Federal Trade Commission and State of Connecticut v. Chase Nissan LLC, a limited liability company, also d/b/a Manchester City Nissan, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedMarch 16, 2026
Docket3:24-cv-00012
StatusUnknown

This text of Federal Trade Commission and State of Connecticut v. Chase Nissan LLC, a limited liability company, also d/b/a Manchester City Nissan, et al. (Federal Trade Commission and State of Connecticut v. Chase Nissan LLC, a limited liability company, also d/b/a Manchester City Nissan, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Trade Commission and State of Connecticut v. Chase Nissan LLC, a limited liability company, also d/b/a Manchester City Nissan, et al., (D. Conn. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, : and STATE OF CONNECTICUT, : CIVIL CASE NO. Plaintiff, : 3:24-CV-00012 (JCH) : : v. : : CHASE NISSAN LLC, a limited liability : company, also d/b/a MANCHESTER CITY : NISSAN, et al., : MARCH 16, 2026 Defendants. : RULING ON MOTION TO PRECLUDE TESTIMONY OF DR. JESSICA BROOME (DOC. NO. 196). I. INTRODUCTION Defendants Chase Nissan, LLC d/b/a Manchester City Nissan, Patrick Dibre, Brian Soboh, Michael Hamadi, Matthew Chmielinski, Freddy Mojica, and Aiham Alkhatib (“defendants”), bring this Motion against the plaintiffs Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the State of Connecticut (“State”) (together, “plaintiffs”) to preclude the testimony and opinion of Dr. Jessica Broome, a survey expert. See Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Testimony and Opinions of Dr. Jessica Broome (“Mot. to Preclude”) (Doc. No. 196-1). The plaintiffs oppose the Motion. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Testimony and Opinions of Dr. Jessica Broome (“Pltf’s Opp’n”) (Doc. No. 208). The defendants submitted a reply to further support their Motion. See Reply in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Testimony and Opinions of Dr. Jessica Broome (“Def’s Reply”) (Doc. No. 209). For the reasons stated below, the court denies the Motion to Preclude. II. BACKGROUND The plaintiffs, State and FTC, sued Chase Nissan LLC, d/b/a Manchester City Nissan (“MCN) and multiple individuals, alleging that MCN, along with others, acted together to defraud thousands of consumers. See Pltf’s Opp’n at 2. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants charged consumers for additional products or services (“add-

ons”) that consumers never agreed to purchase. Id. The plaintiffs claim the defendants effected unauthorized charges in multiple ways, including add-ons inserted into unaware consumers’ closing documents or charging consumers for add-ons that MCN told consumers were free. Id. The plaintiffs retained Dr. Jessica Broome to conduct a customer experience survey about add-on products or services offered at MCN (“Broome Survey”). See Mot. to Preclude at 1. The defendants make no challenges to Dr. Broome’s qualifications as an expert on surveys. See Pltf’s Opp’n at 3. Dr. Broome was tasked with examining whether (1) MCN charged customers extra for add-ons that they did not agree to pay extra for; and (2) for those customers who did agree to pay extra for an add-on, whether MCN led those customers to believe they were required to

purchase the add-on. Id. Dr. Broome designed and conducted a Survey directed towards adults who purchased a vehicle and add-ons from MCN between January 1, 2019, and December 31, 2023. See Mot. to Preclude at 2. The Survey was conducted from May 28, 2024, to June 24, 2024. Id. at 5. Potential respondents in the population were contacted by email, phone, or direct mail to complete the Survey online or in a telephone interview. Id. at 6. III. LEGAL STANDARD Expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. Rules of Evid. 702. The District Court acts as a gatekeeper, charged with the task of deciding whether the expert's testimony satisfies Rule 702’s general requirements. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 113 (1993). In defining the gatekeeping role of the District Court, the Second Circuit has distilled Rule 702’s requirements into three broad criteria: (1) qualifications, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance and assistance to the trier of fact. See Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396- 97 (2d Cir. 2005). If an expert meets the threshold requirement of qualification, the court must determine whether the expert's testimony itself is reliable. In Daubert, the Supreme Court identified several factors that may be considered in assessing reliability: (1) whether a theory or technique “can be (and has been) tested,” (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication,” (3) a technique's “known or potential rate of error,” and “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation’” and (4) whether a particular technique or theory has gained “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community.

See Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94 (internal quotations and citations omitted)). These factors, however, do not constitute a “definitive checklist or test.” See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). Instead, the inquiry is a flexible one and must be “tied to the facts of a particular case” with attention to “the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Id. Further, is bears noting that the Second Circuit has endorsed a broad standard of admissibility for expert testimony. See, generally, Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 126 F.4th

109 (2d Cir. 2025). IV. DISCUSSION The defendants argue that the methodology Dr. Broome applied to her survey is significantly flawed, and therefore, the results and conclusions are insufficiently probative. See Mot. to Preclude at 12. Specifically, they argue that (1) the Broome Survey included misleading questions; (2) the Survey disclosed the FTC as the sponsor and the purpose of the survey; (3) that respondents were able to change their previous answers; and (4) that the population selected was underinclusive. Id. at 12-13. A. Question A1 is Clear and Unambiguous First, the defendants argue that Question A1 is misleading and ambiguous and thus the survey is unreliable. See Mot. to Preclude at 12-13. The defendants assert

that this question is a crucial question and, because it is sufficiently ambiguous, it may be a basis for rejecting the survey. Id. at 14. Question A1 states: “Did you agree to pay extra for any of the following add-on products or services when purchasing this vehicle?” See Id. at 15, citing Broome Survey at ¶ 29. Respondents were then presented with a list of eleven possible add-on products and services and, for each, asked to answer “Yes,” “No,” or “Not Sure.” Id. Based upon the responses received to Question A1, Dr. Broome concluded that “Manchester City Nissan charged the vast majority of customers surveyed (88%) for at least one add-on that they did not agree to pay extra for or led customers to believe that the add-on was required rather than optional.” Id. Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
Federal Trade Commission and State of Connecticut v. Chase Nissan LLC, a limited liability company, also d/b/a Manchester City Nissan, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-trade-commission-and-state-of-connecticut-v-chase-nissan-llc-a-ctd-2026.