Federal Trade Commission v. ACRO Services LLC

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedNovember 21, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-00895
StatusUnknown

This text of Federal Trade Commission v. ACRO Services LLC (Federal Trade Commission v. ACRO Services LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Trade Commission v. ACRO Services LLC, (M.D. Tenn. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 3:22-cv-00895 v. ) ) JUDGE RICHARDSON ACRO SERVICES LLC, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

OPINION AND ORDER Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order with Asset Freeze, Appointment of Receiver, Other Equitable Relief, and an Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue (Doc. No. 4, “Motion”). In the Motion, Plaintiff requests several forms of extraordinary relief against three individual defendants—Sean Austin, John Steven Huffman, and John Preston Thompson (the “Individual Defendants”)—as well as eight legal entities that the Individual Defendants allegedly own and control, namely, ACRO Services LLC, American Consumer Rights Organization, First Call Processing LLC, Music City Ventures, Inc., Nashville Tennessee Ventures, Inc., Reliance Solutions, LLC, Thacker & Associates Int’l LLC, and Consumer Protection Resources, LLC (each an “Entity Defendant,” and collectively, the “Entity Defendants”). The Individual Defendants and Entity Defendants will herein be referred to collectively as “Defendants.” BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have engaged, and continue to engage, in a debt relief scheme whereby Defendants falsely represent to a large number of targeted consumers that Defendants will eliminate or substantially reduce the respective consumers’ credit card debts. Contrary to such representations, according to Plaintiff, Defendants actually do nothing to reduce consumers’ debts. Instead, allegedly Defendants simply charge consumers fees and instruct the respective consumers to stop paying their debts and communicating with credit card companies. The alleged result is that consumers not only pay Defendants for fraudulent services but also wind

up in more debt and with worse credit scores. In the Motion, Plaintiff requests an ex parte temporary restraining order (“TRO”) that, among other things, would (1) prohibit Defendants from operating their debt relief scheme, (2) freeze all of Defendants’ assets, and (3) appoint a receiver to take control of the Entity Defendants. Plaintiff contends that it is necessary for this Court to order this drastic relief on an ex parte basis because of the risk that Defendants will dissipate assets and/or destroy evidence if they learn of the instant civil action before the TRO is in place. In support of the Motion, Plaintiff has filed a Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 16), nineteen declarations (Doc. Nos. 7-1 through 7-19), and a Rule 65(b) Certification and Declaration of Counsel (Doc. No. 6) accompanied by 24 attachments

(Doc. Nos. 6-1 through 6-24). Plaintiff has also submitted a list of three individuals recommended to the Court for appointment as the receiver Plaintiff is requesting. (Doc. No. 8). Plaintiff filed its Complaint and Motion on November 7, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 1, 4). Three days later, on November 10, 2022, the Court held an ex parte hearing on the Motion at which counsel for Plaintiff only were present, and at which the Court questioned Plaintiff’s counsel regarding “Plaintiff’s legal theories, authority and requested relief.” (See Doc. No. 17). At the Court’s request, Plaintiff submitted notices containing additional information about the government’s investigations of Defendants and the scope and basis of Plaintiff’s authority to seek the relief requested in the Motion. (See Doc. Nos. 18, 20, 21, 23). ANALYSIS On November 16, 2022, the Court held an ex parte teleconference with counsel for Plaintiff only, in which the Court announced that it would grant the Motion in part and explained in broad strokes its reasons for doing so. A transcript of that teleconference will appear in the record, and the Court’s reasoning as set forth during the teleconference is fully incorporated herein by

reference. In this Order, the Court will repeat only a high-level summary of the main points addressed in the teleconference, including the information required to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). The Court concludes that all of the relief Plaintiff seeks here—whether sought under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 53(b)), or under Section 19 of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 57b)—is subject to the traditional four-factor test for preliminary injunctive relief1 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Plaintiff argues that its requested preliminary injunctive relief should be evaluated under the more lenient standard prescribed by Section 13(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (“Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission’s likelihood of

ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest, and after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction may be granted without bond”); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 121 F.3d 708 (Table), 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997) (per curiam) (“The FTC need not prove irreparable harm to obtain a preliminary injunction under § 13(b).”). However, the Court concludes that this more lenient standard is inapplicable here because Plaintiff seeks ex parte relief, while the more lenient standard by its terms applies only “after notice to the defendant,” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). In other words, for Plaintiff to obtain the benefit

1 The Court uses the term “preliminary injunctive relief” to describe all relief available under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, including any provisions of a TRO (as sought in this Motion) as well as preliminary injunctions. of Section 13(b)’s easier-to-satisfy standard for preliminary injunctive relief, it would have to first give notice to Defendants.2 Under Rule 65, the Court must consider four factors in determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief: (1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether

issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to the opposing party or others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of the injunction. Doe #11 v. Lee, — F. Supp. 3d—, 2022 WL 2181800, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. June 16, 2022) (citing Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2020)). The undersigned previously has explained the standard as follows: Generally speaking, “district courts weigh the strength of the four factors against one another,” in what is commonly described as a “balancing test.” D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 2019). However, the inquiry is not a pure balancing test because the second factor—irreparable injury absent the injunction—must be present in order for the Court to issue the requested preliminary injunction. Id. at 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven the strongest showing on the other three factors cannot ‘eliminate the irreparable harm requirement.’ That factor is indispensable: If the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable injury, there’s no need to grant relief now as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.”) (quoting Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Mich.

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Federal Trade Commission v. ACRO Services LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-trade-commission-v-acro-services-llc-tnmd-2022.