Fawwaz F. Beyha

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 4, 2020
Docket11-18010
StatusUnknown

This text of Fawwaz F. Beyha (Fawwaz F. Beyha) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fawwaz F. Beyha, (Pa. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re : Chapter 11

Fawwaz Beyha :

Debtor : Case No. 11-18010 (JKF) ________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is the Debtor’s Motion to Reopen his bankruptcy case. Conestoga Title Insurance Company (Conestoga) filed a Response in opposition to the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted.1 Background Prior to bankruptcy the Debtor amassed a portfolio of investment properties. See Sched. A. Among those properties is 1900 South 19th Street in Philadelphia (the 19th Street property). Id. The Debtor purchased that property in 1997 with a mortgage loan which would later be assigned to Springleaf Financial. Resp. ¶¶ 23-24 Delta Loan and Title Report In 2006 the Debtor sought financing from Delta Funding. Id. ¶ 25. As collateral for a loan, the Debtor pledged the 19th Street property. Id. In addition to the mortgage itself, Delta obtained title insurance from Conestoga as to that property.2 In preparing the title

1 As the instant proceeding concerns the scope of the discharge injunction arising from §§ 524 and 1141 of the Code, it is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (O).

2 Presumably, this would have been what is known in the industry as a “lender’s policy.” As a condition to providing refinancing, the lender would have required proof of clear title in order to protect its investment. See Markocki v. Old Republic Nat. Title Insur. Co., 254 F.R.D. 242, 245 (E.D.Pa. 2008) class decertified 2015 WL 3421401 (E.D.Pa. May 27, 2015) (discussing aspects of title insurance associated with refinancing) report on the 19th Street Property, the abstractor failed to identify the Springleaf lien. Id. ¶ 26. Whether this was ever made known to Delta is unclear. What is certain, however, is that Delta made the loan. Sometime thereafter it was assigned to Ocwen Loan Servicing. Id. ¶ 29.

Bankruptcy In October 2011 the Debtor commenced this case under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Both Ocwen and Springleaf filed secured Proofs of Claim. See Claims Docket. While both claims asserted that the 19th Street property secured their loans, neither indicated that their lien was in any place other than first position. This discrepancy must have come to the Debtor’s attention because in January 2012 he filed an adversary proceeding against both Ocwen and Springleaf.3 That action sought to

determine the validity and extent of the two liens. It would be dismissed, however, after the Debtor converted his case to a Chapter 11 proceeding.4 In June 2012 the Debtor Amended his Schedule D to reflect the following lien positions as to the 19th Street Property and in this order of priority: 1. Springleaf 2. Ocwen 3. Lava Funding See Am. Schedule D.

3Adv. No. 12-0044 4 In his Chapter 11 Plan, the Debtor would propose to modify the respective liens on the 19th Street property. Pertinent Events Outside of Bankruptcy

This is how things stood until September 2012. At that time, Conestoga learned that it had failed to detect the prior Springleaf mortgage when it insured Delta’s loan. In order to provide Delta with first lien position on the 19th Street property, Conestoga paid off the Springleaf loan and became assignee of that obligation. See Resp. ¶ 31, Ex. A, Assignment of Mortgage. That, however, just substituted Conestoga for Springleaf as the first lienholder: more was required to place Delta in first lien position. The mechanism by which that was achieved was for Conestoga to unilaterally subordinate its mortgage to Delta’s.5 Id. ¶ 32, Ex. B, Subordination of Mortgage. Importantly for present purposes, there is no indication in the record that the Debtor was apprised of these actions. The Plan is Confirmed In December 2014, the Debtor confirmed his plan. The Plan was consummated, the Debtor obtained a discharge in June 2016, and a Final Decree was entered that same month. Motion to Reopen The Debtor now moves to reopen his case. A bankruptcy case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed “to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 350(b) (emphasis added). A case will be reopened only where one of the three stated ground are found to exist. In re Lee, 356 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va.2006). The party moving to reopen a case has the

5 It is unclear why Delta was named as the first lienholder as by that time it had already assigned its interest to Ocwen. burden of proof. In re Cloninger, 209 B.R. 125, 126 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1997). The decision to reopen a case is within the Court's sound discretion. Apex Oil Co. v. Sparks (In re Apex Oil Co.), 406 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir.2005); In re Shondel, 950 F.2d 1301, 1304 (7th Cir.1991).

Although the Debtor does not expressly state it, his purpose for reopening the case is to accord relief to him. Conestoga, he contends, is acting in violation of the discharge injunction: despite the discharge of its claim against the Debtor, Conestoga continues to demand payment. That is making it impossible for him to sell one of his real estate properties. See Mot. ¶¶ 19-21. Conestoga responds that it still has a lien on the 19th Street property notwithstanding confirmation of the plan. It explains that it never received any notice of the Plan as required by the Code and so was not afforded the opportunity to object thereto. On that basis, it maintains that the terms of the Plan and resulting discharge have no legal effect upon it. Resp. ¶¶ 7, 9, 10-12. If that is the case, then there is no

point in reopening the bankruptcy. Analysis Conestoga would be correct that reopening the case would be futile if either of two circumstances existed: if its lien was not modified by the Debtor’s confirmed plan or, assuming it was, Conestoga did not receive notice of the proposed plan and its treatment of Conestoga’s claim. Effect of Plan on Conestoga Lien

The first condition does not exist because the plan expressly proposed to modify the secured interest of Conestoga. The confirmed plan provided that the Debtor would retain the 19th Street property. As to treatment of the liens which encumbered it, the plan provided as follows: The treatment and consideration to be received by Class 3 claims in connection with their Secured Claims( i.e., … Ocwen……) shall be in monthly installments consistent with the below mentioned chart during which these creditors will retain their liens, except the claims of Lava and Springleaf. … Mortgage balance modified interest rate … f) Ocwen 115,232.18 5.0 Eighth Am. Plan, p. 9 [emphasis added]. So as to the 19th Street property, the plan proposed that only the Ocwen lien would be paid and at a modified rate of interest. The liens of Springleaf (now Conestoga) and Lava would be extinguished and no payment would be received. None of the three lienholders objected to this treatment. What resulted from confirmation as far as the junior lienholders was concerned was the divesture of their respective secured interests in the 19th Street property. Section 1141 of the Code provides, in pertinent part: Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section and except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor.

11 U.S.C. § 1141

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Related

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
339 U.S. 306 (Supreme Court, 1950)
In the Matter of Gladys E. Shondel, Debtor-Appellant
950 F.2d 1301 (Seventh Circuit, 1991)
In Re Cloninger
209 B.R. 125 (E.D. Arkansas, 1997)
In Re Lee
356 B.R. 177 (N.D. West Virginia, 2006)
Apex Oil Co. v. Sparks (In Re Apex Oil Co.)
406 F.3d 538 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
In re Omega Optical, Inc.
476 B.R. 157 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2012)
Markocki v. Old Republic National Title Insurance
254 F.R.D. 242 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2008)

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Fawwaz F. Beyha, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fawwaz-f-beyha-paeb-2020.