Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.

7 F.R.D. 318, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1663
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJuly 14, 1947
DocketCiv. A. No. 891
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 7 F.R.D. 318 (Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 318, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1663 (D. Del. 1947).

Opinion

RODNEY, District Judge.

This case involves the determination of objections to interrogatories. The plaintiff has asked each of the defendants to answer 46 interrogatories, some of which contain subdivisions. Each of the defendants has filed the same objections to 24 of the interrogatories, and the objections may be assigned to three general groups:

1. Irrelevance is assigned as objection to all 24 of said interrogatories.

2. Objection is made to 18 interrogatories on the ground of the unreasonable burden of research placed upon the de[320]*320fendants in the compilation of statistics, data and information.

3. Objection is made to three of the interrogatories in that they call for conclusions and opinions rather than relevant facts.

Before considering these general questions as connected with the present interrogatories, a brief word about Hickman v. Taylor1 may not be amiss since that case is discussed by both parties. The cited case did have a very distinct bearing upon the general subject of interrogatories. While that case dealt primarily with matters involving an attorney-client relationship, yet expressly or implicitly, it laid down standards applicable in general to discovery process, including interrogatories. It did hold that “mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation” and “either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.” While Hickman v. Taylor solved many problems concerning interrogatories, there is no indication that it solved the problems here present. It did not attempt to make irrelevant and immaterial matters proper subjects of interrogatories. It expressly recognized that discovery has ultimate and necessary boundaries and that these boundaries are reached when they result in oppression of the opposite party. There is no indicaton that Hickman v. Taylor intended in any way to change the preexisting rule of' law that it is the ascertainment of facts that is the object of discovery proceedings as contrasted with opinions, conclusions or contentions.

1. As stated, the defendants have objected to 24 of the interrogatories on the ground of their claimed irrelevance. The plaintiff insists upon such relevance. All of the interrogatories may be considered together because the objection lies to all and grows out of the concept of the subject matter as covered by the complaint. The defendants contend that the basic controversy was simply as to whether or not the defendants had conspired to deny to the plaintiff’s theatre, the Broadway Theatre in Denver, motion picture films on a “move-over run” from the Orpheum Theatre in Denver upon the same terms as those enjoyed by the plaintiff’s predecessor as lessee of the Broadway Theatre. The plaintiff denies that the issue is so narrow and asserts that the issue is whether or not the defendants and others have conspired to monopolize the exhibition of all desirable motion pictures in the United States by the elimination of independent exhibitors. As a part of this alleged nation-wide conspiracy and of the alleged violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note, and Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. A. § 12 et seq., and as evidence of such actions, the plaintiff alleges the particular action against the plaintiff and its theatre in the City of Denver.

From a careful reading of the complaint and a consideration of questions therein raised, I think the interrogatories are not subject to the general charge of irrelevancy and, if otherwise unobjectionable, should be answered.

Five of the interrogatories, however (Nos. 19, 20, 22, 23 and 43), are subject to an additional alleged taint of irrelevancy in that they seek information after the filing of the complaint as well as before that time. It is generally held that relevancy to the issue requires that the interrogatories be confined to a period ending with the commencement of the suit. To this effect is McInerney v. Wm. P. McDonald Construction Co., D.C., 28 F.Supp. 557; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Harrisburg Trust Co., D.C., 2 F.R.D. 197.

The plaintiff contends that since damages, if authorized, may be collected to the date of judgment, so under familiar principles incorporated in the Federal Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, disclosure may be compelled for the period subsequent to the filing of the complaint.

The cause of action or the right to recover must be determined as of the time of the institution of the suit. If this right to recover be eventually sustained then evidence of -matters happening subsequent to the institution of the suit may, perhaps, become material as to the question of [321]*321extent of damages or other relief, but until that time comes and the right to recover or to relief be established, information to be required on interrogatories will be confined to the period prior to the institution of the suit. For this may be cited Ball v. Paramount Pictures, D.C., 4 F.R.D. 194, which differs from this case in the extent of the claimed conspiracy, it being limited in that case to the particular theatre involved.

2. Eighteen of the interrogatories (Nos. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 30, 32, 33, 34 & 35) are objected to on the general ground that they impose an undue burden upon the. defendants, compelling them to analyse and to tabulate for the plaintiff a large mass of data and statistics. To this objection some consideration must be given. I adhere to the general rule that an interrogated party need only answer matters of fact within his knowledge and is not required to make research and compilation of data not readily known to him.2

The generality of the rule makes difficult its specific application. The necessity of answering interrogatories where it is necessary to make research and compile data may, preliminarily, be divided into two classes: (a) where the sources of information and data are not in the possession or control of the interrogated party, and (b) where the interrogated party does possess or control such sources. This distinction may be shown by an example. Most of the interrogatories here involved are based upon Interrogatory No. 7 to which no objection was made and which is as follows: “List the name of all theatres within the Denver area to which you have distributed film product since Sept. 1, 1944.”

Interrogatory No. 2-1 is as follows: “List every instance of overbuying in regard to all such theatres to which you have licensed films during the above mentioned period, i. e., any and all instances in which a theatre has bought more product than its current needs would require or justify.”

(a) Now, clearly, the answer to this interrogatory No. 24, if confined to the defendants themselves, must call for the expression of an opinion or a conclusion as to what the current needs of many independent theatres would require or justify. If not calling for this conclusion or opinion of the defendants, then the interrogatory must contemplate the acquisition of knowledge by the defendants from many independent sources. In either event, the answer cannot be required from these defendants.

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Bluebook (online)
7 F.R.D. 318, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cinema-amusements-inc-v-loews-inc-ded-1947.