Fedder v. Component Structures Corp.

329 A.2d 56, 23 Md. App. 375, 1974 Md. App. LEXIS 296
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedNovember 18, 1974
Docket79, September Term, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 329 A.2d 56 (Fedder v. Component Structures Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fedder v. Component Structures Corp., 329 A.2d 56, 23 Md. App. 375, 1974 Md. App. LEXIS 296 (Md. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

*377 Lowe, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Alan and Carol Fedder, appellants, sought to recover damages and to obtain other relief from Component Structures Corporation, Alan Bentley Glass and Craig W. Damon, Charles J. Miller, Inc., and Malcolm E. Hudkins in a suit demanding Ejectment and alleging Violation of Easement and Trespass Quare Clausem Fregit. 1

The issues arose after the Fedders purchased a three acre tract of land on August 1, 1969, improved by a house and a barn, from Stone Haven, Inc. 2 Stone Haven reserved a fifty foot right-of-way across the property to a forty-two acre tract adjacent to the southwest portion of the Fedders’ land. The right-of-way, described by metes and bounds, intersected the public way known as Mineral Hill Road and provided access to the forty-two acre tract. The course it took divided the Fedders’ house from their barn. 3

The non-use of the right-of-way for the next two years apparently obscured its existence for appellants until Stone Haven, Inc. sold the undeveloped forty-two acres to Component Structures Corporation. In May of 1971 Component commenced the improvement of the right-of-way to conform to the specifications required by Carroll County for roads to be dedicated to the County.

The right-of-way, now known as Snowden’s Run Road, was originally laid out and later designated by stakes by *378 Malcolm E. Hudkins who was brought into the suit by Component under a third party claim. The perimeters of the right-of-way were marked for Charles Miller, Inc., a road construction contractor, whom Component had hired to improve the right-of-way to County specifications.

As the construction proceeded the road equipment severed electric lines, sewer lines and waterlines which had been established under the right-of-way. The record does not disclose whether those lines were installed before or after the creation of the easement. In addition, the grading substantially altered the land elevation between the house and barns, and consequently, the course of surface water flow.

The trial was bifurcated by stipulation. On November 15, 1972 the three issues upon which the parties had agreed were decided against the appellants by Judge Edward O. Weant. The issues thus resolved were:

1. Is Snowden’s Run Road laid out in the right place on the property? The court decided it was.
2. Did the Defendants wrongfully regrade and change the elevation on said land within the right-of-way area? The court decided they did not.
3. Did the Defendants wrongfully convert a private easement to a public road? Again the court decided they did not.

One year later the second phase of the case was tried in the Circuit Court for Carroll County. Again Judge Weant presided, but on this occasion he presided over a jury. Prior to presentation of evidence, appellants prepared to amend their declaration to allege negligence in addition to the trespass count which alone remained after the preliminary decisions on the issues. The court denied that motion.

Appellants contend first, that the change of grade resulting from road construction was itself a violation of the easement; second, that Component was not entitled to *379 dedicate the road to Carroll County; third, and we feel most significantly, that the trial judge erred when he refused to permit evidence of any damage off the right-of-way if caused by appellees while working on the right-of-way. As their final contention, appellants assert that the court’s denial of their motion to amend the declaration was an abuse of discretion.

To reach the key issue, we need first dispose of the assertion that the construction was in violation of the easement. Appellants argue that the easement was restricted to ingress and egress over the prescribed area, with no improvement rights. In support of this position, they point out that the language in the deed simply reserved a “right-of-way” without mention of its extent or use. Because contractual provisions for improvement rights were not reiterated, appellants would limit us to the words of the deed to determine the parties’ intent and purpose.

While we agree that an easement acquired by an express grant depends for most part on the construction of the deed conveying it, where its purpose, use and extent are not readily discernible from that document, courts must give effect to the intention of the parties at the time the contract was made. 4 Such rule is elementary for the construction of contracts and is applicable to the construction of a grant of an easement. Buckler v. Davis Sand and Gravel Corp., 221 Md. 532, 537.

The most dependable indicium of the parties’ intentions is the language of the sales contract between Stone Haven, Inc., for whom the easement was reserved, and the Fedders:

“Seller to have option to create a right-of-way for future road. Said road to meet Carroll Co. Specs, as to width and location.”

Although appellants correctly argue that the contract has “merged” into the deed as the latter was the final executed *380 instrument, that observation prevents our resort to the contract only where its terms are inconsistent with correlative terms in the deed. Millison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 515. We find no inconsistency here. The deed provided for a right-of-way but did not elaborate on its intended extent and use. The contract merely amplified that provision by indicating that what the parties contemplated was a right-of-way which would eventually be converted to a public road. It is an old and well established principle of law:

“ . . . that parol evidence may be given of collateral and independent facts, which tend to support a deed, provided it is not offered to vary the agreement and is consistent with the deed.” Creamer v. Stephenson, 15 Md. 211, 222; accord, Buckler, supra.

When the simple language of the contract is considered in the surrounding circumstances — as it should be, Desch v. Knox, 253 Md. 307 — the intention of the parties becomes crystal clear. The contract provides for “a right-of-way for future road . . . ,” and that the road shall meet “Carroll County Specs.” The width of the right-of-way, when described in the easement is the minimum standard prescribed by Carroll County, fifty feet. The plat, incorporated by a reference in the deed shows the right-of-way widening considerably into a flange for easier turning access onto the public road to which it connects the corporate owner’s retained property. That retained property, undeveloped and uninhabited at the time of execution of Fedders’ deed obviously becomes developable only if the access road is improved to conform to the requirements of the County for new roads in such developments.

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329 A.2d 56, 23 Md. App. 375, 1974 Md. App. LEXIS 296, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fedder-v-component-structures-corp-mdctspecapp-1974.