Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.

41 F.R.D. 531, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 865, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7964
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJanuary 18, 1967
DocketNo. 4-65-Civ. 392
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 41 F.R.D. 531 (Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 41 F.R.D. 531, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 865, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7964 (mnd 1967).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

LARSON, District Judge.

Defendant seeks an Order sustaining objections to portions of plaintiff’s “Supplementing First Set Interrogatories [532]*532Nos. 72 and 73.” Plaintiff instituted this action seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant’s Holmes ’124 and Holmes ’125 patents are invalid. Other counts of the complaint are grounded on violations of the antitrust laws and unfair competition, but they are not immediately relevant to the challenged interrogatories. Defendant’s counterclaim alleges infringement of both the Holmes ’124 and ’125 patents, as well as of its De Caro and Laloux patents. All relate to shotgun shells.

The interrogatories in question seek answers with respect to accompanying models of shotgun shells manufactured by plaintiff, designated as PIX 1 — PIX 6. Question 1 asks defendant to state what claims of the Holmes ’124 patent it contends plaintiff has infringed by each of the six structures. Questions 2, 3, and 4 ask for the same information concerning the Holmes ’125, Laloux and De Caro patents, respectively. Question 5 asks for further specification of plaintiff’s acts which infringe the four patents in suit. Question 6 asks for identification of other patents owned, licensed to, or controlled by defendant which are infringed by the six structures. Defendant has answered all six questions for PIX 1 and PIX 2, which the parties indicate are the accused devices referred to in the pleadings. Defendant objects to the interrogatories as they relate to PIX 3 — 6, contending these are hypothetical structures with questionable relevancy to the instant litigation. Further, defendant maintains the interrogatories are burdensome, requiring time consuming and expensive research before answers can be formulated. Defendant also claims that since PIX 3 — 6 are handmade, test results would be inconclusive and, therefore, it would be prejudiced by having to state whether they infringe on the basis of such test results. In addition, defendant argues that the interrogatories improperly require expression of a legal opinion. The Court concludes that questions 1 through 5 must be answered for PIX 3 — 6, but that question 6 need not be answered.

Relevancy• — -Interrogatories under Rule 33 “may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Under the latter, inquiry is permissible as to any matter “which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” The present action revolves around four patents and two accused devices. Question 6 brings up completely new subject matter, relating neither to the accused devices nor the patents in suit. While mindful that plaintiff might amend the complaint to raise issues with respect to other patents owned by defendant, the Court is of the view that question 6 need not be answered. Interrogatoi-ies are designed to provide a party with information enabling him to prepare his case, eliminating surprises at the time of trial. Failure to obtain the information requested in question 6 does not hamper plaintiff’s trial preparation, and it cannot be surprised by additional patents at the time of trial since they are not germane to the present suit. Discovery also serves to narrow issues by pinpointing areas where no substantial dispute exists. Question 6, however, attempts to determine whether a separate area of controversy exists. Relying on Salem Engineering Co. v. National Supply Co., 75 F.Supp. 993 (W.D.Pa.1948) ; General Electric Co. v. Refrigeration Patents Corp., 65 F.Supp. 75 (W.D.N.Y.1946), and White v. E. L. Bruce Co., 62 F.Supp. 577 (D.Del.1945), plaintiff contends that a patentee cannot “refuse to show his hand,” but can be compelled to set forth his position on infringement. These cases do not relate to discovery, but rather to the declaratory judgment procedure. In the White case the Court refused to allow a patentee-defendant to withdraw a patent from suit after it had been raised by counterclaim in a declaratory judgment action, stating that an actual controversy existed between the parties and the matter should be ad[533]*533judicated. General Electric ruled that a declaratory judgment suit was proper even though the plaintiff had not yet manufactured the product in question. The Court noted that the plaintiff had been notified of possible infringement and should not be required to begin manufacturing at his peril. In Salem, the Court said:

“[I]f a manufacturer fears that he will be charged to infringe, he can always inquire of the patentee, and if the answer is unsatisfactory, he can bring an action for a declaratory judgment. The time has now passed when a patentee may sit by and refuse to show his hand.” 75 F.Supp. at 1000.

This course is still open to plaintiff here for the additional patents. The discovery process is not appropriate in this instance as a means of compelling the patentee to show its hand for patents not in suit with respect to structures not yet in controversy.

The objectionable portions of •questions 1 — 5 seek information about nonaccused devices. But they are distinct from question 6 in that they relate to patents in issue. Information about the new structures at this stage in the litigation assists plaintiff’s trial preparation, and also gives defendant more ■advance notice than the patentee received in Kalamazoo Loose-Leaf Binder Co. v. Proudfit Loose-Leaf Co., 243 F. 895 (6th Cir. 1917). During accounting proceedings in that ease defendant-infringer presented a modified structure to the ■Court, seeking a determination of whether it also infringed the patent. Although plaintiff patentee objected to this procedure, it was approved by the Sixth Circuit, which stated:

“There is no inherent injustice to a plaintiff in allowing a defendant to submit to the court his proposed non-infringing structure, rather than to submit himself to civil and even criminal action for contempt, as well as ■action for infringement. Plaintiff’s right to elect whether or not to proceed against an infringer is not invaded by the exercise of a jurisdiction which it has already invoked.” 243 F. at 900.

Certainly it seems preferable that PIX 3 — 6 be brought in at the discovery state rather than during an accounting. Further, these structures assume relevancy in view of defendant’s acknowledgment that if its patents are found valid and infringed, damages could be claimed at the accounting stage for all infringing sales by plaintiff. Because the new devices are being manufactured by plaintiff, questions 1 — 5 have even greater relevancy in this case than the interrogatory sustained in Harvey v. Levine, 25 F.R.D. 15 (N.D.Ohio 1960), in which the Court required the patentee to state whether a device manufactured by a third party was charged with infringement. Lee v. Electric Products Co., 37 F.R.D. 42 (N.D.Ohio 1963) is also analogous. Interrogatories sustained by that ease described various devices and inquired whether they constituted an infringement of the subject patent. Being germane to the subject matter of the action, interrogatories 1 — 5 must be answered unless it can be said that the burden imposed on defendant outweighs the usefulness of the information.

Burden — In 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, Par. 33.21, p.

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41 F.R.D. 531, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 865, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7964, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/federal-cartridge-corp-v-olin-mathieson-chemical-corp-mnd-1967.