Calhoun, Judge:
In this declaratory judgment proceeding instituted in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County on March 25, 1960, the plaintiff, W. C. Farley, an individual doing business as Oak Hill Wrecking, seeks a declaration as to the construction and validity of Chapter 89, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1959, which amended Chapter 17 of the Code of 1931, by adding thereto a new provision designated as Article 23. The defendant, Patrick C. Graney, is the State Road Commissioner of West Virginia and as such official is charged with the administration of the statute.
Certain questions arising upon the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition have been certified by the trial court on its own motion to this Court, pursuant to 58-5-2, Code, 1931.
By its title it is stated that the act relates “to the establishment, maintenance, operation and licensing of junk yards; * * Section 1 contains the following definitions:
“ ‘Junk’ shall mean old or scrap copper, brass, rope, rags, batteries, paper, rubber, junked, dismantled or wrecked automobiles or parts thereof, iron, steel and other old or scrap ferrous or non-ferrous materials.
“ ‘Junk yard’ shall mean an establishment or place of business which is maintained or operated for the purpose of storing, keeping, buying or selling such junk, or for the maintenance or operation of an automobile graveyard.
“‘Fence’ shall mean an enclosure at least six feet in height so constructed and maintained as to obscure the junk in said enclosure from ordinary view to those persons passing upon the public highways in this state.”
[25]*25Other provisions of the act may be summarized as follows:
1. No such business shall be operated or maintained outside a municipality without a license.
2. If such business is commenced after January 1, 1959, it must be located at least 1000 feet from a primary highway. If it is maintained within 300 feet of a secondary highway, the view thereof from the highway must be obscured by natural objects or a fence.
3. If such business, as in the plaintiff’s case, was maintained and operated prior to January 1, 1959, it must be maintained and operated more than 100 feet from any primary or secondary highway right of way with the view from such highway obscured by natural objects or a fence, but it may not be enlarged, expanded, or increased in size.
4. Required fences must be at least 6 feet in height, constructed and maintained so as to obscure the materials in the enclosures “from ordinary view to those persons passing upon the public highways in this state”, must be kept in good order and repair, at all times painted, and no advertisement is permitted thereon other than the name of the licensee and the nature of the business.
5. Penalties are provided for violation of the act.
6. Though the statute became effective June 11, 1959, the provisions thereof were not enforceable until the first day of July, 1960.
In his petition for a declaratory judgment the plaintiff contends that the statute in question is unconstitutional and void in its entirety, or at least insofar as it applies to the plaintiff, in that it deprives him of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing his property and of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety, in violation of Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution of West Virginia; that the statute takes and damages the plaintiff’s property without [26]*26just compensation in violation of Section 9 of Article III of the Constitution of West Virginia; that the effect of the statute is to deprive the plaintiff of his property without due process of law, in violation of Section 10 of Article III of the Constitution of West Virginia and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; that it deprives the plaintiff of the equal protection of the law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; and that the statute creates an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers in violation of Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of West Virginia.
The facts alleged in the petition are, for the purposes of the demurrer, taken as true. The plaintiff has been for the past eleven years engaged in the business of salvaging wrecked and disabled automobiles, rehabilitating those which can be rehabilitated, dismantling and using or selling used parts and equipment therefrom, and selling the remains to junk dealers for resale as scrap. In 1959 he had eight employees and did a gross business of $200,000.
In 1957 the plaintiff and his wife purchased a 9.29-acre tract of land near Oak Hill, Fayette County, for the sum of $6,000. This tract, on which plaintiff’s business is operated, lies between the primary highway designated as U.S. Route 21-W. Va. Route 61 and the secondary highway known as Old U.S. Route 21, which is now designated as West Virginia Secondary Routes 15 and 20. According to a plat made a part of the petition, the widest portion of the tract between the two highways is approximately 345 feet; and if the 100-foot set-back provisions of Section 2 of the statute in question are applied to the tract from each of the two highways, it would leave for plaintiff’s business use an area about 145 feet wide at it widest point and tapering sharply to a point about 500 feet to the southeast. The plaintiff has an office building and other small buildings located within the 100-foot area adjacent to the present U.S. Route 21. He alleges that [27]*27be bas expended in improvements in excess of $10,000; that tbe cost of erecting tbe fences required by tbe statute will exceed tbe sum of $6,500; and that sucb portion of tbe tract as will remain after tbe set-back will be inadequate for tbe conduct of bis business.
Tbe three issues raised by tbe defendant’s demurrer and tbe several questions certified may be summarized as follows: (1) Is tbe proceeding precluded under tbe provisions of Section 35 of Article VI of tbe Constitution of West Virginia, as a suit against tbe state? (2) Is tbis a controversy of sucb a nature that it may be determined in tbis declaratory judgment proceeding? (3) Does tbe statute in question violate Section 1, 9 or 10 of Article III of tbe Constitution of West Virginia; Section 1 of Article V of tbe Constitution of West Virginia; or tbe Fourteenth Amendment of tbe Constitution of tbe United States?
