Federal Trade Commission v. Patriot Alcohol Testers, Inc.

798 F. Supp. 851, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10849
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJuly 14, 1992
DocketCiv. A. 91-11812-C
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 798 F. Supp. 851 (Federal Trade Commission v. Patriot Alcohol Testers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Trade Commission v. Patriot Alcohol Testers, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 851, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10849 (D. Mass. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

CAFFREY, Senior District Judge.

This case is before the Court on a motion for partial summary judgment by the Plaintiff, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), against Defendants Patriot Alcohol Testers, Inc. (“Patriot”) and Anthony J. *854 Prall (“Prall”)- Specifically, the FTC asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the following two issues: first, whether certain representations made by or on behalf of Patriot constituted “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988); and second, whether Defendant Prall can be held personally liable for these alleged violations. 1 For the reasons set forth below, the motion for partial summary judgment by the FTC should be granted in part and denied in part.

I.

There is no dispute regarding the following facts. Patriot is a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with a principal place of business in Massachusetts. Prall, a Massachusetts resident, is the president of Patriot and controlled its operations and policies. Beginning in 1988 and continuing thereafter, Patriot has been in the business of manufacturing and selling a coin-operated, blood alcohol measuring device known as the “Model 5000.” Patriot marketed the Model 5000 as a business opportunity for potential distributors. Upon purchasing Model 5000s, a distributor could derive income from the devices by placing them in bars, nightclubs and restaurants for use by patrons. To use the device, patrons would deposit fifty cents, blow through a straw into the machine and then receive a reading as to their alcohol level. Patriot has sold these devices to distributors in many different states.

The dispute in the instant case primarily revolves around Patriot’s promotional communications regarding its Model 5000. The FTC seeks summary judgment in connection with the following six representations made by or on behalf of Patriot: (1) that distributors’ average income from the Model 5000 is $130 per week per device; (2) that distributors reasonably could expect to earn $350 per week per device in busy locations; (3) that the Model 5000 is maintenance-free; (4) that it is easy to place the Model 5000 in bars and other drinking establishments; (5) that bars and other drinking establishments are able to obtain substantial discounts on liability insurance based on their installation of alcohol testing devices like the Model 5000; and (6) that the Model 5000 provides an accurate measure of a user’s blood alcohol level. In addition, the FTC seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether Prall can be held personally liable for alleged misrepresentations made by or on behalf of Patriot.

II.

A. Summary Judgment Standard

According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine *855 issue of fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable finder of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. In determining whether a genuine issue exists, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to “present evidence from which a [finder of fact] might return a verdict in its favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. To satisfy its burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts and may not rely on general denials. United States v. O’Connell, 890 F.2d 563, 565 (1st Cir.1989). Finally, “[a] trial judge may freely grant summary judgment on a non-jury issue if no dispute over material fact exists and a trial or hearing would not enhance its ability to decide the issue.” Posadas de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Radin, 856 F.2d 399, 400-01 (1st Cir.1988).

B. Alleged Misrepresentations

Section 5 of the FTC Act provides that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988). To establish that an act or practice is “deceptive” under Section 5, the FTC must establish three required elements. First, The FTC must establish that there is a representation, omission, or practice. In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (1984). Second, the FTC must establish that the representation, omission or practice is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. Id. Third, the FTC must establish that the representation, omission or practice is material. Id.

The first element simply requires a showing that the defendant made some representation. With respect to the second element, a court must consider whether the representation is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer “ ‘by viewing it as a whole, without emphasizing isolated words or phrases apart from their context.’ ” Removatron Int’l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489, 1496 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir.1976)). In addition, a court must focus on “[t]he impression created by the advertisement, not its literal truth or falsi-ty_” Id. (quoting American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir.1982)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC
332 F. Supp. 3d 729 (S.D. Illinois, 2018)
Nicholas T. Long v. Dell, Inc.
93 A.3d 988 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2014)
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA INS. CO.(EUROPE)
678 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Massachusetts, 2010)
Federal Trade Commission v. Medical Billers Network, Inc.
543 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D. New York, 2008)
United States v. Acosta
357 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D. Nevada, 2005)
Federal Trade Commission v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc.
97 F. Supp. 2d 502 (S.D. New York, 2000)
Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division
726 A.2d 702 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1999)
FTC v. Pmcs, Inc.
21 F. Supp. 2d 187 (E.D. New York, 1998)
Federal Trade Commission v. P.M.C.S., Inc.
21 F. Supp. 2d 187 (E.D. New York, 1998)
Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. Thompson
944 P.2d 547 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1996)
Commonwealth v. Amcan Enterprises, Inc.
5 Mass. L. Rptr. 53 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 1996)
Federal Trade Commission v. Wilcox
926 F. Supp. 1091 (S.D. Florida, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
798 F. Supp. 851, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10849, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-trade-commission-v-patriot-alcohol-testers-inc-mad-1992.