Filed 8/20/26 Fan v. Huang Law Group CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
GUANGZHAO FAN, B350302 (Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent Super. Ct. No. 25STCV11860)
v.
HUANG LAW GROUP,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Michael B. Wilson, Judge. Reversed.
Michael Chen Law Offices and Michael Chen for Defendant and Appellant.
Guangzhao Fan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff Guangzhao Fan alleged he worked briefly for defendants the Huang Law Group (the firm), Xiaosheng Huang, and Qing Yang. He then filed discrimination cases with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), California Civil Rights Department (CRD), and Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) (collectively, the agencies). Plaintiff’s civil complaint included allegations that defendants made false statements to the agencies that caused him severe emotional distress. Defendants brought an anti-SLAPP1 motion seeking to strike the portions of plaintiff’s causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) that arose from communications with the agencies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court denied the motion.
We reverse. Statements parties make to government agencies tasked with investigating discrimination during official proceedings are protected speech. Here, plaintiff alleged claims for relief arising in part from defendants’ statements to the agencies. These claims lack minimal merit because the litigation privilege shields the statements. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) To the extent that plaintiff’s causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation and IIED rely upon protected speech, they should be stricken. The causes of action will proceed based upon the unprotected conduct alleged.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint The following allegations are drawn from the complaint.
1 “SLAPP” refers to “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.”
3
Plaintiff is a “severely disabled individual with Athetoid Cerebral Palsy.” Huang was the firm’s president.
During a lunch on June 8, 2024, Huang invited plaintiff to “work with him and his team” and proposed a meeting to discuss the employment arrangement. On June 11, 2024, plaintiff received WeChat messages from the firm’s general manager, Yang, describing office hours, an in-office work policy, an hourly pay rate of $20, lunch breaks, and a probationary period. The same day, he was assigned a laptop and workstation and began work. Over three days, he organized case files, communicated with clients, attended a case review meeting, completed approximately 15 immigration applications or petitions, and was asked to edit videos for the firm’s YouTube channel.
On June 12, 2024, a malfunctioning elevator trapped plaintiff on the third floor of the building, and fire department personnel had to carry him down the stairs. Subsequently, Yang informed him that his “‘visit’” had concluded and he need not return.
The firm did not pay plaintiff, so he filed a wage complaint with the California Labor Commissioner. After mediation, the firm agreed to pay him $480. He refused to sign the settlement agreement, however, because the firm unilaterally included a clause stating that it did not admit liability or the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Plaintiff alleged that this was an attempt to mislead him into waiving his legal rights.
Plaintiff also filed discrimination complaints with the EEOC, CRD, and DLSE. Defendants, in responsive submissions to the agencies, disparaged him and made false statements about his status as an employee. As the result of the termination and
4
defendants’ subsequent statements, plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.
Plaintiff asserted causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, IIED, disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.), failure to pay wages, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
B. The Anti-SLAPP Motion Defendants moved to strike the portions of the complaint purporting to establish fraud and IIED based upon their statements to the agencies. They argued their statements to the agencies were made in furtherance of their petitioning and free speech rights and were barred by the litigation privilege. Defendants made clear that their motion was limited. They acknowledged both causes of action also rested on allegations of unprotected communications and conduct, such as Yang’s WeChat messages. They did not seek to strike the causes of action to the extent that they relied on the unprotected communications and conduct.2 Plaintiff opposed the motion.3 The exhibits attached to his declaration included Huang’s December 2024 response to the discrimination complaint filed with the EEOC. In that response,
2 Defendants did not supply evidence to support an award of attorney fees and costs, but they reserved their right to seek such an award if the motion were granted. 3 Plaintiff’s opposition included at least two quotes that do not exist in the cited cases. We note these citation deficiencies for the record and warn plaintiff not to misquote cases in any future filings. Misquoting cases may result in sanctions. (See Sheerer v. Panas (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 367, 371.)
5
Huang denied the firm hired or terminated plaintiff, and he described plaintiff’s time in the office as a “visit” to determine if the parties could work together in a reference-based relationship. Huang stated he found “fatal” errors in the forms plaintiff prepared and that plaintiff was unable to verbally express himself so others could understand him.
Plaintiff did not dispute the agency communications were protected speech but contended the fraud and IIED causes of action did not arise from those communications. He contended the “core wrongful acts” underlying the fraud count were Yang’s WeChat messages relaying his employment status and compensation. As for the IIED count, he argued that emotional harm was caused by the “discriminatory termination” and “deceptive mediation terms.” The agency communications, he argued, were merely evidence of defendants’ fraudulent intent, discriminatory animus, and retaliatory motive, not as the basis of liability. Defendants did not file a reply brief.
