Federal Trade Commission v. MOBE Ltd.

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided January 6, 2021·No. 6:18-cv-00862·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 6:18-cv-862-Orl-37DCI

MOBE LTD.; MOBEPROCESSING.COM, INC.; TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT USA, INC.; MOBETRAINING.COM, INC.; 9336-0311 QUEBEC INC.; MOBE PRO LIMITED; MOBE INC.; MOBE ONLINE LTD.; MATT LLOYD PUBLISHING.COM PTY LTD.; MATTHEW LLOYD MCPHEE; SUSAN ZANGHI; and INGRID WHITNEY,

Defendants.

ORDER Before the Court is Receiver Mark J. Bernet’s (“Receiver”) motion to establish claims procedures. (Doc. 279 (“Motion”).) On referral, U.S. Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick recommends granting the Motion and entering the proposed order (Doc. 279-3). (Doc. 280 (“R&R”).) No objections were filed, and the time for doing so has now passed. Absent objection, the Court reviewed the R&R only for clear error. See Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 8:12-cv-557-T-27EAJ, 2016 WL 355490, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2016); see also Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). Finding none, the Court adopts -1- the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 280) in full. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. U.S. Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 280) is ADOPTED, CONFIRMED, and made a part of this Order. 2. The Receiver’s Motion to Establish Claims Procedures (Doc. 279) is GRANTED, as follows: I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter.

2. The Court has entered a final order and judgment against Defendants awarding Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission $318,512,336, which represents the amount of injury suffered by consumers and the amount of unjust enrichment obtained by Defendants in connection with the practices alleged in the Complaint. (Docs. 139, 242, 258, 260.) The judgments are final,

unappealed, and unappealable. As previously ordered, all money paid to the Commission pursuant to the final order against the Receivership Defendants may be deposited into a fund administered by the Commission or its designee to be used for equitable relief, including consumer redress and any attendant expenses for the administration of any redress fund.

(Doc. 260, Sec. IV.A.) 3. To conclude the receivership, the Receiver will be required to pay legitimate receivership expenses, including any valid and enforceable claim held by

-2- potential third party creditors that are legally superior to the right of recovery of injured consumers. It therefore is appropriate for the Court to

establish summary claims procedures to be employed to afford potential Non-Consumer Creditors the ability to present and prosecute a Claim. 4. District courts have broad powers and wide discretion to determine relief in equity receiverships. SEC v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1992); SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1986). This discretion derives from the inherent powers of an equity court to fashion relief, Elliott, 953 F.2d at 1566,

and any action by a trial court in supervising an equity receivership is committed to the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed unless there is a clear showing of abuse. SEC v. Pension Fund of Am. LC, No. 09-10241 (11th Cir. May 6, 2010) (citing SEC v. Safety Fin. Servs., Inc., 674 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1982)).

5. In granting relief in an equity receivership, it is appropriate for a district court to fashion and utilize summary procedures, because summary procedures reduce the time necessary to settle disputes, decrease litigation costs, and prevent dissipation of receivership assets. Elliott, 953 F.2d at 1566. Parties subject to summary procedures are entitled to the due process right

to notice and an opportunity to be heard; the particular process that is due varies according to the nature of the right and the type of proceeding. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Matthews v, Eldridge,

-3- 424 U.S. 319 (1976). II. DEFINITIONS For the purpose of this Order, the following definitions apply:

1. “Administrative Fees” means any fees and/or costs owed to the Receiver or Special Receiver, or to professionals retained by the Receiver or Special Receiver, in performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Receiver and Special Receiver under the authority previously granted by the Court (Docs. 107, 182), to the extent such fees or costs have not been settled, and

which will be the subject of separate court orders. 2. “Business Coaching Program” means any program, plan, or product, including those related to work-at-home opportunities, that is represented, expressly or by implication, to train or teach a participant or purchaser how to establish a business or earn money or other consideration through a

business or other activity. 3. “Claim” means any right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 4. “Claim Form” means the form attached hereto as Exhibit “1.” Non-

Consumer Creditors who intend to file a Claim Form may contact the Receiver to obtain a version of the Claim Form in a fillable format. 5. “Consumer” means any person or entity who paid money to any of the

-4- MOBE Receivership Defendants or any related entity (i) to enroll in a Business Coaching Program or an Investment Opportunity, or (ii) to obtain

goods or services related to a Business Coaching Program or an Investment Opportunity. 6. “Contested Matter” means any proceeding brought in the Court whereby (i) a Non-Consumer Creditor objects to the Receiver's disallowance of such Non-Consumer Creditor's Claim, whether in whole or in part, in a Receiver's Claim Report, or (ii) the FTC objects to the Receiver's allowance

of any Claim in favor of any Non-Consumer Creditor. 7. “Defendant(s)” means Receivership Defendants and Individual Defendants, individually, collectively, or in any combination. 8. “Individual Defendant(s)” means Matthew Lloyd McPhee a/k/a Matt Lloyd, Susan Zanghi, and Ingrid Whitney (as personal representative of the

Estate of Deceased Defendant Russell W. Whitney), individually, collectively, or in any combination. 9. “Interested Parties” means Plaintiff, the Receiver, and all Non-Consumer Creditors who timely file a Claim with the Receiver and Plaintiff. 10. “Investment Opportunity” means anything, tangible or intangible, that is

offered, offered for sale, sold, or traded based wholly or in part on representations, either express or implied, about past, present, or future income, profit, or appreciation.

-5- 11. “McPhee” means Individual Defendant Matthew Lloyd McPhee, a/k/a Matt Lloyd.

12. “Non-Consumer Creditor” means any persons or entity who is not a Consumer and who has or claims to have a Claim against the Receiver, the Special Receiver or any of the Receivership Defendants. 13. “Receiver” means the receiver appointed in this action, Mark J. Bernet, and any deputy receivers that he names. 14. “Receiver's Claim Report” means a report to be filed by the Receiver

analyzing Claim Forms received timely and determining whether each Claim Form timely received is allowed, disallowed, or allowed in part and disallowed in part. 15. “Receivership Claim” means any Claim asserted by any Non-Consumer Creditor, whether the claim arose prior to or during the pendency of the

Receivership on or after June 5, 2018, with the exception of Administrative Fees. 16.

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Related

Colleen Macort v. Prem, Inc.
208 F. App'x 781 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Mathews v. Eldridge
424 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
470 U.S. 532 (Supreme Court, 1985)