2020 IL App (2d) 190198 No. 2-19-0198 Opinion filed August 31, 2020 ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ASSOCIATION, ) of Du Page County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 10-CH-5654 ) WILLIE ALTAMIRANO, JOSE MANUEL ) GARCIA-VELAZQUEZ, ERNESTINA ) ALTAMIRANO-CRUZ, ANAYELI ) GONZALEZ, UNITED STATES OF ) AMERICA, UNKNOWN OWNERS, and ) NONRECORD CLAIMANTS, ) ) Defendants ) ) (Jose Manuel Garcia-Velasquez and Ernestina ) Altamira-Cruz, Defendants-Appellants; ) Gaspar Huerta, Rosaura Lopez, and ) Honorable Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., ) James D. Orel, Respondents-Appellees). ) Judge, Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 I. INTRODUCTION 2020 IL App (2d) 190198
¶2 Petitioners, Jose Manuel Garcia-Velazquez and Ernestina Altamirano-Cruz, filed a petition
under section 2-1401 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)), alleging that a
judgment entered against them was void for want of personal jurisdiction. The trial court found
their claim barred by laches. A motion to dismiss this appeal has also been filed, which we ordered
taken with the case. As we explain below, that motion is denied. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
¶3 II. BACKGROUND
¶4 On September 30, 2010, respondent, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), filed a complaint to foreclose a mortgage against Willie Altamirano, Jose Manuel Garcia-
Velazquez, Ernestina Altamirano-Cruz, and Anayeli Gonzalez (also named were the United States,
unknown owners, and nonrecord claimants). The parcel at issue was residential property located
in West Chicago. The summons listed “WILLIE ALTAMIRANO et al” in the caption. Jose
Manuel Garcia-Velazquez, Ernestina Altamirano-Cruz, and Anayeli Gonzalez were identified as
defendants on an attached service list. A process server filed affidavits attesting that all four
defendants were served.
¶5 Defendants failed to appear, and a default judgment was entered on February 7, 2012.
Fannie Mae purchased the property at a judicial sale. On December 26, 2012, Fannie Mae sold the
property to respondents Gaspar Huerta and Rosaura Lopez. The property was mortgaged to
respondent Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS).
¶6 On August 13, 2018, petitioners filed their section 2-1401 petition (id.). In it, they alleged
that the judgment of foreclosure was void, as they were not named in the caption to the summons.
They contend that this technical defect deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction over them.
Huerta, Lopez, and MERS moved to dismiss on numerous grounds, pursuant to section 2-619.1 of
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the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)). The trial court granted the motion,
noting the legislature’s recent amendment to section 2-201(c) of the Civil Practice Law, which
added that “[a] court’s jurisdiction is not affected by a technical error in format of a summons”
(Pub. Act 100-1048, § 5 (eff. Aug. 23, 2018) (adding 735 ILCS 5/2-201(c) (West 2018)) and
further finding petitioners’ claims barred by laches. Petitioners now appeal.
¶7 III. ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, petitioners raise two main issues. First, they contend that the summons was
defective and the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction when it entered the judgment of
foreclosure. Second, they contend that laches does not bar their current action. Before addressing
those issues, we will examine the motion filed by Huerta, Lopez, and MERS to dismiss this appeal.
Because this appeal comes to us following a successful motion to dismiss, our review is de novo.
Schloss v. Jumper, 2014 IL App (4th) 121086, ¶ 15.
¶9 We note that petitioner’s first argument raises a potential constitutional issue. In Arch Bay
Holdings, LLC-Series 2010B v. Perez, 2015 IL App (2d) 141117, ¶ 19, we held that the failure to
name a defendant on the face of a summons deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction. As
noted, the legislature subsequently amended section 2-201 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS
5/2-201 (West 2018)) to state that “[a] court’s jurisdiction is not affected by a technical error in
the format of the summons” (Id. § 2-201(c)). To give the amendment effect in this case, we would
have to read it as abrogating the earlier-decided Arch Bay case and validating the still earlier-
effected service of process. This conflict raises an arguable separation of powers issue. See First
Mortgage Co. v. Dina, 2017 IL App (2d) 170043, ¶ 30 (“ ‘[W]hile the General Assembly can pass
legislation to prospectively change a judicial construction of a statute if it believes that the judicial
interpretation was at odds with legislative intent [citation], it cannot effect a change in that
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construction by a later declaration of what it had originally intended [citation].’ ” (Emphasis in
original and internal quotation marks omitted.) (quoting Hamilton County Telephone Cooperative
v. Maloney, 151 Ill. 2d 227, 233 (1992))). It is axiomatic that we must avoid addressing a
constitutional issue unless it is truly necessary. Id. ¶ 20. As such, we will only address petitioner’s
argument concerning personal jurisdiction if we cannot resolve the case on another basis.