By an order entered on June 21,1960, tbe trial court held that tbis proceeding does not constitute a suit against tbe state in contravention of Section 35 of Article VI of tbe Constitution of West Virginia, and that tbe controversy is one proper for determination in tbis declaratory judgment proceeding, thereby overruling tbe first and second points of tbe demurrer to tbe petition. Point three of tbe demurrer, dealing with tbe constitutionality of tbe statute, was sustained, but tbe constitutionality of tbe statute was upheld, ‘ ‘ except insofar as tbe set-back provisions * * * may destroy tbe business and use of tbe premises of plaintiff to tbe extent alleged in tbe petition herein, * *
Counsel for tbe defendant now concedes that under tbe authority of Douglass v. Koontz, 137 W. Va. 345, 71 S. E. 2d 319, tbis proceeding is merely one for a declaratory judgment construing tbe statute in question and is not a suit against tbe state. Tbe second point of tbe syllabus of that case is as follows: “A suit against tbe state tax commissioner for a declaratory judgment to determine whether tbe Business and Occupation Tax, imposed by Chapter 11, Article 13, [28]*28as amended, is applicable to a given state of facts, ■which suit seeks only to construe the statute and direct the parties, is not a suit against the State within the provisions of Article YI, Section 35 of the Constitution of West Virginia.”
In asserting that at the time of the institution of this proceeding on March 25, 1960, there did not exist a controversy of such a nature as to be cognizable in a declaratory judgment proceeding, the defendant refers to the fact that, though the statute now in controversy became effective on June 11, 1959, by the express terms thereof its provisions were not “enforceable until and after” July 1, 1960. The pertinent allegations of the petition are as follows:
“Plaintiff, through his duly authorized representative, has urged and requested defendant to waive the provisions of Sections 2 and 4 of said statute as the same apply to plaintiff and his business, but defendant has refused to do so and continues in his intention not to do so, maintaining that the said statute is constitutional and valid and is applicable to plaintiff and his business and that plaintiff must meet the requirements of said statute and obtain the license for the conduct of his business required thereby on or before the effective date of the statute.
“Plaintiff further represents and says that the matters and things herein set forth and a settlement of the controversy between the parties hereto are of great urgency, requiring speedy determination, for unless decision as to the validity and the construction of Chapter 89 of the Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1959, is obtained on or before the enforceable date thereof plaintiff, and other persons similarly situated, will be forced to expend great sums of money in order to meet the requirements thereof, or to discontinue and abandon the conduct of their business until said questions are determined, at a great cost and loss to plaintiff and each of the other persons so similarly situated.”
By Chapter 26, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1941, Chapter 55 of the Code, 1931, was amended by inserting therein a new provision designated as Article 13, known as the Uniform Declaratory [29]*29Judgments Act. Section 1 provides that courts of record shall have “power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Section 2 provides: “Any person * * * whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, # * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the * * # statute, # * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” Section 3 provides: “A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof. ’ ’ By Section 5 it is provided that the enumeration contained in the statute “does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in section one, in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy” giving rise to the proceeding. Section 12 provides: “This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.”
In the case of Crank v. McLaughlin, 125 W. Va. 126, 23 S. E. 2d 56, the newly-enacted statute was first construed by this Court. In the single syllabus point of that case, it is stated that under its provisions courts may enter judgments or decrees declaratory of the law, in eases of “actual and existing controversies.” The spirit of the statute is exemplified by Section 3, which provides that a contract may be construed before a breach thereof.
In Board of Education of Wyoming County v. Board of Public Works, 144 W. Va. 593, 109 S. E. 2d 552, 556, the Court stated: “The purpose of a declaratory judgment proceeding, however, is to anticipate the actual accrual of causes for equitable relief or rights of action by anticipatory orders which adjudicate real controversies before violation or breach results in loss to one or the other of the persons involved.” It is true that the courts will not in such a proceeding [30]*30adjudicate rights which are merely contingent or dependent upon contingent events, as distinguished from actual controversies. Town of South Charleston v. Board of Education of Kanawha County, 132 W. Va. 77, 50 S. E. 2d 880. Nor will courts resolve mere academic disputes or moot questions or render mere advisory opinions which are unrelated to actual controversies. Mainella v. Board of Trustees, 126 W. Va. 183, 27 S. E. 2d 486. 26 C. J.S., Declaratory Judgments, Section 30, page 107.
The constitutionality of a statute may he determined in a declaratory judgment proceeding if an actual controversy exists relative to the rights of the parties thereunder. Board of Education of Wyoming Co. v. Board of Public Works, 144 W. Va. 593, 109 S. E. 2d 552. Statutes may he construed before or after breach at the petition of a properly interested party. “So, a plaintiff is not required to violate a penal statute as a condition of having it construed in a proceeding for a declaratory judgment.” 26 C.J.S., Declaratory Judgments, Section 45, page 129.
The controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant is actual, existing and justiciable in the sense that the defendant has made evident his purpose to enforce provisions of the statute and that such enforcement will directly and materially affect the rights of the plaintiff. At the time of the institution of this proceeding the statute in question was in effect. It is true that under the provisions thereof the plaintiff was given until July 1, 1960, to make such changes as were necessary in order to cause his business and his property to conform to the requirements of the statute. Meantime the statute was effective in the sense that the plaintiff was forbidden thereby to make any changes in or use of his property except in conformity with the legislative enactment. The controversy was actual, existing and justiciable in that the unconstitutionality of the statute, designed to have a material effect on the plaintiff’s property rights, was asserted by the plaintiff and denied by the defendant. [31]*31It would not be consonant with the spirit, intent and purpose of the declaratory judgment statutes to have required the plaintiff to wait until the July 1, 1960, deadline, then to violate the statute and to be arrested in order to have a determination of his rights, duties and responsibilities under the statute. Only in a limited sense can it be said that the plaintiff has sought herein a declaratory judgment before the statute became effective. Only the enforcement provisions were in abeyance at the time this proceeding was commenced.
Authorities are divided on the question whether a declaratory judgment proceeding to construe a statute or ordinance or to determine its constitutionality may be maintained prior to the effective date of such statute or ordinance. Persuasive is the opinion in the case of Pierce, Governor of Oregon, et al. v. Society of Sisters, and a companion case, 268 U.S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. 1070, wherein, before the effective date of a statute, the court in injunction proceedings determined the unconstitutionality of the statute and enjoined its enforcement. In the case of Hoagland v. Bibb, 12 Ill. App. 2d 298, 139 N.E. 2d 417 at page 420, the court stated: “A declaratory judgment action will lie to determine rights under a statute even though the act is not yet in effect. Anderson on Declaratory Judgments Section 291 page 676, Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. 2d 341, 114 A.L.R. 1345 and annotation following report of case in 114 A.L.R. 1365; Department of Financial Institutions v. General Finance Corp., 227 Ind. 373, 86 N.E. 2d 444, 10 A.L.R. 2d 436. The amendatory act was certain to take effect. In the absence of an adjudication declaring its invalidity, it is to be presumed that those officials charged with its enforcement will do their duty and enforce it. If, as alleged, such enforcement will substantially affect plaintiffs ’ property rights, a declaration may be sought before the legislation becomes effective.” See also Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 359 Mo. 439, 222 S. W. 2d 70; Ostrander v. Linn, 237 Iowa 694, 22 N.W. 2d 223; State v. Shanahan, 178 Kan. 400, [32]*32286 P. 2d 742; Maguire v. Monaghan, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 320, 206 Misc. 550, affirmed 139 N.Y.S. 2d 883, 285 App. Div. 926; Hyde Park Dairies v. City of Newton, 167 Kan. 730, 208 P. 2d 221.
For the reasons stated above, the Court is of the opinion that the controversy disclosed by the pleadings is of such nature and character as to be proper for determination in this declaratory judgment proceeding.
The basic contention made in behalf of the plaintiff on the question of constitutionality is that the statute is based solely on esthetic considerations, and therefore is not justified under the police power. As a preliminary to a discussion of the precise question of constitutionality, we undertake a brief reference to principles by which a court must be guided in determining the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of West Virginia provides that the three branches of government “shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others ’ ’. While the Supreme Court of the United States, in the absence of a specific authorization in the Constitution, determined merely by judicial construction its right to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress or of a state legislature, this Court is specifically authorized to determine ‘ ‘ the constitutionality of a law.” Article VIII, Section 3, of the Constitution of West Virginia. This Court has, nevertheless, displayed its zeal to hold within restricted limits this area of judicial supremacy in the state government, and has stated the obvious fact that one branch of the government can not encroach on the domain of another without danger. Nulter v. State Road Commission, 119 W. Va. 312, 317, 193 S. E. 549, 551.
In pursuance of its purpose to observe scrupulously the constitutional mandate that the several branches of state government must remain separate in practice as well as in theory, the Court has formulated and perpetuated certain fundamental rules which must be [33]*33adhered to in the performance of the delicate task of determining the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. In the early case of Osburn et al. v. Staley, et al., 5 W. Va. 85, the Court pointed out the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; that if a statute can be construed so as to avoid a conflict with the Constitution, such construction will be adopted by the courts; and that courts can not declare an act of the legislature invalid “unless its invalidity is placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt.” (Italics supplied). Similar principles were restated by the Court in the recent case of Board of Education of Wyoming County v. Board of Public Works, 144 W. Va. 593, 109 S. E. 2d 553 at pages 559-60:
a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which is, and the other of which is not, violative of a constitutional provision, the statute will be given that construction which sustains its constitutionality unless it is plain that the other construction is required.
