Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Robertson

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Robertson

187 S.E. 575, 210 N.C. 436, 1936 N.C. LEXIS 119

Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided September 23, 1936·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

Notwithstanding the trustee’s deed recites a bid of $5.00, it is competent to show by parol, or otherwise, the real consideration or the true terms of the bid. Pate v. Gaitley, 183 N. C., 262, 111 S. E., 339. For this purpose, the report of the trustee (if, indeed, any were made), whether required to be filed by law or not, is competent as evidence, as the trustee was a party to the transaction. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that when a party to a transaction makes a statement as to its terms, orally or in writing, the declaration may be offered in evidence either to corroborate or to impeach his testimony. Stott v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 205 N. C., 521, 171 S. E., 858; Anderson v. Nichols, 187 N. C., 808, 123 S. E., 86; Allred v. Kirkman, 160 N. C., 392, 76 S. E., 244. On the other hand, such report is not sacrosanct. It is subject to explanation, correction, or rebuttal, by other competent evidence. Braddy v. Pfaff, ante, 248; Bean v. Bean, 135 N. C., 92, 47 S. E., 232; Allen v. Royster, 107 N. C., 278, 12 S. E., 134; Turner v. Turner, 104 N. C., 566, 10 S. E., 606. Nor would such attack upon said report be regarded as collateral in the present proceeding. Oliver v. Hood, Comr., 209 N. C., 291, 183 S. E., 657. The remark in Bank v. Stewart, 208 N. C., 139, 179 S. E., 463, relied upon by plaintiff, was in reference to the sale and not to the report. It was error, therefore, to exclude appellant’s proffered testimony in regard to the terms of the bid, especially as plaintiff had offered parol evidence to the same point.

In this view of the matter, the principal question debated on argument and brief, i.e., whether the doctrine of Baber v. Hanie, 163 N. C., 588, *439 80 S. E., 57, is controlling or applicable, becomes presently unnecessary to decide. Upon a full disclosure of the evidence, the facts may appear otherwise. The following citations, however, may be of interest on the second hearing: Annotation, 12 A. L. R., 1528; "Wiltsie on Mortgage Foreclosures (4th Ed.), sec. 246; Decennial Digest (Mortgages), Key No. 282 (2).

For the error, as indicated, in excluding appellant’s proffered testimony, a new trial must be awarded. It is so ordered.

New trial.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Stacy, C. J.

Notwithstanding the trustee’s deed recites a bid of $5.00, it is competent to show by parol, or otherwise, the real consideration or the true terms of the bid. Pate v. Gaitley, 183 N. C., 262, 111 S. E., 339. For this purpose, the report of the trustee (if, indeed, any were made), whether required to be filed by law or not, is competent as evidence, as the trustee was a party to the transaction. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that when a party to a transaction makes a statement as to its terms, orally or in writing, the declaration may be offered in evidence either to corroborate or to impeach his testimony. Stott v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 205 N. C., 521, 171 S. E., 858; Anderson v. Nichols, 187 N. C., 808, 123 S. E., 86; Allred v. Kirkman, 160 N. C., 392, 76 S. E., 244. On the other hand, such report is not sacrosanct. It is subject to explanation, correction, or rebuttal, by other competent evidence. Braddy v. Pfaff, ante, 248; Bean v. Bean, 135 N. C., 92, 47 S. E., 232; Allen v. Royster, 107 N. C., 278, 12 S. E., 134; Turner v. Turner, 104 N. C., 566, 10 S. E., 606. Nor would such attack upon said report be regarded as collateral in the present proceeding. Oliver v. Hood, Comr., 209 N. C., 291, 183 S. E., 657. The remark in Bank v. Stewart, 208 N. C., 139, 179 S. E., 463, relied upon by plaintiff, was in reference to the sale and not to the report. It was error, therefore, to exclude appellant’s proffered testimony in regard to the terms of the bid, especially as plaintiff had offered parol evidence to the same point.

In this view of the matter, the principal question debated on argument and brief, i.e., whether the doctrine of Baber v. Hanie, 163 N. C., 588, *439 80 S. E., 57, is controlling or applicable, becomes presently unnecessary to decide. Upon a full disclosure of the evidence, the facts may appear otherwise. The following citations, however, may be of interest on the second hearing: Annotation, 12 A. L. R., 1528; "Wiltsie on Mortgage Foreclosures (4th Ed.), sec. 246; Decennial Digest (Mortgages), Key No. 282 (2).

For the error, as indicated, in excluding appellant’s proffered testimony, a new trial must be awarded. It is so ordered.

New trial.

Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Robertson, 187 S.E. 575, 210 N.C. 436, 1936 N.C. LEXIS 119 (N.C. 1936).

Pincite

187 S.E. 575 (Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Robertson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

Related