¶ 10 A. MOTION TO DISMISS THIS APPEAL
¶ 11 Huerta, Lopez, and MERS move to dismiss this appeal as moot. They assert that under
sections 13-107.1 and 13-109.1 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/13-107.1, 13-109.1 (West
2018)), they have established adverse possession of the subject parcel, rendering all other issues
moot. Section 13-107.1 provides:
“(a) Actions brought for the recovery of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments of
which any person may be possessed for 2 successive years, having a connected title,
deductible of record, as a purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale, other than a mortgagee,
who takes possession pursuant to a court order under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure
Law, or a purchaser who acquires title from a mortgagee or a purchaser at a judicial
foreclosure sale who received title and took possession pursuant to a court order, shall be
brought within 2 years after possession is taken. When the purchaser acquires title and has
taken possession, the limitation shall begin to run from the date a mortgagee or a purchaser
at a judicial foreclosure sale takes possession pursuant to a court order under the Illinois
Mortgage Foreclosure Law or Article IX of this Code. The vacation or modification,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 2-1401, of an order or judgment entered in the judicial
foreclosure does not affect the limitation in this Section.
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(b) This Section applies to actions filed on or after 180 days after the effective date
of this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly.” Id. § 13-107.1.
Section 13-109.1 states:
“Every person in the actual possession of lands or tenements, under claim and color of title,
as a purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale, other than a mortgagee, who takes possession
pursuant to a court order under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, or a purchaser who
acquires title from a mortgagee or a purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale who received
title and took possession pursuant to such a court order, and who for 2 successive years
continues in possession, and also, during such time, pays all taxes legally assessed on the
lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner of the lands or
tenements, to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title. All persons
holding under such possession, by purchase, legacy, or descent, before such 2 years have
expired, and who continue possession, and continue to pay the taxes as above set forth so
as to complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term above set forth, are entitled
to the benefit of this Section. The vacation or modification, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 2-1401, of an order or judgment entered in the judicial foreclosure does not affect
the limitation in this Section.
This Section applies to actions filed on or after 180 days after the effective date of
this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly.” Id. § 13-109.1.
Note the final sentence of each statute. Both are limited to actions filed at least 180 days after the
effective date of the respective amendments. Both became effective on August 23, 2018. Here, the
initial foreclosure was filed in 2010, well before the effective date of these amendments. Even if
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we were to consider the date petitioners filed their section 2-1401 petition—August 13, 2018—as
the relevant date, it would still predate when the amendments became effective.
¶ 12 Somewhat cryptically, respondents assert that, because a section 2-1401 petition is a
collateral attack on a previously entered judgment, no action for recovery of land has yet been
filed. They then conclude that the “ ‘sunrise’ provisions contained in [s]ections 13-107.1 and 13-
109.1 are inapplicable.” Something has been filed because something is pending before this court.
Moreover, this case has been pending since before the effective date of these amendments, a
fortiori, this action was filed before that date. We would thus have to give this statute retroactive
effect, which would be inappropriate given the legislature’s plain statement regarding when these
provisions became effective. See Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 330 (2006)
(“[I]f the legislature has expressly prescribed the statute’s temporal reach, the expression of
legislative intent must be given effect absent a constitutional prohibition.”).
¶ 13 In sum, we find this argument unpersuasive and deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.
¶ 14 B. LACHES
¶ 15 The primary basis cited by the trial court in dismissing petitioners’ petition was laches.
Laches, an equitable doctrine, “precludes a litigant from asserting a claim when the litigant’s
unreasonable delay in raising the claim has prejudiced the opposing party.” Madigan ex rel.
Department of Healthcare & Family Services v. Yballe, 397 Ill. App. 3d 481, 493 (2009). It “is
grounded in the equitable notion that courts are reluctant to come to the aid of a party who has
knowingly slept on his rights to the detriment of the opposing party.” Tully v. State of Illinois, 143
Ill. 2d 425, 432 (1991).
