Fawley v. Lea County Board of Commissioners

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 17, 2024
• Docket: 22-2120
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 22-2120 Document: 010110984875 Date Filed: 01/17/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 17, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court BENJAMIN W. FAWLEY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 22-2120 (D.C. No. 2:18-CV-01221-MV-KRS) LEA COUNTY BOARD OF (D. N.M.) COMMISSIONERS; DANIELLE ROMERO, Court Clerk II; SANDY BODLE, Judicial Supervisor Specialist; JENIFER SALCEDO, 5th Judicial District Court Clerk III,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

This is a pro se civil rights appeal brought by an inmate in state custody. After

examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously

that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument. Below, the district court dismissed Fawley’s case

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 22-2120 Document: 010110984875 Date Filed: 01/17/2024 Page: 2

for failure to state a claim. We affirm. Fawley fails to state a claim because he

cannot obtain the relief he seeks against Lea County or the County’s court clerks.

I.

Benjamin W. Fawley remains incarcerated and appears pro se. In his original

42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, he alleged that Lea County and the County’s court

clerks violated his constitutional right to access the courts by failing to file a § 1983

case and a state habeas petition. In all, he sought declaratory and injunctive relief,

$400,000 in compensatory damages, and $400,000 in punitive damages.1 The district

court dismissed Fawley’s case without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Though

at the same time, the court granted him sixty days to file an amended complaint.

After the district court denied Fawley’s motion for reconsideration, he filed an

amended complaint. He alleged that the clerks deprived him of his right to access the

courts when they refused to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a New

Mexico Tort Claims Act complaint. Notably, Fawley was eventually able to file both

pleadings. Regardless, he also maintains that the clerks’ actions delayed his filing of

both actions and deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal

protection. Like before, the district court dismissed Fawley’s case for failure to state

a claim. This time, however, the court dismissed his case with prejudice. Fawley

timely appealed.

1 Fawley later acknowledged that the court clerks had immunity against his § 1983 claim for damages. Thereafter, he only sought equitable relief against the clerks. 2 Appellate Case: 22-2120 Document: 010110984875 Date Filed: 01/17/2024 Page: 3

II.

We review de novo an order dismissing an inmate’s case for failure to state a

claim. McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001). That means, like the

district court, we must assess whether Fawley’s amended complaint contains

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addition, Fawley is pro se. As such, we

review his complaint “liberally” and hold it to a “less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.

1991).

Fawley brings a § 1983 suit against Lea County and three of the County’s

court clerks. In the end, Fawley fails to state a claim against each defendant.

A.

As a preliminary matter, Fawley raises a host of new claims on appeal that

were “not pursued in the trial court.” Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Tr., 994 F.2d 716,

722 (10th Cir. 1993). Such arguments that do not at all impact the district court’s

ultimate decision “cannot be the basis for the appeal,” and we need not and will not

address them for the first time on appeal. Id.

B.

We shift focus to Fawley’s claims against the local government, Lea County.

On appeal, Fawley does not argue that the County has done anything specifically

against him. Nor could he. His amended complaint contains no allegations of such.

3 Appellate Case: 22-2120 Document: 010110984875 Date Filed: 01/17/2024 Page: 4

Instead, Fawley solely focuses on the clerks’ conduct. He argues that the clerks

failed to file his pleadings and to thereby comply with the New Mexico Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Thus, even liberally construing Fawley’s amended complaint,

the only way we could find Lea County liable is via some theory of respondeat

superior, whereby the County is responsible for its clerks’ actions.

We cannot do so. As the Supreme Court has already determined, “a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, “the

language of § 1983 . . . compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend

municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of

some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id.

Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against Lea County, Fawley had to allege

that the clerks’ “execution of a government’s policy or custom” gave rise to his

injury. Id. at 694. Not only did Fawley fail to do so; he alleged the exact opposite of

what he needed to. Instead of claiming that the clerks complied with and executed a

policy, he said they did not comply with a handful of rules on the books. As a result,

Fawley fails to state a § 1983 claim against the County.

C.

Next up, we consider Fawley’s claims against the County’s clerks. Fawley

“no longer seeks monetary damages, only equitable relief,” against the clerks. R. at

231. As such, we turn our attention to whether Fawley can obtain injunctive relief.

He cannot.

4 Appellate Case: 22-2120 Document: 010110984875 Date Filed: 01/17/2024 Page: 5

We need look no further than § 1983 to figure out that “injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir.

2011) (declining to grant injunctive relief because an inmate did not “show[] that

either condition was satisfied”). Fawley’s amended complaint does not allege that

the clerks violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable to

him. Consequently, his § 1983 claims against the clerks fail. See Knox, 632 F.3d at

1292.

Given that Fawley cannot obtain the relief he seeks against either the County

or its clerks, we need not get into the sufficiency of his court access and equal

protection claims. Either way, he fails to state a claim upon which a court can grant

relief. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm.2

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge

2 We note that the district court’s dismissal will count as Fawley’s second strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act even though Fawley paid his filing fees in full. 5