Faust v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.

73 N.W. 623, 104 Iowa 241
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedDecember 18, 1897
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 73 N.W. 623 (Faust v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Faust v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 73 N.W. 623, 104 Iowa 241 (iowa 1897).

Opinion

Robinson, J.

On the twenty-fourth day of January, 1894, the plaintiff placed in a box car of the defendant at Lisbon, Iowa, several horses, harness, a wagon, a buggy, and other articles, all of which were consigned to the plaintiff for delivery at Carroll. The car thus loaded was taken by the defendant, and hauled to a point a short distance west of Ames, where its contents were discovered to be on fire. Efforts were made to extinguish the fire, and to prevent damage to other cars of the train, and the burning car was hauled to Ontario, the first station west of Ames, and the fire was there extinguished, but not until the sides and roof of the car were burned, and its contents were destroyed. The plaintiff seeks to recover the value of the property which he placed in the car.

[243]*2431 The defendant denies that the property destroyed was in its possession, denies that it was negligent in what it did concerning it, denies that it is in any manner responsible for the loss of the property, and avers that the fire which destroyed it was caused by the act of the plaintiff. In a counter-claim the defendant asks judgment for the amount alleged to have been agreed upon for hauling the property from Lisbon to Oarroll. In connection with the shipment of the property, the plaintiff signed a contract which contained the following provisions: “Shipment of live stock in car loads, or less than car loads, will only be taken at the rates named herein, after this contract or agreement shall have been signed by the company’s station agent and the owner or shipper, by which it is agreed and understood that such owner or shipper shall load, feed, water, and take care of such stock at his own expense and risk. * * * All persons in charge of live stock will be passed on the train with and to take care of the stock, and will be expected to ride in the caboose attached to the train.” The plaintiff claims that the train containing his car left Lisbon at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of January 24, and that he rode in his car to Cedar Rapids, where he purchased a lantern; that he rode in the caboose from Cedar Rapids to Belle Plaine, where there was a change of conductors and cabooses; that there was considerable delay at Belle Blaine; that he went into a restaurant for a few minutes, and when he came out could not find his car; that he then purchased a ticket for Nevada, and took the first west-bound passenger train for that place in order to catch his car; that he reached Nevada a little before daylight, and failing to learn anything in regard to the train which contained his car, went to a hotel and waited until the next train for the west arrived; that he took that train and went on to Oarroll, and there learned that his property had been destroyed as stated.

[244]*244 2

[245]*2453 [244]*244I. The plaintiff testified that he did not read the shipping contract before he sighed it, and was asked, “Why didn’t you?” An objection by the defendant was overruled, and the plaintiff was permitted to answer: “Why, the freight was right there, and the agent says, Now, you want to get right on, or you will have to wait until night.’ I was not quite ready for it yet. I left a coat down to the hotel, and a lantern I bought at Lisbon I did not get. I wanted to. go after it, but could not do it, and a man said, Nou are a fool to have that agent run you out of town before you are ready.’ I did not have time to read it before the freight started.” A motion of the defendant to strike out the answer as immaterial and irrelevant was overruled, and the defendant complains of the ruling which permitted the jury to consider that evidence. We do not think it was material to any issue presented by the pleadings. In an amendment to his petition the plaintiff alleged that, after the property was loaded, the agent of the defendant presented to him the contract, and represented it to be a pass to carry him to Carroll, and requested him to sign it, and that he understood that it was a pass; that it seeks to change the liability of the defendant in regard to receiving, transporting, and delivering the property, and to excuse the defendant for negligence, and is void and of no effect; and that the only purpose for which it was given was to pass the plaintiff as a passenger in the caboose of the train. There is no controversy over the fact that the contract -included a pass, and the testimony in question did not tend to support any statement contained in the petition in regard to the contract, excepting that it was intended to pass the plaintiff as a passenger, and should not have [245]*245been admitted. See Mulligan v. Railway Co., 36 Iowa, 188; Wilde v. Transportation Co., 47 Iowa, 274. But we think that the evidence could not have been prejudicial, for the reason that the charge to the jury treated the contract as in force, and required the jury to so consider it.

4 II. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that “the burden is upon the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the testimony, that his loss did not occur by reason of his acknowledged failure to remain upon the train with his stock and care for it. If he has failed to show you by such preponderance that the loss was not occasioned by such failure upon his part, then he cannot recover in this action.” The‘defendant also asked the court to instruct the jury that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that his loss did not occur by reason of any failure on his part to carry out his agreement to take care of the horses while in transit, and that the mere fact that he remained at Belle Plaine when his car went west, whether left accidentally or by reason of his own negligence, would not excuse him from his contract to accompany the stock, or notify the proper officers of the defendant that he had been left, and could not care for the stock. The court refused to so instruct, and charged the jury that, to entitle the plaintiff to recover, he must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fire which destroyed his property was not occasioned by any act of negligence on his part, and that, if he established that fact, he was entitled to recover for the property which he delivered to the defendant. It is said in 4 Elliott, Railroads, section 1549, that, “where the owner accompanies the stock under a special contract to care for them himself, he may well be presumed to be as well acquainted with the facts in regard to their loss or injury as the carrier, and as they may have been injured because of his own negligence, or because of [246]*246their inherent nature and propensities, and not by the negligence of the carrier, it is but just to require him to show the facts. The rule in such cases, therefore, is that the burden of proof i'S upon the plaintiff to show that a breach of duty upon the part of the carrier caused the injury or loss, and, if the carrier is liable only for negligence, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show such negligence.” See, also, Railroad Co. v. Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129 (31 N. E. Rep. 781). But we do not think this case is within the rule of the authorities cited. Of course, the plaintiff should be held to' the performance of his part of the agreement, but there was nothing in the circumstances or character of the loss shown to justify the conclusion that it resulted from the absence of the plaintiff.

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Bluebook (online)
73 N.W. 623, 104 Iowa 241, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/faust-v-chicago-northwestern-railway-co-iowa-1897.