¶ 16 Laches is an affirmative defense that requires a defending party to establish two elements:
that “the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in bringing its suit” and that “the plaintiff’s delay
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served to prejudice the defendant.” Yballe, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 493. Here, both elements are easily
met. Regarding the first element, all defendants were served and thus had actual knowledge of the
foreclosure proceeding. However, no defendant responded to the complaint. Further, as the trial
court noted, it was not until over eight years since service was accomplished and over six years
since they were evicted from the premises that petitioners first filed their section 2-1401 petition.
Petitioners provide no reasonable explanation for this delay and cannot be said to have been acting
with due diligence. See Osler Institute, Inc. v. Miller, 2015 IL App (1st) 133899, ¶ 25 (holding
two-year delay in filing suit sufficient to show lack of due diligence). Moreover, this delay was
prejudicial to respondents, particularly Lopez and Huerta who purchased and maintained the
subject property in reliance on the completed foreclosure. Accordingly, both elements of laches
are met.
¶ 17 Petitioners contend that laches does not apply for several reasons. First, they contend that
the doctrine does not apply when a void judgment is involved. They assert that a judgment entered
without personal jurisdiction is void. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311,
¶ 45. They contend that the judgment at issue here is void because the summons issued in this case
did not properly name all defendants. See Ohio Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Inter-Insurance
Exchange of the Illinois Automobile Club, 367 Ill. 44, 56 (1937). We will assume that these
assertions are correct for the sake of resolving this argument.
¶ 18 Petitioners begin by pointing to the well-known principle that, “[u]nder Illinois law, a party
may challenge a judgment as being void at any time, either directly or collaterally, and the
challenge is not subject to forfeiture or other procedural restraints.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 15. Moreover, petitioners note, equity must
follow the law. See Adams v. Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau, 2016 IL App (3d) 150418,
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¶ 18. Nevertheless, recent cases from this district have recognized the possibility that a party’s lack
of diligence could deprive them of the ability to raise the issue of whether a judgment is void. In
West Suburban Bank v. Advantage Financial Partners, LLC, 2014 IL App (2d) 131146, ¶ 26
(collecting cases), this court observed, “[I]n some circumstances, laches have been held to
interpose a limit on when a void judgment may be collaterally attacked.” More recently, we stated,
“Although we do not determine if laches applies to this case [involving a void judgment], we agree
with the court in West Suburban that laches can preclude relief in an appropriate case where
prejudice is demonstrated.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Robinson, 2020 IL App (2d) 190275,
¶ 30. There is a historical precedent for this proposition.
¶ 19 For example, in Koberlein v. First National Bank of St. Elmo, 376 Ill. 450, 456-57 (1941),
our supreme court found that a void-judgment claim was barred by laches. Similarly, in James v.
Frantz, 21 Ill. 2d 377, 383 (1961), the court explained:
“The appellees attempt to meet the charge of laches by asserting that a void decree
may be attacked collaterally at any time, without regard to laches. They rely upon the
statements in [Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 369 Ill. 334, 339 (1938), and Ward v.
Sampson, 395 Ill. 353, 359 (1946)], that ‘a void judgment or order may be vacated at any
time and the doctrines of laches and estoppel do not apply.’ These statements are far too
sweeping, however, for laches is a familiar defense when the validity of an earlier judgment
or decree has been attacked in equity.”
More recently, the First District noted that “ ‘Illinois cases recognize that even if service of process
is defective an attack on a decree may be barred by laches. [Citation.] It is a [sic] basic to the
laches doctrine that a complainant may be barred when, after ascertaining the facts, he fails
promptly to seek redress.’ ” In re Jamari R., 2017 IL App (1st) 160850, ¶ 55 (quoting Rodriguez
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v. Koschny, 57 Ill. App. 3d 355, 361-62 (1978)). The principle that laches may bar a collateral
attack on a void judgment is far from novel. See Eckberg v. Benso, 182 Ill. App. 3d 126, 131
(1989) (“Illinois courts have applied [laches] to bar claims that a decree is void for defective
service of process despite contrary arguments that such a jurisdictional claim may be brought at
any time.”); Miller v. Bloomberg, 60 Ill. App. 3d 362, 365 (1978) (holding that “the two-year
period provided in Section 72 for bringing the action is not applicable where relief is sought from
a void decree, although the equitable defense of laches may be interposed”). Thus, the mere fact
that petitioners contend that the underlying judgment is void does not render laches inapplicable.
¶ 20 Petitioners attempt to avoid this result in several ways. First, they point to Warren County
Soil & Water Conservation District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, which they assert held that
equitable considerations are inapplicable to a section 2-1401 petition that raises only legal issues.
Petitioners are reading this case far too broadly. At issue in Warren County was whether the trial
court could relax due diligence standards in light of equitable considerations. Id. ¶ 22. The supreme
court ultimately held that equitable considerations were relevant to a fact-based section 2-1401
petition but not to one that raises a solely legal challenge to a judgment. Id. ¶¶ 49-51. Here,
petitioners reason, their voidness challenge is purely legal (see id. ¶ 48), so equitable
considerations should not apply and the defense of laches should not be available to respondents.
Thus, petitioners are attempting to extend the holding of Warren County from its original
circumstances—whether a trial court may consider equitable matters in assessing due diligence—
to the ability of a respondent to assert an affirmative defense.
¶ 21 We do not believe that these two situations are sufficiently analogous such that Warren
County controls here. Laches is an affirmative defense. Bill v. Board of Education of Cicero School
District 99, 351 Ill. App. 3d 47, 54 (2004). Due diligence, conversely, is something a petitioner
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must show to prevail on a section 2-1401 petition. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21
(1986). Thus, unlike due diligence, laches is not raised by the petition at all. Indeed, an affirmative
defense admits the sufficiency of the petition and asserts new matter to defeat the cause of action.
Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n v. Neumann, 2015 IL App (3d) 140026, ¶ 16. Thus, in
resolving a laches issue, the merits of the 2-1401 petition are not a consideration. Therefore,
whether the trial court can consider equitable matters in assessing due diligence—the issue
addressed in Warren County—is beside the point. Further, it does not automatically follow that
equitable defenses are precluded simply because equitable considerations are not relevant to
assessing the elements of section 2-1401 petition that raises a legal challenge. Petitioners do not
attempt to address this relationship. Petitioners’ reliance on Warren County is misplaced. It is not
petitioners’ 2-1401 petition that invokes the equitable powers of the trial court; rather, it is
respondents’ assertion of an equitable defense. This, in turn, renders Warren County consistent
with the extensive caselaw cited above that holds that laches may be interposed to a claim that a
judgment is void.
¶ 22 Petitioners also attempt to distinguish cases on which the trial court relied. Regarding
James, 21 Ill. 2d at 383, petitioners point out that the court stated that “laches is a familiar defense
when the validity of an earlier judgment or decree has been attacked in equity.” (Emphasis added.)
However, James was issued “[p]rior to the adoption of the judicial article of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970, [when] there was a distinction between courts of law and equity as to
jurisdiction to hear matters.” Metrobank v. Cannatello, 2012 IL App (1st) 110529, ¶ 19. Hence,
this distinction carries little force today. See Lashever v. Zion-Benton Township High School, 2014
IL App (2d) 130947, ¶ 8 (“[T]he relaxation of the traditional rule limiting laches to actions based
in equity militates against the formalistic approach that plaintiff advocates.”); Valdovinos v.
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Tomita, 394 Ill. App. 3d 14, 18 (2009) (“[L]aches is now routinely applied in lawsuits
simultaneously seeking both legal and equitable remedies.”). Further, petitioners note, James
involved oil and mineral rights, and the James court stated, “ ‘there is no class of property in which
laches is more relentlessly enforced’ than with respect to oil and mining property.” James, 21 Ill.
2d at 382 (quoting Pyle v. Ferrell, 12 Ill. 2d 547, 553 (1958)). Assuming this proposition remains
valid today, it simply addresses the magnitude of the interest at stake. Here, at issue is the interest
of subsequent-purchasers Huerta and Lopez in their home, which is a significant interest as well.
Cf. GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Arrigo, 2014 IL App (2d) 130938, ¶ 15 (noting purpose of homestead
exception is to insure family’s possession of house). Petitioners also point out that in James, a
witness had died in the interim; however, that merely helped establish prejudice, and we do not
read the case as holding that prejudice cannot be established in any other way. As such, we find
unpersuasive petitioners’ attempts to distinguish James.
¶ 23 Petitioners also attempt to distinguish Jamari R., 2017 IL App (1st) 160850. They note that
it involved child custody and adoption while this case does not. Initially, we note that while the
interest at stake in Jamari R. was undoubtedly substantial, it does not mean that Huerta and Lopez’s
interest in their home is insignificant. More importantly, we read nothing in Jamari R. to suggest
that laches does not apply outside the realm of child custody or adoption. Thus, petitioners’ attempt
to distinguish Jamari R. fails.