# # $
“The principle is also firmly established that any doubt as to the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature will always be resolved in favor of the validity of the statute. * s *In passing upon the validity of a statute which is challenged as violative of the Constitution of this State, every reasonable construction will be resorted to by the Court to sustain its constitutionality. * *
The Court has carefully noted the supremacy of the legislature in its own field:
“In resolving the question of the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature * * *, two controlling principles must be kept in mind. The first of these principles is that the power of the legislative department * * * is subject only to the limitations imposed by the State and Federal Constitutions. State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S. E. 385, 30 L.R.A.N.S., 1004. The test of legislative power in this State is constitutional restriction. That which the Constitution of this State does not prohibit the Legislature from doing, and which does not violate the [34]*34Constitution of the United States, the Legislature may do Harbert v. Harrison County Court, 129 W. Va. 54, 39 S. E. 2d 177; State Road Commission v. County Court, 112 W. Va. 98, 163 S.E. 815. The power of the Legislature of a State is an attribute of sovereignty and its power would be absolute if there were no constitutional limitations. Howard v. Ferguson, 116 W. Va. 362, 180 S. E. 529. The other principle is that any doubt as to the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature will always be resolved in favor of the validity of the statute. State v. See, W. Va., 42 S. E. 2d 31; State v. Furr, 101 W. Va. 178, 132 S. E. 504.” State v. Harmon, 130 W. Va. 246, 43 S. E. 2d 214.
“This Court has held that the general powers of the Legislature are almost plenary and that it can legislate on every subject not interdicted by the Constitution itself. The test of legislative power in this State is constitutional restriction, and what the people have not said in the organic law their representatives shall not do, they may do. State Road Commission v. County Court, 112 W. Va. 98, 163 S. E. 815; State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister, 38 W. Va. 485, 18 S. E. 770, 24 L.R.A. 343; State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1. In the case of Howard v. Ferguson, 116 W. Va. 362, 180 S. E. 529, 532, this Court used this appropriate and clearly applicable language: ‘The authority of a state legislature is of the essence of sovereignty; it would be absolute but for constitutional limitations. * * Harbert v. County Court of Harrison County, 129 W. Va. 54, 39 S.E. 2d 177.
“* * * Unfortunately, a definite criterion of reasonableness has not yet been formulated. If a statute is within the legitimate range of the police power, has a fair tendency to accomplish the end proposed, is not unjustly discriminative, and does not destroy nor despoil a particular class, courts should not declare it unreasonable merely because they consider it impolitic or because it will operate harshly upon some individuals. The necessity for the statute and the manner of its enforcement are fundamentally legislative, not judicial, questions. Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 520, 6 S. Ct. 110, 29 L. Ed. 463; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 61, 35 S. Ct. 501, 59 L. Ed. 835; Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 584, 49 S. Ct. 430, 73 L. Ed. 856; Hiller v. State, 124 Md. 385, 92 A. 842; Shea v. Ellenstein, 118 N.J.L. 438, 193 A. 551. Every reasonable presump[35]*35tion must be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt. One branch of the government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule.’ Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718, 25 L. Ed. 496. Accord, State Road Comm. v. County Court, 112 W. Va. 98, 102, 163 S. E. 815.” Nalter v. State Road Commission of West Virginia, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S. E. 549.
The police power is difficult to define because it is so extensive, elastic and constantly expanding in its scope to meet the new and increasing demands for its exercise for the benefit of society. Weber City Sanitation Co. v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 1152, 87 S. E. 2d 153, 160. It embraces the power of the state to preserve and promote the public welfare and it is concerned with whatever affects the peace, security, morals and general welfare of the community. W. Va. Water Service Co. v. Cunningham, 143 W. Va. 1, 98 S. E. 2d 891. For exhaustive definitions in other recent decisions of this Court, see Quesenberry v. Estep, 142 W. Va. 426, 95 S. E. 2d 832; State v. Chambers, 138 W. Va. 701, 77 S. E. 2d 297; City of Huntington v. State Water Commission, 137 W. Va. 786, 73 S.E. 2d 833; State v. W. Va. Racing Commission, 133 W. Va. 179, 55 S. E. 2d 263; Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S. E. 2d 747. “The police power of a state, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its whole system of internal regulation by which the state may subject persons and property to all kinds of reasonable restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, to preserve public order, prevent offenses, and to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens those rules of good conduct and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own rights so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others. In the police power, which cannot be surrendered, or defined with circumstantial pre-[36]*36cisión, but which, except as restrained by constitutional inhibition, is unlimited, is found the inexhaustible source of those new legislative regulations which in response to the needs of a progressive civilization are designed to promote the public convenience and general prosperity. It is said that the police power is coeval with government, * * #.” 4 M. J., Constitutional Law, Section 66, pages 158-9.
