Fan v. Jiang

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 FEI FEI FAN, Case No. 3:21-cv-00458-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 YAN YAO JIANG, 9 Defendant. 10 11 Following remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 12 Plaintiff Fei Fei Fan is pursuing a “forced labor claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(4) for the 13 2015-2019 period” and corresponding state-law claims against Defendant Yan Yao Jiang. 14 (ECF No. 125 at 3-5; see also ECF No. 130 (executing the Ninth Circuit’s mandate).) 15 Before the Court is Jiang’s objection to United States Magistrate Judge Craig S. Denney’s 16 decision to reopen discovery in this case (ECF No. 145), along with a corresponding 17 motion to shorten time to brief that motion (ECF No. 146). While Fan has not yet 18 responded to these motions, and as further explained below, the Court will overrule 19 Jiang’s objection because Judge Denney did not clearly err in reopening discovery. The 20 Court will accordingly deny the motion for an order shortening time as moot. 21 Magistrate judges are authorized to resolve pretrial matters subject to district court 22 review under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); 23 see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); LR IB 3-1(a) (“A district judge may reconsider any pretrial 24 matter referred to a magistrate judge in a civil or criminal case pursuant to LR IB 1-3, 25 where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s ruling is clearly erroneous or contrary 26 to law.”). “This subsection . . . also enable[s] the court to delegate some of the more 27 administrative functions to a magistrate, such as . . . assistance in the preparation of 28 plans to achieve prompt disposition of cases in the court.” Gomez v. United States, 490 2 support it, the reviewing body on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 3 conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 4 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). A magistrate judge’s pretrial order issued under 5 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) is not subject to de novo review, and the reviewing court “may 6 not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & County 7 of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 8 Judge Denney did not clearly err when he entered a scheduling order that included 9 a reopened discovery period. The Court referred the case to him “for purposes of creating 10 a new scheduling order to bring this case to final resolution consistent with this order and 11 the Ninth Circuit’s mandate.” (ECF No. 130 at 3.) The Ninth Circuit had reversed the prior 12 dismissal of some of Fan’s claims and made clear that she should be permitted to proceed 13 on her forced labor claim covering a particular time, and her corresponding state law 14 claims. (ECF No. 125 at 3-5.) Meanwhile, Fan had been trying to get her counsel removed 15 from the case and proceed pro se. (ECF Nos. 123, 127.) Judge Denney held a hearing 16 on the issues related to Fan’s relationship with her counsel and the Court’s direction to 17 enter a new scheduling order. (ECF No. 142 (hearing minutes).) Judge Denney first 18 granted Fan’s counsel’s request to withdraw. (Id. at 1-2.) And from the Court’s review of 19 the minutes of that hearing, both sides then addressed Judge Denney regarding potential 20 discovery, with Fan seeking leave to file an amended complaint and reopen discovery, 21 and Jiang’s counsel opposing those requests, highlighting that Fan conducted no 22 discovery during the initial discovery period—and then Judge Denney took a recess. (Id. 23 at 2.) After the recess, Judge Denney explained that he was going to grant Fan’s request 24 to reopen discovery, and Jiang’s counsel objected based on the prejudice that would be 25 imposed on Jiang, reiterating that there was an initial discovery period back in 2022. (Id.) 26 Judge Denney overruled Jiang’s objection. (Id.) 27 Between the hearing and now, in addition to the two pending motions that are the 28 subject of this order, Fan filed two motions to allocate the responsibility to pay sanctions 2 hearing) counsel (ECF No. 143), and to impose additional sanctions on her prior counsel, 3 in part because he conducted no discovery on her behalf and obstructed and did not 4 respond in good faith to the discovery conducted by Jiang (ECF No. 147 at 3).1 5 Jiang’s objection to Judge Denney’s order is primarily because Fan conducted no 6 discovery during the initial discovery period, and Jiang notes in his objection that Fan was 7 represented by counsel during that initial discovery period. (ECF No. 145 at 3-6.) This 8 argument is unpersuasive because it overlooks the key facts that it is Fan’s former 9 counsel, not Fan, who did nothing during the initial discovery period, and that Fan seeks 10 sanctions against her former counsel in part because he did nothing during that period. 11 Indeed, it seems fundamentally unfair to hamstring Fan’s pro se prosecution of this case 12 from this point forward because of the failings of her former counsel only formally 13 discharged during Judge Denney’s recent hearing. It is also unclear to the Court how it 14 could honor the Ninth Circuit’s mandate to let Fan proceed on her forced labor claim, but 15 not allow her to take any discovery on it. It would of course be strategically beneficial for 16 Jiang if the Court forced Fan to proceed on her forced labor claim without any discovery, 17 but Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 requires the Court to apply the Federal Rules to secure the just— 18 not just the speedy—determination of every case. 19 Jiang otherwise objects that Judge Denney’s decision to reopen discovery and the 20 corresponding discovery deadlines he set must be set aside because he did not explicitly 21 make a good cause determination. (ECF No. 145 at 8-10.) But the Court reasonably infers 22 from the hearing minutes summarized above that Judge Denney implicitly made that good 23 cause determination. (ECF No. 142 at 2.) And regardless, there is good cause to reopen 24 discovery—Fan’s counsel never propounded any discovery on her behalf, and the Ninth 25 Circuit vacated and remanded in pertinent part so that she can pursue her forced labor 26

27 1This order does not address Fan’s motions regarding sanctions, which are not yet ripe either. (ECF Nos. 143, 147.) And by referencing Fan’s former counsel’s failure to 28 conduct discovery, the Court does not in any way suggest a ruling either way on the merits of Fan’s motions seeking sanctions. 1 || claim. The Court accordingly overrules Jiang’s objection and denies his motion for an 2 || order shortening time—which does not include a proposed briefing schedule or otherwise 3 || explain how much time he would like shortened anyway—as moot. 4 It is therefore ordered that Jiang’s objection to Judge Denney’s scheduling order 5 || (ECF No. 145) is overruled. 6 Itis further ordered that both sides are bound by Judge Denney’s scheduling order 7 || (ECF No. 142), unless and until it is later amended. 8 It is further ordered that Jiang’s motion for an order shortening time (ECF No. 146) 9 || is denied as moot. 10 DATED THIS 3" Day of March 2025.

12 MIRANDA M. DU 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28