Farmer v. Fruehauf Trailer Co.

76 N.W.2d 859, 345 Mich. 592, 1956 Mich. LEXIS 414

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: May 14, 1956
• Docket: Docket 89, Calendar 46,618
• Status: Published

Opinions

Dethmers, C. J.

In 1940 plaintiff’s decedent conveyed'her home at Muskegon to her son, Frank Ristau,'reserving a life éstate. In consideration thereof he agreed in writing to provide a home for her for the rest of her life and to maintain and support her for so long as it was agreeable to both to live together, but, if that became unsatisfactory to either, then, in lieu thereof, he would pay her $15 per month as lorig as she lived; he was also to supply her with necessary medicines and medical care and to keep the house in repair and agreed that, in the event of default on his part, the premises should revert to her. Until 1951 he fully performed the terms of his agreement with her. Then he became somewhat in arrears, but caught up again.- In February of 1952 he was divorced and his mother then lived with him and his children in his home in the city of Holland until June of 1953, but spent the week ends in her home at Muskegon to which she and the grandsons returned permaneiitly after the latter date. In September of 1953 the son also moved to the Muskegon home and he and his sons lived there with the mother until her death on January 25, 1954. In November of 1952 he became involved with individual creditors and the internal revenue department, in consequence of which his business property was seized and he was forced out of his trucking business. His debts at that time amounted to approximately $50,000. In December of 1952 he began work as a truck driver. During all this time and until the mother’s death he continued to give her such support as his means permitted. He testified that in 1953, and earlier, there were times when he had not been able to buy her medicine or clothes, but he had bought the food for the family, and his oldest son, who lived with them, paid her $15 per week as board and room, his sister bought some of. the medicines and clothes for her, that he neglected repairs to the house, and that during the last couple of years of his mother’s lifetime he failed to pay her $15 per month under the written agreement. He further testified that she expressed dissatisfaction with his performance of the agreement and that, as a result, he deeded the Muskegon home back to her on October 1, 1953.

On November 7,1952, defendant Fruehauf Trailer Company obtained a $2,750 judgment against him and in February, 1953, caused an execution to issue against his property and filed the same with the Muskegon county register of deeds. During the ensuing summer the mother knew that Fruehauf was attempting to satisfy its judgment by a levy on the home and on August 25th caused her attorneys to write Fruehauf to advise of her interests in it. On August 31st the sheriff gave notice of sale pursuant to a levy of execution and on October 19th sold the premises on execution sale to Fruehauf for the amount of its judgment, plus interest and costs.

When, the mother died on January 25, 1954, she left a will, executed on October 15, 1953, by which the premises were devised to her son, Frank Ristau, the will stating that this was done “for the reason that since 1940 he has assumed the responsibility of supporting me.” On the son’s petition the will was admitted to probate shortly after her death and a few days later he filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Two months thereafter plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of the mother, brought this suit to have the levy and sheriff’s sale set aside as a cloud on plaintiff’s title and to quiet title to the premises in plaintiff. Defendants 'defended on the ground, inter alia, that the conveyance, on October 1, 1953, by Frank Ristau to his mother was without consideration and void because in fraud of creditors and particularly of defendants. Plaintiff, in turn, contended that Frank was in default on his agreement to support his mother and that, for that reason, she was entitled to a reconveyance under its terms. The trial court agreed with plaintiff’s-contention, held the conveyance valid and entered a- decree granting plaintiff, the relief prayed. Defendants appeal.

Was the conveyance from Frank Ristau to his brother in fraud of creditors and therefore void ? A question of fact is presented. This being a chancery action we hear it de novo. We are persuaded that had we sat in the position of the trial judge we would have decided otherwise on the facts and that the decree is not in accord with the just rights of the parties and should be reversed. From an examination of the entire record, disclosing facts as outlined in brief above, we are satisfied that the son fully performed his obligations under the agreement with his. mother from 1940 until 1951, that thereafter his straitened financial circumstances limited his ability to do everything for her that he theretofore had done,, hut that he continued performance to the best of his ability, and that there was substantial compliance and performance on his- part with some voluntary assistance by his oldest son and sister; that the facts-with respect to his performance at that time and until the mother’s death and the equities between them were such that at no time could she have prevailed in an action to cancel her conveyance to him for breach of contract or failure of consideration, in view of his full performance for a dozen years and substantial performance to the extent of his ability thereafter, and in view of the further fact that his failure during the last period of his mother’s life to pay her $15 per month was not a default, as he professed to believe, because he was not required, under the agreement, to do so while they lived together, as they had done almost continuously during the period encompassing the alleged default. During that period creditors were harrassing him. Fruehauf had obtained judgment, made a levy and noticed a sheriff’s sale thereon for October 19, 1953. Under all these circumstances it is apparent that his'deed to his mother, executed on October 1st, allegedly given her because of his failure to support her as agreed but followed within a few days by her execution of a will leaving everything to him because, as therein recited, he had supported her, amounted to nothing more or less than an attempt to salvage the home by putting it beyond the reach of creditors at a time when he was insolvent and shortly to go into voluntary bankruptcy. It follows that the conveyance by the son was in fraud of creditors and void and that, accordingly, the premises belonged not to the mother but to the son at the time of levy and sheriff’s sale and were, therefore, subject thereto. This view of the case renders decision of other questions raised unnecessary.

Decree reversed and set aside. A decree may enter here dismissing plaintiff’s bill of complaint with prejudice and with costs to defendants.

Sharpe, Boyles, Kelly, and Carr, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, C. J.