The exercise of the police power cannot be circumscribed within narrow limits nor can it be confirmed to precedents resting on conditions of the past. As civilization becomes more complex and advancements are made the police power of necessity must develop and expand to meet such conditions. Weber City Sanitation Comm. v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S. E. 2d 153. ‘ ‘ The police power is not susceptible of circumstantial precision because it is impossible to foresee changing conditions which may call for its exercise. City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823, 23 A.L.R. 1322.” Cavalier Vending Corp. v. State Board of Pharmacy, 195 Va. 626, 632, 79 S. E. 2d 636, 640. In holding that slum-clearance and low-cost housing legislation is within the police power, in the case of Chapman v. Huntington, W. Va., Housing Authority, 121 W. Va. 319, 331, 3 S. E. 2d 502, 508, the Court, speaking of the police power, stated: “Of course, the conception of a public purpose must expand within constitutional limits with the broadening of the functions of government and the growth of the country.” ‘ ‘ Such power is not confined to the physical welfare of the public, but includes the general intellectual and moral well-being and development; it extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.” 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Section 175, page 903. “It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, [17 S. Ct. 864, 42 L. Ed. 260.] It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, [37]*37or held by tbe prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to tbe public welfare.” Noble Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 31 S. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed, 112, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487. See also Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S. E. 914, affirmed in 274 U.S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675, 71 L. ed. 1228, 53 A.L.R. 1210. ‘Whether in any given case tbe general welfare calls tor particular legislation is a question primarily for tbe legislature; and tbe courts will not ordinarily interfere therewith, unless, after every allowance is made, tbe legislature has been found to have exceeded its powers or no sufficient basis for such exercise can be found. Tbe legislature is also vested with a large discretion in respect of tbe means necessary to promote tbe general welfare.” 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Section 198, at page 968.
"When tbe legislature has authority under tbe police power, tbe reasons by which it is influenced in exercising such power can not be inquired into by tbe courts. If tbe legislature has tbe power, it has a wide latitude in determining tbe need for its exercise and tbe extent thereof. “Tbe test of valid legislation is legislative power, not inducement.” Nulter v. State Road Commission, 119 W. Va. 312, pt. 1 syl., 193 S. E. 549. See also Chapman v. Huntington, W. Va., Housing Authority, 121 W. Va. 319, pt. 15 syl., 3 S. E. 2d 502. “Tbe expediency or inexpediency of an act in question is a question for tbe Legislature and not tbe courts. ’ ’ Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612, pt. 6 syl. See also State v. Peel Splint Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000, 17 L.R.A. 385. For an excellent discussion of tbe police power, see tbe dissenting opinion of Judge Given in tbe case of State v. Memorial Gardens, 143 W. Va. 194, 101 S. E. 2d 432. Tbe authorities are legion to tbe effect that it is not tbe province of tbe courts, nor within their power, to pass judgment on tbe exercise of tbe legislative discretion and prerogative in determining tbe need for or tbe wisdom of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. 4 M. J., Constitutional Law, Sec[38]*38tion 55, pages 142-146; 5 West’s Digest, Va. and W. Va. Constitutional Law, Section 70(3), page 194.
In brief the police power is an inherent attribute oi sovereignty, existing independently of a constitutional grant thereof. In general terms it may be said that it is as broad and comprehensive as the demands of society for its exercise. It is not static, but it is capable of evolving within constitutional limits to meet the demands or needs of an increasingly dense population and an increasingly complex society. Its scope is not to be determined on the basis of precedent alone, for there may be no precise precedent for the needs or demands of a given time; but such needs or demands also may furnish a measure of its scope. It is fortunate for this nation that Justice John Marshall was not required to find support in precedent for the momentous decisions which breathed the breath of life into the infant nation and caused it to take shape and stand erect in its magnificent, mature form. The greatness of the Constitution he so ably interpreted lies, in a great measure, in the fact that its provisions are of such flexible nature as to permit the development and evolvement of the nation in a manner and to a degree which bespeak the wisdom of the men whose brains conceived it and whose patient labors gave it birth.
While various constitutional questions have been urged in behalf of the plaintiff, their solution, in a great measure at least, depends on a determination whether the legislative enactment under consideration falls properly within the police power, and whether such power has been exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. We must bear in mind that the plaintiff’s property has not been “taken”, nor has his business been prohibited. The plaintiff still has his property and he may make a restricted use of it in his junk business, he may devote it to other uses, or he may engage in the junk business at a different location. The authorities listed below deal with other constitutional questions raised in behalf of the defendant, and, we believe, furnish answers to such questions. In the interest of [39]*39brevity, they are not referred to in detail. Huntington v. State Water Commission, 137 W. Va. 786, syl. 3, 73 S. E. 2d 833. For other aspects of the question of constitutionality, see Laing v. Fox, 115 W. Va. 272, 175 S. E. 354; Chapman v. Huntington, W. Va., Housing Authority, 121 W. Va. 319, 3 S. E. 2d 502; Nulter v. State Road Commission, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S. E. 549; State v. Morrison, 98 W. Va. 289, 127 S. E. 75; Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S. E. 914; Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission, 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557, 7 A.L.R. 1081; Burdett v. Allen, 35 W. Va. 347, 13 S. E. 1012; Weber City Sanitation Commission v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S. E. 2d 153; West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S. E. 881; Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S. E. 2d 872; Miller v. State Etomologist, 146 Va. 175, 135 S. E. 813, 67 A. L. R. 197; 4 M. J., Constitutional Law, Sections 80 and 81, pages 174-79; Nebbia v. People of the State of N. Y., 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940; Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S. Ct. 920, 95 L. ed. 1233, 35 A. L. R. 2d 335; 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, Section 209, pages 1048-65; State v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440.
