1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 Dexter Farlough, Case No. 2:25-cv-00438-RFB-BNW 5 Plaintiff, 6 SCREENING ORDER v. 7 Henderson Police Department, et al., 8
9 DefendantS.
10 11 Pro se plaintiff Dexter Farlough initiated this lawsuit by filing an application to proceed in 12 forma pauperis and a complaint. ECF Nos. 4, 1-1. Plaintiff submitted the affidavit required by 28 13 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to prepay fees or costs or give security for them. 14 Accordingly, this Court will grant his request to proceed in forma pauperis. This Court now 15 screens his complaint. 16 I. Screening standard 17 In screening a complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that 18 are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary 19 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is 20 frivolous if it contains “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless,” such as “claims 21 describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989). 22 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to 23 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 24 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual 25 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. 26 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only 27 1 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 2 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 3 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 4 II. Factual allegations 5 Plaintiff appears to allege that on October 19, 2023, Henderson Police officers went to his 6 apartment and questioned him and a woman in relation to a domestic dispute which may or may 7 not have involved a firearm. Plaintiff alleges the woman in question did not have any bruises on 8 her, but that he showed signs of “defensive wounds.” Plaintiff contends that although Officer 9 Norton stated that he could not determine who was the primary aggressor, Officer Norton took 10 Plaintiff to jail. In turn, a criminal complaint, No. 23CR005982, was filed. 11 It is not clear what happened with that criminal case, but Plaintiff alleges that the 12 confession at issue was coerced, that he had no access to the courts, that his attorney did not 13 defend him properly, and that his speedy trial rights were denied. 14 Plaintiff asserts the following constitutional violations: “Detained, False Arrest, Miranda 15 warning violations, denied due process and equal protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth 16 Amendments against unlawful search and seizure.” He names the following defendants: 17 Henderson Police Officer Gerald Norton, Henderson Police Officer R. Canales, Assistant City 18 Attorney Marc Schifalacqua, and Deputy Public Defender Phung Jefferson. 19 III. Analysis 20 At the outset, this court notes there are no factual allegations against Henderson Police 21 Officer R. Canales, Assistant City Attorney Marc Schifalacqua.1 As a result, these defendants are 22 dismissed with leave to amend. 23 *** 24
25 1 Should Plaintiff wish to amend, he should be aware that prosecutorial immunity protects eligible 26 officials when they are acting pursuant to their official role as advocates performing functions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 27 Such immunity applies regardless of allegations of malice, bad faith, or conspiracy. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793F.2d 1072, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). As a result, Assistant City Attorney Marc Schifalacqua 1 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims 2 Based on the allegations above, Plaintiff appears to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3 This court provides a brief analysis of what is required to assert such claims below. 4 Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a “person who, under color of any [state 5 law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 6 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not 7 create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by 8 governmental officials.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff 9 bringing a claim under § 1983 must show that “(1) the action occurred ‘under color of state law’ 10 and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” 11 Id. (citation omitted). 12 i. False Arrest 13 To state a claim for False Arrest, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing that a defendant 14 arrested them “without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San 15 Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 16 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Arrest by police officers without probable cause violates the Fourth 17 Amendment’s guarantee of security from unreasonable searches and seizures, giving rise to a 18 claim for false arrest under § 1983.”). 19 Based on the above facts, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for a violation of the 20 Fourth Amendment against Officer Norton in his individual capacity. But before this claim can 21 proceed, Plaintiff must indicate what happened with the charges stemming from this arrest. That 22 is due to the fact that a civil action “is barred if success in the action would ‘necessarily require 23 the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.’” Lemos v. County of 24 Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 25 (1994)). Heck bars a civil action when the plaintiff’s “criminal conviction is fundamentally 26 inconsistent with the unlawful behavior” for which damages are sought. Smith v. City of Hemet, 27 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). To put it another way, Heck bars a civil claim if the 1 sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 Dexter Farlough, Case No. 2:25-cv-00438-RFB-BNW 5 Plaintiff, 6 SCREENING ORDER v. 7 Henderson Police Department, et al., 8