The trial court denied defendants’ motion. The court construed the agency communications as evidence to “bolster” plaintiff’s “central” allegations of wrongdoing— misrepresentations regarding his employment status and compensation and a discriminatory termination. It found defendants failed to show the fraud and IIED causes of action arose from protected activity and denied the motion without reaching the second step. The firm appealed.
6
DISCUSSION4
A. Governing Law – the Anti-SLAPP Statute The Legislature enacted section 425.16 to prevent and deter “lawsuits [referred to as SLAPPs] brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).) “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) An act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech includes any statement or writing “made before . . . [an] official proceeding authorized by law” or “in connection with an issue under consideration or review” by such a proceeding. (Id., subd. (e)(1), (2).) Such statements include those made in administrative proceedings or investigations. (See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [statements in connection with issues under consideration by federal agency]; Dible v. Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [statements to Employment Development Department].)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e]
4 Plaintiff filed a motion in this court to strike parts of defendant’s reply brief on the basis the reply raised new matters. The motion is denied. New matters raised have not been considered.
7
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s order de novo and in so doing, conduct the same two-step analysis. (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42.)
B. Analysis The firm contends that the trial court misapplied the anti-SLAPP framework for “mixed” causes of action—i.e., those alleging both protected and unprotected activity. It argues the court incorrectly focused on the gravamen or overall thrust of the dispute rather than determining whether the fraudulent misrepresentation and IIED counts sought to impose liability based on their statements to the agencies. We agree.
1. Step One – Legal Standards “The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson).) “Although at one time courts were applying a gravamen test in the first step of an anti-SLAPP analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear it is not the proper inquiry.” (Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 616, 628 (Sandoval), citing Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009–1011 (Bonni).) “Instead, we must first identify each claim for relief pled in the complaint, without being constrained by the way the complaint
8
structures each cause of action.” (Sandoval, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Once we identify each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action, we must determine whether each act or set of acts is protected. (Ibid.) If cause of action is “mixed,” meaning it rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of which do not, we disregard the unprotected acts and reach the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis as to the protected acts. (Ibid., citing Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.)
“Identifying the act or set of acts which supply a basis for relief, meaning the acts from which a claim arises, involves looking to the legally required elements of a cause of action.” (Sandoval, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) “Allegations which are merely incidental, collateral, or provide context, as opposed to supplying an element of a claim, may not be used as a basis for triggering anti-SLAPP protection.” (Ibid.) “[I]f protected speech activity supplies an element of the claim, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits.” (Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 802, 819.)
2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation – Step One In their anti-SLAPP motion, defendants correctly stated that a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation requires a misrepresentation of material fact. Plaintiff’s complaint identified false statements defendants allegedly made before he began work: that he was being hired as a legal assistant, would be paid for his work, and was a member of the firm’s active team. Defendants conceded the hiring-related communications were
9
unprotected speech. They argued the complaint also included statements made months later to the agencies reviewing his discrimination complaints. These statements were the target of the anti-SLAPP motion.
In deciding the motion, the trial court did not separately analyze the hiring-related communications from those made to the agencies as it should have. (Sandoval, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Instead, it considered the gravamen of plaintiff’s causes of action.5 (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011 [rejecting argument that courts “should consider whether the gravamen of the entire cause of action was based on protected or unprotected activity”].) The court found that the hiring- related statements and a disability-related termination were the “primary allegations of [d]efendants’ wrongful conduct.” It concluded the communications to agencies were incidental to the “central claims for relief.”
The trial court should have focused on whether defendants’
communications to the regulatory agencies supplied elements of the cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation. (Sandoval, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Plaintiff alleged that defendants “filed position statements [with the EEOC and CRD] that falsely described Plaintiff as a mere ‘observer’ or ‘visitor,’ denied the existence of any work performed, and attacked Plaintiff’s motives and abilities.” He also alleged that defendants
5 The trial court relied on pre-Bonni decisions that stated that a cause of action’s principal thrust or gravamen determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies. (Nam v. Regents of University of California (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1191, disapproved in part by Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 892; McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 177.)