¶ 24 Petitioners argue that respondents cannot show a lack of diligence on their part, because a
void judgment can be attacked at any time. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 15. However,
“depending on the facts in question, the doctrine of laches may apply ‘although the time fixed by
the statute of limitations has not expired.’ ” Tolbert v. Godinez, 2020 IL App (4th) 180587, ¶ 24
(quoting Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 270 (2001)). Thus, the mere
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fact that time remains for a party to bring a cause of action is not fatal to the other party asserting
a defense of laches. Petitioners further assert that Fannie Mae cannot show prejudice; however,
they ignore the prejudice accruing to Huerta and Lopez. Moreover, Fannie Mae points out that “it
would be required to reopen a foreclosure action completed over seven years ago.” Fannie Mae
asserts that this would make it difficult for it to calculate amounts due and produce records to
support its claim. Petitioners assert that the original trial record would contain all Fannie Mae
needed to prosecute the action. However, as petitioners did not resist the initial foreclosure, it is
unlikely the record contains more than the bare minimum necessary to secure a default judgment.
In any event, as noted, the prejudice to Huerta and Lopez is undisputed.
¶ 25 Petitioners also contend that “equitable considerations cannot make a void judgment
effective.” That is not what is happening here. It has been observed that “[l]aches is a species of
estoppel.” Martin v. Consultants & Administrators, Inc., 966 F.2d 1078, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992).
Thus, here, petitioners are being estopped from asserting the invalidity of the judgment by their
lack of diligence and the prejudice it caused. Given that they sat on their rights, petitioners are not
a proper party to attack the earlier judgment. There are, after all, limitations on how a void
judgment may be attacked. For example, even where a judgment has been entered by a court
lacking subject matter jurisdiction, it may not be attacked unless it is part of a case properly before
the court where relief is sought. EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419, ¶ 15. Similarly,
here, only a proper party can raise a voidness challenge. As we have explained, petitioners, being
estopped, are not proper parties.
¶ 26 Petitioners cite the equitable maxim that equity must follow the law. First American Title
Insurance Co. v. TCF Bank, F.A., 286 Ill. App. 3d 268, 276 (1997). They argue, “When the rights
of parties are defined and established by law, a court of equity, without jurisdiction over the
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parties, has no power to change or unsettle those rights or situation which are defined and fixed
by existing legal principles.” (Emphasis in original.) However, laches presents a threshold issue
regarding whether petitioners are entitled to proceed with this action. It is an affirmative defense
unrelated to the merits of the suit. See Tully, 143 Ill. 2d at 432. Hence, we have simply determined
that petitioners are not entitled to maintain this action; we have not addressed the underlying
dispute or somehow altered the law in light of equitable considerations.
¶ 27 Before closing, we note petitioners’ reliance on Arch Bay Holdings, 2015 IL App (2d)
141117. In that case, the petitioner, like petitioners here, sought relief from a judgment entered
against her in a foreclosure action due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The petitioner was not
named on the face of the summons but appeared on the service list. The Arch Bay court held that
this deficiency deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and rendered the judgment against her void.
Id. ¶ 19. However, in Arch Bay, the petitioner sought relief less than six months after the judicial
sale and less than a year after the entry of the default judgment against her. Respondents did not
interpose the defense of laches. In this case, petitioners waited for over six years after they were
defaulted to file their section 2-1401 petition. Indeed, by the time they filed the petition, Huerta
and Lopez had owned the home for five years. Moreover, the defense of laches has been invoked
here. Thus, Arch Bay is distinguishable.
¶ 28 In short, we hold that petitioners’ claim is barred by laches regardless of whether the trial
court’s judgment was void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioners.
¶ 29 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
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No. 2-19-0198
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 10-CH- 5654; the Hon. James D. Orel, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Joseph Cho, of JSC Law, of Des Plaines, for appellants. for Appellant:
Attorneys Ralph T. Wutscher, Coleman J. Braun, and Jeffrey T. Karek, of for Maurice Wutscher LLP, of Chicago, for appellee Federal National Appellee: Mortgage Ass’n.
Nathan B. Grzegorek and James A. Larson, of Plunkett Cooney, P.C., of Chicago, for other appellees.
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