Fantroyal v. Walmart

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 5, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00257
StatusUnknown

This text of Fantroyal v. Walmart (Fantroyal v. Walmart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fantroyal v. Walmart, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

VICTOR LAMAR FANTROYAL,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-CV-257-JPS

WALMART and MARINETTE POLICE DEPARTMENT, ORDER

Defendants.

Plaintiff Victor Lamar Fantroyal, an inmate confined at Chippewa Valley Correctional Treatment Facility, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his rights were violated. ECF No. 1. On April 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 9. The Court will deny this motion because it is premature; the Court has not screened the complaint yet and no defendants have been served at this juncture. The remainder of this Order screens Plaintiff’s complaint and resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and motion to reduce the initial partial filing fee (“IPFF”). 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. Following extensions, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an IPFF of $32.63. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff paid that fee on June 6, 2025. The Court will therefore deny as moot Plaintiff’s motion to reduce the IPFF. ECF No. 15. The Court will also grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 2. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff names the Marinette Police Department and Walmart as defendants. ECF No. 1 at 1–2. On September 1, 2023, Marinette police pulled Plaintiff over to question him about a retail theft. Id. at 2. During this interaction, law enforcement contacted Suzanne Rybak with loss prevention at Walmart. Ms. Rybak told the officers that Plaintiff had been in Walmart on August 29, 2023, and that he took merchandise. The police therefore arrested him for felony retail theft. Id. at 3. Later, Plaintiff’s attorney received a video in discovery that proved Plaintiff was not guilty. Id. It took 361 days for Plaintiff’s case to be dismissed on September 25, 2024. Id. Plaintiff is a contractor from Georgia and lost his job as a result of his arrest. Id. 2.3 Analysis First, the Court finds that Plaintiff may not proceed on a Fourth Amendment claim. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures” and provides that “no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause is an absolute defense to a § 1983 claim for wrongful arrest. See Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2014). A police officer has probable cause to arrest if, at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to permit a prudent person to believe that the suspect had committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. Id. “When an officer has received his information from some person— normally the putative victim or an eye witness—who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth, . . . he has probable cause.” Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To begin, the Marinette Police Department is not a ‘person’ for the purposes of § 1983 and therefore is not a suable entity. See Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he district court was correct that, in listing the Knox County Jail as the sole defendant, [Plaintiff] named a non-suable entity.”). However, even if Plaintiff had named the police officers involved, he still would not be able to state claim because his allegations show they had probable cause to arrest him for retail theft.

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Fantroyal v. Walmart, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fantroyal-v-walmart-wied-2025.