10
“falsely denied the employment relationship to regulatory authorities” and “[s]uch conduct constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation under California law.” Plaintiff further alleged that Huang “submitted false statements to regulatory agencies, including the [CRD, EEOC, and DLSE], in violation of his duty under Civil Code §§1709–1710,[6] which prohibits conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” These alleged misrepresentations of material facts supplied an element of plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action. (See Cooper v. Equity Gen. Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) As such, they were more than mere evidence. (See Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038 [protected statements supplied element of misrepresentation/false promise].)7 Accordingly, we conclude plaintiff asserted a claim that arose in part from defendants’ protected statements to the agencies, and as to these statements, defendants carried their step one burden.
6 Civil Code section 1709 provides: “One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” Section 1710 defines “deceit” to include, e.g., “[t]he suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true” and “[t]he assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true . . . .” (Id., subds. (1), (2).) 7 Plaintiff attempts to limit the statements’ purpose to evidence of pre-employment misrepresentations. He points to an allegation that he “retained [a] copy” of these submissions to “serve as evidence of their false representations.” This allegation confirms that plaintiff believed the submissions contained “false representations,” and he kept a copy of them for use as evidence in the future.
11
3. IIED – Step One In their anti-SLAPP motion, defendants identified the elements of a cause of action for IIED as including “extreme and outrageous conduct,” “severe emotional distress,” and “proximate causation.” In his complaint, plaintiff alleged he suffered emotional anguish because he was “misled” and “placed in danger due to his disability.” This alleged misconduct by defendants was not protected. Plaintiff also alleged, however, that he suffered anguish because he was “publicly discredited.” He further alleged, “[a]s a result of Defendants’ subsequent submissions to government regulatory agencies—many of which included false statements disparaging Plaintiff’s character and professional competence—Plaintiff’s depressive condition worsened,” leading to insomnia, suicidal ideation, and other symptoms.
In assessing plaintiff’s IIED cause of action, the trial court again employed a gravamen analysis, rather than considering whether defendants’ communications to the regulatory agencies supplied requisite elements of the cause of action. (Sandoval, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) “Public[] discredit[ing]” appears to refer to defendants’ agency communications about plaintiff. This and the “subsequent submissions to government regulatory agencies” supplied the element of extreme and outrageous conduct that caused severe emotional distress. (See Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1164 [elements of IIED].) Thus, the IIED cause of action relies in part on protected statements.
Plaintiff argues he alleged only a “worsen[ing]” of the emotional distress he had already suffered. Aggravation of an existing injury, he argues, could bear on the progression of harm but does not necessarily provide a basis for a claim arising from
12
protected communications. Plaintiff cites no authority to support this argument, and it is unpersuasive. Tortfeasors may be liable for a plaintiff’s damages when their wrongdoing aggravates a preexisting condition. (Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 146, 168.) By alleging that defendants’ false statements to the agencies aggravated his depression, plaintiff sought to impose liability on them for making those statements.
We conclude plaintiff alleged an IIED claim for relief arising in part from the protected agency communications, and defendants carried their step one burden as to these communications.
4. Step Two – Minimal Merit In the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court determines whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) Only claims with minimal merit may proceed. (Ibid.)
The firm argues that the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) bars both the fraudulent misrepresentation and IIED causes of action to the extent they rely on the statements made in the agency proceedings. Plaintiff cannot carry his step two burden if the litigation privilege precludes liability for the challenged claims. (Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648, 661.)
The litigation privilege exists to protect citizens from the threat of litigation for communications to government agencies whose function it is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing.
13
(People ex rel. Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber Co. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 950, 958 (Gallegos).) The privilege applies to communications made in an “official proceeding” or in the “course of any other proceeding authorized by law.” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) This includes false statements made to an agency during administrative proceedings. (Gallegos, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 958–959 [“whether fraudulent or not,” statements in California Environmental Quality Act proceedings fell within litigation privilege].) When it applies, the privilege bars all tort causes of action except malicious prosecution. (Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1031.)
Following augmentation of the record, we permitted plaintiff to file a supplemental brief addressing step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis. His brief did not dispute application of the litigation privilege to defendants’ statements to the agencies. We conclude his fraudulent misrepresentation and IIED causes of action are barred by the privilege to the extent they arise from these communications. Plaintiff did not carry his step two burden of demonstrating minimal merit.
14
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is reversed. On remand, the allegations concerning defendants’ communications in the agency proceedings in support of the first cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation and second cause of action for IIED shall be stricken from the complaint, as indicated in this opinion. The causes of action will proceed based upon the unprotected conduct alleged. The firm shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.