As has been stated previously, it is insisted in behalf of the plaintiff that the legislative enactment obviously is predicated solely on esthetic considerations; that the police power will not justify legislation based purely on esthetic considerations; and that, therefore, the legislative enactment is unconstitutional and void. We commence a consideration of this proposition by a frank acknowledgment that it presents a difficult question. It would serve no useful purpose to engage in an extended discussion of the place of esthetic considerations in the enactment of legislation under the police power. It can not be gainsaid that at this time the great weight of authority is to the effect that esthetic considerations alone will not justify the exercise of legislative authority under the police power. But on the other hand, it is perhaps just as well established that esthetic considerations may be given due [40]*40weight in connection with other factors which suppor legislative exercise of the police power. It is clear als< that there is in this day a marked tendency to accorc greater importance to esthetic considerations. Conrtf have frequently been at pains to assign other bases for the validity of legislation when obviously the leg islation being considered has been predicated predom inately on esthetic considerations. 11 Am. Jur., Con stitutional Law, Section 280, page 1038; State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 165 A. 601; 62 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations, Section 226(6), page 437; State v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440.
In the case of West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S. E. 881, involving the righ.1 to operate a brickyard in an area reserved for residential purposes, the Court stated: [41]*41En General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309, at page 312, the court stated: “Under a liberalized construction of the general welfare purposes of state and Federal Constitutions there is a trend in the modern decisions (which we approve) to foster, under the police power, an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development— to prevent a thing that offends the sense of sight in the same manner as a thing that offends the senses of hearing and smelling. 3 McQuillen, Mun. Corps (2d) 1049; Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 157, 214 P. 99; State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans (1923) 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A. L. R. 260; State ex rel. Carter v. Harper (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 158, 196 N.W. 451, 33 A.L.R. 269; Cochran v. Preston (1908) 108 Md. 220, 70 A. 113, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163, 129 Am. St. Rep. 432, 15 Ann. Cas. 1048.”
[40]*40“Aesthetic considerations alone are not enough but they should be considered.
“ ‘It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative in their nature. With the passing of time, social standards conform to new ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more refined, and that which formerly did not offend cannot now be endured. That which the common law did not condemn as a nuisance is now frequently outlawed as such by the written law. This is not because the subject outlawed is of a different nature, but because our sensibilities have become more refined and our ideals more exacting. Nauseous smells have always come under the ban of the law, but ugly sights and discordant surroundings may be just as distressing to keener sensibilities. The rights of property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted to plague the average or dominant human sensibilities well may be pondered.’ State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 158, 196 N.W. 451, 455, 33 A.L.R. 269. It might be hard to prove that a city dump was hurtful to health, but plainly it should not be located in a residential district. The days of kitchen middenz are gone. * * *
“All of these considerations address themselves primarily to the Legislature (city council), and its judgment stands unless there has been plain abuse of its wide discretion.”
[41]*41“* # if Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.” Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed. 303.
In the recent case of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S. Ct. 98, 101-2, 99 L. ed. 27, involving the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1940, the Supreme Court of the United States stated: “We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. [42]*42State of Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424, 72 S. Ct. 405, 407, 96 L. Ed. 469. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine thai the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. ’ ’ See also 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Section 195, pages 938-40.
Turning now to previous decisions of this Court, in Snyder v. Cabell, 29 W. Va. 48, 1 S. E. 241, occupants of dwelling houses sought to enjoin the defendants from operating a skating rink near the residences of the plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the bill, but this Court reinstated the original temporary injunction and made it perpetual. The Court in its opinion stated: “* # * We base the propriety of the injunction on the noise alone.” The fifth point of the syllabus is as follows: “Where the prosecution of a business in itself lawful in the neighborhood of a dwelling-house renders the occupation of it materially uncomfortable by noises alone, the carrying on of such business, while it produces such results, will be restrained by a court of equity.”
In Ritz v. The Woman’s Club of Charleston, 114 W. Va. 675, 173 S. E. 564, this Court affirmed a decree of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County finding that dances conducted at the club house of the defendant in a residential district of the city were a nuisance and enjoining their continuation after nine o’clock at night. The first point of the syllabus states: “Noise alone may create a nuisance, depending on time, locality and degree.”
[43]*43In the case of Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. E. 105, involving the establishment by municipal ordinance of bnilding lines adjacent to streets of the City of Charleston, the Court stated: ‘ ‘ Our conclusion is, that under the present status of the law, and considering the present conditions as to population existing in the cities of our state, we should not go counter to the great weight of authority and take advanced ground on the question of the police power to regulate and control the use of private property, based on mere aesthetic ground and having no reasonable reference to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the people at large.” (Italics supplied.) The case of State v. Stahlman, 81 W. Va. 335, 94 S. E. 497, involved an ordinance of the City of Bluefield, regulating the height of buildings in the business section of the city, and in that connection the Court stated in the fifth point of the syllabus that such a regulation could not be applied “to effect symmetry or ornamentation of a city, street or section, * * See also State v. Nunley, Mayor, and City Council of the City of Montgomery, 94 W. Va. 189, 117 S. E. 888. Since the decisions referred to immediately above, however, this Court, following the precedent of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed. 303, 54 A. L. R. 1016, has upheld a municipal zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to a legislative delegation of police power. Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S. E. 2d 747. It is to this case, therefore, rather than to the earlier decisions of this Court, that we look for such guidance as it may furnish to us in the case now under consideration.
The case of Carter v. City of Bluefield, supra, upholding the validity of a zoning ordinance enacted under the police power, was decided in 1949. In 1937 there was before the Court the case of Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S. E. 368, 110 A.L.R. 1461, involving a suit in equity to enjoin the defendant from using his property within the City of Parkersburg for “outdoor storage and [44]*44wreckage of abandoned automobiles”. From the opinion it appears that the defendant’s business being conducted on the property was a junk yard and automobile graveyard. The opinion was written by Judge Maxwell, who for years was an able and respected member of this Court. The entire opinion is believed to be pertinent to the case now before us, and only in the interest of brevity do we resist the urge to quote it herein almost in its entirety and especially so because of the position of honor and respect which Judge Maxwell established for himself as a member of this Court. A portion of the opinion is as follows:
“Truly, in our complex American society where congestion is yearly becoming more pronounced, the changing conditions of this progressive nation require an expanding application of basic principles. The modern tendency to yield to such expansion is clearly illustrated in recent holdings of our highest court giving enlarged meaning to certain provisions of our organic law deemed to be necessary to meet changing conditions in our national life. Therefore, we need not shirk our responsibility in matters of this character when necessity for action is made clear on impelling grounds of public good, even though the result be attained through liberalization of hitherto accepted restrictions respecting the safety, peace, morals and general welfare of the people. Evincing this fundamental truth is the circumstance that in some states where zoning ordinances were at first declared unconstitutional, later decisions have upheld them. See reference in Euclid case, supra, at p. 391 of 272 U.S.
“But evolutional conceptions respecting the right and duty of society to protect itself from undesirable and disagreeable conditions are not of necessity confined to municipal zoning ordinances. There is a growing belief that that which is offensive to the view, an eye-sore, a landscape-blight, may attain such significance as to warrant equitable interposition. In Yeager v. Traylor, 306 Pa. 530, 160 A. 108, neighboring property owners sought to enjoin the erection of a public storage garage which was to have open sides and parking space on the roof. The court permitted the building to be erected but required that it be en[45]*45tirely enclosed, and stated further, ‘If it is proposed to supply parking space upon the roof an effective screen must be provided by means of a suitable balustrade or other device to hide the unsightly appearance which would be the result of such practice.’
# # #
“Happily, the day has arrived when persons may entertain appreciation of the aesthetic and be heard in equity in vindication of their love of the beautiful, without becoming objects of opprobrium. Basically, this is because a thing visually offensive may seriously affect the residents of a community in the reasonable enjoyment of their homes, and may produce a decided reduction in property values. Courts must not be indifferent to the truth that within essential limitations aesthetics has a proper place in the community affairs of modern society.
# # #
“Where, however, a section of a municipality is not a clearly established residential community a court of equity will not be warranted in excluding therefrom as a nuisance an automobile-wrecking business merely on the ground of unsightliness. Such, in our opinion, is the situation at bar.”
Judge Kenna wrote a concurring opinion. The basis thereof seems to have been his belief that considerations of unsightliness or esthetics should be left to the legislature in the exercise of the police power and that the Court was without authority independently of legislative enactments to exercise the police power in the equity suit to enjoin a nuisance. Judge Kenna stated: at page 615 of the opinion (192 S. E. 292): “There is to my mind a clear and most decided (difference between direct control by the courts through the process of injunction on the one hand, and the control exercised by the legislative branch through the use of the police power on the other.”
The case of Martin v. Williams, 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S. E. 2d 835, involved a suit in equity to enjoin as a nuisance the operation by the defendant of a “used car sale business” near the corporate limits of the City of Bluefield. In the opinion the Court quotes at length from the ease of Parkersburg Builders Material [46]*46Co. v. Barrack, supra, and refers to it as the “latest decision of this Court upon the question” presented for decision. The first point of the syllabus is as follows : ‘4 The establishment of what is commonly known as a ‘used car lot’ with its incident noise, light, unsightliness and resultant depreciation of adjoining residential property values in an area, which, though unrestricted and without the corporate limits of a town or city, was across a highway from zoned residential property lying within the corporate limits, and which area had previously been exclusively residential on both sides of the highway for a distance of approximately one-fourth of a mile, and which ‘used car lot’ greatly interferes with the use, comfort and enjoyment of such surrounding residential properties, constitutes a nuisance in fact, and may be abated by a court of equity.” (Italics supplied.)
By way of summary of the prior pertinent decisions of this Court, we note from Snyder v. Cabell, supra, and Ritz v. The Woman’s Club of Charleston, supra, that “noise alone” may create a nuisance cognizable by a court of equity. Perhaps it is not without basis to assert that Fruth v. Board of Affairs, supra, dealing with municipal building lines and State v. Stahlman, supra, dealing with muncipal regulation of the height of buildings in business districts, have been superseded and outmoded, in some measure at least, by Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., and Carter v. City of Bluefield, supra, which upheld the validity of zoning ordinances. We note also that Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, supra, is a precedent for the proposition that “persons may entertain appreciation of the aesthetic and be heard in equity in vindication of their love of the beautiful” because “a thing visually offensive may seriously affect the residents of a community in the reasonable enjoyment of their homes and may produce a decided reduction in property values.” (Italics supplied.) We note that in Martin v. Williams, supra, the Court in enjoining a used car lot as a nuisance, considered “its incident noise, light, un[47]*47sightliness and resultant depreciation of adjoining residential property values” and considered the fact that the used car lot interfered “with the use, comfort and enjoyment of such surrounding residential properties.” (Italics supplied.)
Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, supra, Carter v. City of Bluefield, supra, and Martin v. Williams, supra, are the most recent decisions of this Court bearing directly on the question of the weight which may be given to esthetics and related considerations in the exercise of the police power; and they are, therefore, the most appropriate precedents for onr consideration to be found among the prior de-cions of this Court. It is obvious that they are adequate to support the validity of a legislative enactment based on an exercise of the police power if it appears that such enactment may reasonably be predicated on considerations of noise, unsightliness, a thing visually offensive, a tendency to depress neighborhood property values, and an interference with the use, comfort and enjoyment of surrounding residential properties. To say the very least, the prior decisions of this Court are authority for the proposition that unsightliness may be considered with other proper factors in upholding a legislative enactment based on an exercise of the police power. Therefore, the various factors referred to in this paragraph were proper ones to be considered by the legislature in the enactment of the statute under consideration herein. “Dealers in secondhand articles, and particularly junk dealers, are constantly receiving stolen goods, either innocently or otherwise. * * # For these and other reasons they are subject to rigid control and regulation, under the police power of the state.” 47 Am. Jur., Secondhand Dealers, Section 3, page 554. Counsel for the defendant in his brief states: “It is established that disabled and junked automobiles most generally retain quantities of gasoline and oil which produce a fire hazard or a trap for children playing with fire. The old junked ‘icebox’ has made more than one headline as a death trap for a playful child. [48]*48The existence of these conditions, pins the invitation to play and plunder, most certainly establish sufficient constitutional grounds for the regulation of junk yards.”
Section 7 of the statute in question provides: “Nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect, set aside or alter the provisions of chapter eleven, article twelve, section seven of this code.” This reference is to other statutes of this state regulating junk dealers and their agents. There can be no question of the right by legislation reasonably to regulate junk dealers. We can not say that the legislature was unjustified under its police power, based on considerations heretofore considered herein, in the enactment of the statute in controversy, including the set-back provisions and those relating to fences. No doubt the legislature took into consideration, among all other factors, an effort to promote public pride and public spirit, both on a statewide and local basis, and also a plan and purpose to promote efforts to attract to the state tourists and other travelers on our highways, with a view of promoting the economic well-being and the general welfare.
We do not consider it within the province of the courts to override the judgment of the legislative branch of government in an area which must necessarily be a matter of legislative determination. State Road Commission v. The County Court of Kanawha County, 112 W. Va. 98, 163 S. E. 815; Bent v. Weaver, 108 W. Va. 299, 150 S. E. 738; South Morgantown v. Morgantown, 49 W. Va. 729, 40 S. E. 15. We apprehend that the duty of the courts to uphold basic, important constitutional principles can be performed as well by according to the other two branches of government their proper functions, prerogatives and powers as by invalidating legislative enactments which are clearly unconstitutional. Our adherence to constitutional requirements and our “frequent recurrence to fundamental principles” may be made manifest in ways other than by declaring laws unconstitutional.
[49]*49Authorities from other jurisdictions hearing upon the primary question presented, but not in all instances supporting the views herein expressed, are as follows: Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis (Wis.), 96 N. W. 2d 85, rehearing denied 97 N. W. 2d 423; City of Shreveport v. Brock, 230 La. 651, 89 So. 2d 156; People v. Sevel (Cal.) 261 P. 2d 359; Vermont Salvage Corporation v. St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A. 2d 188.
In the light of the allegation of the petition that the effect of the statute in the peculiar circumstances of the plaintiff’s case will be to put him out of business and to prohibit the continued operation thereof on its present location, the trial court, while holding that the statute is valid, held it invalid as it relates to the plaintiff. On demurrer to the petition this allegation is, of course, taken as true. Ultimately, such allegation may or it may not be supported by proof. It does appear, however, that if this is designed to be a test case, certainly an appropriate situation was selected for the test in view of the peculiar location of the plaintiff’s property between two public highways. We are of the opinion that the allegations of the petition disclose that the statute, though valid in general scope and broad outline, is arbitrary and unreasonable as its application relates to the plaintiff and to that extent is invalid. In Carter v. Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, pt. 8 syl., 54 S. E. 2d 747, the Court stated: “A municipal ordinance creating zoning districts and im-posting restrictions upon the use of property within such districts may be valid in its general scope and broad outline but invalid to the extent that the restrictions imposed are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable in their application to particular property.”
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is affirmed and this case is remanded to that court with directions to proceed therein in a manner consonant with the principles stated in this opinion.
[50]*50
Affirmed; remanded with directions