Federal Electric Corp. v. Dunlop

419 F. Supp. 221, 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 996
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedMarch 30, 1976
DocketCiv. A. 74-320-Orl-Civ-Y
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 419 F. Supp. 221 (Federal Electric Corp. v. Dunlop) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 419 F. Supp. 221, 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 996 (M.D. Fla. 1976).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GEORGE C. YOUNG, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff in this action, Federal Electric Corporation (FEC) brought this suit for declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 to obtain review of certain final actions taken by defendants as representatives of the Department of Labor pursuant to the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (hereinafter the “Act”). Jurisdiction of this action is vested in this Court under §§ 702, 704 of Title 5, United States Code.

At the trial, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of case or controversy as to two of the issues involved (Order of August 28, 1975). As a result, a single issue remained for this Court’s decision. The parties agreed that that issue could be decided on the basis of stipulations and memoranda, and they have submitted these for the Court’s consideration. These factual stipulations are hereby incorporated by reference and are attached as Appendix “A”.

The sole remaining issue is whether employees of FEC who fit within ten specific job classifications are “service employees” as defined in the Act. The job classifications involved are all related to computer operations: (1) keypunch operator; (2) senior keypunch operator; (3) technical clerk; (4) senior technical clerk; (5) control specialist; (6) production specialist; (7) auxiliary equipment operator; (8) junior computer operator; (9) intermediate computer operator; and (10) senior computer operator.

The parties have also stipulated that each of the above ten classifications would be classified as a “general schedule” occupation in the federal civil service and would be covered under the Classification Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. None of these classifications would be covered as a “blue collar” or “wage board” occupation in the federal service. Further stipulations detail the exact white collar “GS” classifications of the jobs, the duties and requisite knowledge and abilities involved in each.

I. SCOPE OF REVIEW: The issues here presented is whether the Secretary of Labor correctly determined that the job classifications which are the subject of this suit come within the purview of the Service Contract Act. The determination of the Secretary as to the applicability of the Act to specific classifications must be upheld by this Court “if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.” NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill, 131, 64 S.Ct. 851, 861, 88 L.Ed. 1170, 1185 (1944).

II. APPLICABILITY OF THE ACT: The Act applies to “every contract . entered into by the United States . in excess of $2,500, except as provided in section 356 of this title . . ., the principal purpose of which is to furnish services in the United States through the use of service employees, as defined herein . . . ” 41 U.S.C. § 351(a).

A “service employee” is specifically defined in § 357(b) to mean:

“ . . . guards, watchmen, and any person engaged in a recognized trade or craft, or other skilled mechanical craft, or in unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled manual labor occupation; and any other employee including a foreman or supervisor in a position having trade, craft, or laboring experience as the paramount requirement; and shall include all such persons regardless of any contractual relationship that may be alleged to exist between a contractor or subcontractor and such persons.”

The essence of plaintiff’s contentions is that the Act was never intended to cover persons providing services who fell within the traditional “white collar” classifications as set forth in the Classification Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. Plaintiff contends that the intent of the Act was to include only “blue collar” or “wage board” employees (with the exception of “guards” and *224 “watchmen”, which were not excluded from the coverage of the Classification Act, but which were specifically included in the coverage of the Service Contract Act, § 357(b)). As indicative of the Congressional intent, plaintiff points to (1) the marked similarities between the exclusions from the Classification Act in 5 U.S.C. § 5102(c)(7) and the inclusions in the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 357(b); (2) the Department of Labor’s own statement, contained in 29 C.F.R. § 4.113(b), regarding the extent of the Service Contract Act’s coverage; * (3) the Report on the Service Contract Act issued by the House Education and Labor Committee on September 1, 1965 (H.Rep.No.948) and adopted by the Senate’s Labor and Public Welfare Committee on September 30, 1965 (S.Rep.No.798), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1965, p. 3737; ** and (4) statements of then Solicitor of Labor Donahue before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House of Representatives on August 5, 1965. *** Plaintiff relies additionally on Descomp v. Sampson, 377 F.Supp. 254 (D.C. Del.1974), which is the only case known to this Court to have considered the same issue and which case fully supports plaintiff’s contentions.

Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the statutory definition of “service employee” given in 41 U.S.C. § 357(b), when the words of the statute are given their “ordinary” meaning, would include the job classifications here in issue. Defendants further rely on what they perceive to be the all-inclusive character of § 357(b)’s language:

“ . . . any person engaged in a recognized trade or craft, or other skilled mechanical craft, or in unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled manual labor occupations; and any other employee including a foreman or supervisor in a position having trade, craft, or laboring experience as the paramount requirement; and shall include all such persons regardless of any contractual relationship that may be alleged to exist between a contractor or subcontractor and such persons.” (emphasis supplied).

Defendants urge that the only exceptions to the Act are found in § 356 or as are authorized under the power given to the Secretary under § 353(b) to approve certain variances not in issue here.

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419 F. Supp. 221, 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 996, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-electric-corp-v-dunlop-flmd-1976.