 basis of role in the company. Def.’s Mot. 5-6. But the statute gives the named insured the option 9 to waive “all or part” of UIM coverage. RCW 48.22.030 (3). And generally, “a contract which is 10 not prohibited by statute, condemned by judicial decision, or contrary to the public morals 11 contravenes no principle of public policy.” State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wn.2d
12 477, 481 (1984). 13 Mr. Wall cites Bishop v. Balagtas, No. 79D02-0701-CT-00003, 2008 WL 7123046 (Ind. 14 Super. May 21, 2008), which found that the “directors and officers only” option—similar to the 15 option provided to Hudson in this case—was invalid. However, the option was found to be invalid 16 in Indiana because the Indiana statute includes wording that the named insured “has the right, on 17 behalf of all other named insured and all other insureds, in writing” to reject UIM coverage. Id. 18 (emphasis supplied by the Indiana court). The court determined that the use of the word “and” 19 “indicates that coverage cannot be declined for some insureds while selected for others.” Id. The 20 Washington statute does not contain similar wording, and there is no Washington case law to 21 support this position. “Underinsured motorist coverage is limited personal accident insurance
22 chiefly for the benefit of the named insured. Limiting the scope of the definition of who else is an 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 ‘insured’ does not run afoul of the public policy behind Washington’s UIM statute.” Vasquez v. 2 Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 174 Wn. App. 132, 138 (2013) (citing Smith v. Continental Cas. Co., 128 3 Wash.2d 73, 83 (1995)). Because the named insured may reject all or part of UIM coverage, there 4 is no public policy violated by the named insured rejecting part of UIM coverage, as occurred here. 5 See Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Wn.2d 243, 250 (1993) (“The UIM statute does not 6 mandate UIM coverage, but requires all insurers to make UIM coverage available to Washington 7 policyholders. Once the coverage is offered, the insured is free to waive it.” (emphasis added)). 8 V. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, is 10 GRANTED, and Defendant Nicholas M. Wall’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 11 15, is DENIED. Judgment shall be entered by separate order declaring that Federated has no
12 obligation to provide UIM coverage to Mr. Wall in connection with the underlying accident on May 13 8, 2019. 14 DATED this 22nd day of May, 2023. 15 A 16 17 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein U.S. District Court Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 24 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT