Federal Trade Commission v. Good-Grape Co.
This text of 45 F.2d 70 (Federal Trade Commission v. Good-Grape Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is an original proceeding instituted by tho Federal Trade Commission against the Good-Grapo Company to enforce a modified order 1 issued by tho Commission which, with the original order2 it modifies, is set out in the margin. There is no pretense that respondent obeyed the order. The contention is that it was invalid. Respondent’s business consisted of manufacturing concentrates and soiling them to bottlers: The bottlers produced therefrom and bottled a soft drink beverage which they sold to retailers and which in turn was dispensed to the consuming public. The complaint of the Commission was that respondent violated section 5 of the Act of 1914, e. 311 (U. S. Code, tit. 15, c. 2, § 45 [15 USCA § 45]), by causing the beverage to bo manufactured and sold in interstate commerce under the name, brand, or label “Good-Grapo” and by advertising this product as “Good-Grape,” “Grape,” and “Fruit of the Vine,” and by otherwise falsely assorting and implying that it was composed wholly or in part of the natural juice of the grape. The complaint further charged that the beverage produced from the concentrates manufactured by respondent was sold in interstate commerce in competition with grape juice and other grape products and imitation grape products. These allegations are sustained by findings of fact which are in turn supported by evidence, and are conclusive. IT. S. Code, tit. 15, c. 2, § 45, par. 3 (15 US CA § 45, third paragraph).
The Commission also found that, although the beverage produced from the concentrates sold by respondent was only an imitation grape product, artificially colored and fla^. vored and not made from the natural fruit of tho grape, yet the respondent extensively advertised it by means of publications, circulating in interstate commerce and otherwise, as tho juice from the natural fruit of the grape; that respondent designed and approved the labels attached to the bottles containing tho beverage; that there appeared on some of these labels the name “Good-Grape,” and upon others, in addition to this hyphenated word, the phrase or slogan “Fruit of the Vine”; that prior to June, 1923, respondent furnished to bottlers crowns or bottle eaps bearing the name “Good-Grape”; that since that date it had furnished erowns or caps bearing tho name “Good-Grape” and in addition thereto the phrase “Imitation, artificially colored and flavored” in very small letters, difficult to read; that the bottles used were designed and approved by respondent and had the name “Good-Grape” blown therein, and that, except upon the bottle crowns or caps as indicated, respondent made no reference in its advertising to the fact that tho beverage was an imitation, artificially eoloi'ed and flavored.
*72 These findings are supported by the evidence. The weight to be given to the facts and circumstances as well as the inference to be reasonably drawn therefrom was for the Commission. Fed. Tr. Comm. v. Pac. Paper Ass’n, 273 U. S. 52, 63, 47 S. Ct. 255, 71 L. Ed. 534. The open question is whether the methods and practices of respondent amount to unfair competition to the detriment of a particular and substantial public interest. Fed. Tr. Comm. v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 28, 50 S. Ct. 1, 74 L. Ed. 138; Fed. Tr. Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427, 40 S. Ct. 572, 64 L. Ed. 993; Fed. Tr. Comm. v. Balme, 23 F.(2d) 615, 619 (C. C. A. 2).
This court holds that such methods and practices are unfair to both classes of respondent’s competitors, to wit, those who sell genuine grape juice and those who frankly sell imitations thereof but mark their goods truthfully. They necessarily divert or tend to divert the trade and injure the business of such competitors. Fed. Tr. Comm. v. Winstead Co., 258 U. S. 483, 493, 42 S. Ct. 384, 66 L. Ed. 729; Procter & Gamble Co. v. Fed. Tr. Comm., 11 F.(2d) 47, 48 (C. C. A. 6); Fed. Tr. Comm. v. Balme, supra; Guar. Vet. Co. v. Fed. Tr. Comm., 285 F. 853, 860 (C. C. A. 2); Royal Bak. Powd. Co. v. Fed. Tr. Comm., 281 F. 744, 752 (C. C. A. 2); Fed. Tr. Comm. v. Kay, 35 F.(2d) 160, 162 (C. C. A. 7); Amer. Tob. Co. v. Fed. Tr. Comm., 9 F.(2d) 570, 575 (C. C. A. 2). It serves no worthwhile purpose to elaborate upon these eases. It is enough that they establish the position taken. In this particular the ease presents an aspect entirely different from that shown in Raladam Co. v. Commission (C. C. A.) 42 F.(2d) 430, or in Berkey & Gay Fur. Co. v. Commission (C. C. A.) 42 F.(2d) 427, both decided June 28,1930.
It is equally clear that a substantial public interest is involved. The beverage is sold for human consumption and ordinarily for immediate use, the labeled cap or crown having been first removed. The average purchaser makes for himself only a casual if any examination of the real character of this five-eent drink. About seventy million bottles of it were consumed in each of the years 1923 and 1924.
Respondent insists that the Commission erroneously declined to permit it to show that in the interval between the issuance of the original and the modified order it had adopted a new formula and was using an amount of grape juice substantially greater than that originally used. It is noted that respondent did not reveal to the Commission or to this court the real amount of juice used in the new formula. However, the Commission was authorized to issue the modified order upon the original record (Fed. Tr. Comm. v. Kay, supra), and the allegation that respondent has in the meantime changed its practice did not strip the Commission of this power. Guar. Vet. Co. v. Fed. Tr. Comm., supra; Fox Film Corp. v. Fed. Tr. Comm., 296 F. 353, 357 (C. C. A. 2); Moir v. Fed. Tr. Comm., 12 F.(2d) 22, 27 (C. C. A. 1); Ark. Wholesale Groc. Ass’n v. Fed. Tr. Comm., 18 F.(2d) 866, 871 (C. C. A. 8). It was not compelled to assume that respondent had for all time ceased its original methods.
Respondent’s brief complains that the witnesses before the examiner were excluded during the hearing, that one Sale, a chemist in the Department of Agriculture, and a witness for the Commission, violated this rule by reading a portion of the testimony of another witness, and that Sale’s testimony should therefore be excluded. Whether Sale knew of the rule and violated it willfully is not shown. However, the weight of authority is that the acceptance or exclusion of such testimony is a matter of discretion. Respondent did not bring the action of the examiner to the attention of the Commission or seek a review of it here in the manner provided.
Upon the whole we conclude that the prayer of the petition should be granted, but not to the broad extent of the modified order.
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45 F.2d 70, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-trade-commission-v-good-grape-co-ca6-1930.