9 DefendantS.
10 11 Pro se plaintiff Dexter Farlough initiated this lawsuit by filing an application to proceed in 12 forma pauperis and a complaint. ECF Nos. 4, 1-1. Plaintiff submitted the affidavit required by 28 13 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to prepay fees or costs or give security for them. 14 Accordingly, this Court will grant his request to proceed in forma pauperis. This Court now 15 screens his complaint. 16 I. Screening standard 17 In screening a complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that 18 are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary 19 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is 20 frivolous if it contains “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless,” such as “claims 21 describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989). 22 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to 23 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 24 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual 25 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. 26 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only 27 1 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 2 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 3 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 4 II. Factual allegations 5 Plaintiff appears to allege that on October 19, 2023, Henderson Police officers went to his 6 apartment and questioned him and a woman in relation to a domestic dispute which may or may 7 not have involved a firearm. Plaintiff alleges the woman in question did not have any bruises on 8 her, but that he showed signs of “defensive wounds.” Plaintiff contends that although Officer 9 Norton stated that he could not determine who was the primary aggressor, Officer Norton took 10 Plaintiff to jail. In turn, a criminal complaint, No. 23CR005982, was filed. 11 It is not clear what happened with that criminal case, but Plaintiff alleges that the 12 confession at issue was coerced, that he had no access to the courts, that his attorney did not 13 defend him properly, and that his speedy trial rights were denied. 14 Plaintiff asserts the following constitutional violations: “Detained, False Arrest, Miranda 15 warning violations, denied due process and equal protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth 16 Amendments against unlawful search and seizure.” He names the following defendants: 17 Henderson Police Officer Gerald Norton, Henderson Police Officer R. Canales, Assistant City 18 Attorney Marc Schifalacqua, and Deputy Public Defender Phung Jefferson. 19 III. Analysis 20 At the outset, this court notes there are no factual allegations against Henderson Police 21 Officer R. Canales, Assistant City Attorney Marc Schifalacqua.1 As a result, these defendants are 22 dismissed with leave to amend. 23 *** 24
25 1 Should Plaintiff wish to amend, he should be aware that prosecutorial immunity protects eligible 26 officials when they are acting pursuant to their official role as advocates performing functions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 27 Such immunity applies regardless of allegations of malice, bad faith, or conspiracy. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793F.2d 1072, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). As a result, Assistant City Attorney Marc Schifalacqua 1 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims 2 Based on the allegations above, Plaintiff appears to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3 This court provides a brief analysis of what is required to assert such claims below. 4 Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a “person who, under color of any [state 5 law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 6 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not 7 create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by 8 governmental officials.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff 9 bringing a claim under § 1983 must show that “(1) the action occurred ‘under color of state law’ 10 and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” 11 Id. (citation omitted). 12 i. False Arrest 13 To state a claim for False Arrest, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing that a defendant 14 arrested them “without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San 15 Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 16 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Arrest by police officers without probable cause violates the Fourth 17 Amendment’s guarantee of security from unreasonable searches and seizures, giving rise to a 18 claim for false arrest under § 1983.”). 19 Based on the above facts, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for a violation of the 20 Fourth Amendment against Officer Norton in his individual capacity. But before this claim can 21 proceed, Plaintiff must indicate what happened with the charges stemming from this arrest. That 22 is due to the fact that a civil action “is barred if success in the action would ‘necessarily require 23 the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.’” Lemos v. County of 24 Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 25 (1994)). Heck bars a civil action when the plaintiff’s “criminal conviction is fundamentally 26 inconsistent with the unlawful behavior” for which damages are sought. Smith v. City of Hemet, 27 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). To put it another way, Heck bars a civil claim if the 1 sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. As a result, before a plaintiff may pursue an action in which the 2 claim arose from “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render [his] conviction or 3 sentence invalid,” the plaintiff must first prove he had his conviction vacated or otherwise 4 favorably terminated. Id. As a result, this Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend. 5 Should Plaintiff seek amendment, he must indicate what happened with the criminal case. 6 ii. Coerced confession 7 The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to 8 be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Using a coerced confession against the 9 accused in a criminal proceeding implicates this Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Crowe v. 10 Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 427–29 (9th Cir. 2010).2 11 Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to explain why his confession was “coerced” or 12 why he was “under duress.” Moreover, he does not identify the officer who was allegedly 13 responsible for this interrogation. As explained above, Heck may bar this claim if the coerced 14 confession resulted in a conviction that has not been set aside or otherwise invalidated. This court 15 will dismiss this claim with leave to amend. Should Plaintiff amend this claim he must indicate 16 what role, if any, these confessions played in the criminal case. 17 iii. Remaining claims 18 Plaintiff also alleges, in conclusory fashion, that he had no access to the courts, that his 19 attorney did not defend him properly,3 and that his speedy trial rights were denied. Given the lack 20 of facts supporting each of these claims, this Court will dismiss them with leave to amend. 21 *** 22 23 2 To the extent Plaintiff is simply alleging that he was not provided Miranda warnings, such a violation 24 does not constitute “the deprivation of [a] right . . . secured by the Constitution” for purposes of § 1983. Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022). As a result, he would not be able to state a § 1983 claim based on 25 those alleged facts. 26 3 Plaintiff should be aware that Deputy Public Defenders are immune from a § 1983 claim. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is raising an ineffective assistance 27 of counsel claim, it must be brought in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which addresses “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . on the grounds that he is in custody in 1 iv. Instructions for Amendment 2 Plaintiff is advised that if he files an amended complaint, the original complaint (ECF No. 3 || 1-1) no longer serves any function in this case. As such, if Plaintiff files an amended complaint, 4 || each claim and the involvement of each specific defendant must be alleged sufficiently. This 5 || Court cannot refer to a prior pleading or to other documents to make Plaintiff's amended 6 || complaint complete. The amended complaint must be complete in and of itself without reference 7 || to prior pleadings or to other documents. 8 IV. Conclusion 9 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED his in forma pauperis application (ECF No. 4) is 10 |} GRANTED. Plaintiff will not be required to pay the filing fee in this action. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must detach and file Plaintiff's 12 || complaint (ECF No. 1-1). 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 14 || Plaintiff will have until May 7, 2025, to file an amended complaint. Failure to do so by that 15 || deadline may result in a recommendation that the case be dismissed. See LR IA 11-8. 16 17 DATED: April 21, 2025 18 Li Sar Les re Enon 19 BRENDA WEKSLER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28