Falterman v. Falterman

726 So. 2d 1023, 1999 WL 11233
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 13, 1999
Docket98-CA-158
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 726 So. 2d 1023 (Falterman v. Falterman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Falterman v. Falterman, 726 So. 2d 1023, 1999 WL 11233 (La. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

726 So.2d 1023 (1999)

Kenneth Wayne FALTERMAN, M.D.
v.
Rita Lopez Falterman, wife of Kenneth Wayne FALTERMAN, M.D.

No. 98-CA-158

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

January 13, 1999.

*1024 Robert C. Lowe, Terence L. Hauver, Suzette Marie Smith, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorney For Appellant Kenneth W. Falterman, M.D.

Pat M. Franz, Metairie, Louisiana, Attorney For Appellee Rita Lopez Falterman.

Panel composed of Judges H. CHARLES GAUDIN, SOL GOTHARD and JAMES L. CANNELLA.

CANNELLA, Judge.

Plaintiff, Kenneth Wayne Falterman (Dr. Falterman), appeals from a judgment rendered in favor of defendant, his ex-wife, Rita Lopez Falterman (Ms. Falterman), granting her alimony in the amount of $3000 per month. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.

Ms. Falterman graduated from nursing school in 1967 and married Dr. Falterman on June 22, 1968. During the early years of the marriage Ms. Falterman worked as a registered nurse, helping to support the family, while her husband obtained a medical degree. Dr. Falterman is currently a practicing pediatric surgeon. Two children were born during the marriage. The parties physically separated on May 5, 1992 and were divorced by judgment dated September 27, 1994. Ms. Falterman did not work as a nurse for at least twenty-two years prior to the break-up of the marriage.

Dr. Falterman paid monthly alimony pendante lite of $5,700 to Ms. Falterman through December of 1994. Then, pursuant to a contractual agreement, he paid her $2,250 per month until August 8, 1995. On August 25, 1995, Ms. Falterman filed a motion to set a hearing on her request for post divorce alimony.[1] The community property partition was signed on October 18, 1995. Trial on the post divorce alimony request was conducted over several days and judgment was ultimately *1025 rendered on July 2, 1997, awarding Ms. Falterman post divorce alimony in the amount of $3,000 per month until May 1, 1999 or until she completes college, whichever occurs first. It is from this judgment that Dr. Falterman appeals.

On appeal, Dr. Falterman assigns two errors which he addresses in brief in one argument. He argues that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Falterman had insufficient means to support herself and in awarding Ms. Falterman $3,000 per month post divorce alimony until May 1999.[2]

On the question of the sufficiency of Ms. Falterman's means to support herself, Dr. Falterman points out that, following the community property partition Ms. Falterman received assets totaling about $366,000. He notes that she also has an interest in his retirement plan, valued at about $185,000. Therefore, Dr. Falterman argues that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Falterman had insufficient means for her support. Dr. Falterman recognizes that Ms. Falterman put forward proof that she has largely depleted the assets she received in the community property settlement. However, he argues that her depletion of her assets should not inure to his detriment. He contends that the things on which she spent her money, like housing for herself, tuition and expenses for their major children, are not items for which he would be responsible through post divorce alimony. Further, he notes that Ms. Falterman still has the $185,000 interest in the pension fund.

He also argues that the $3,000 per month awarded was too high because Ms. Falterman did not adequately prove her expenses, lumping several bills together. Dr. Falterman presented evidence supporting his argument that Ms. Falterman was not required to go back to school in a four year program to get her B.S.N., but could have instead taken a refresher course in less than six months.

In response, Ms. Falterman points out that the law does not require that a spouse totally deplete all of her assets before she is entitled to alimony. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that her means were insufficient despite the fact that she has pension rights valued at $185,000. Further, she contends that the liquid assets awarded to her in the community property settlement were spent on her personal living expenses and on the expenses and tuition of the children of the marriage. Alimony was not awarded prior to June of 1996, when she had liquid assets remaining for her support. However, she is now in the third year of her college nursing program. She has one year remaining to complete the program, thereby acquiring sufficient skills to earn more income for herself and her children, and reduce her needs. She contends that the evidence clearly supports the trial court finding that she does not, at this time, have sufficient means available while she is in school.

Further, she presented testimony that the refresher course, referred to by Dr. Falterman, would not provide her with any clinical experience, which is what she needs, having been out of work for over 20 years. Further, the field of nursing is changing and it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain advancement or supervisory positions, without a B.S.N. degree. Finally, she acknowledges some lack of clarity in her proof of her expenses. However, she points out that she submitted proof of expenses totaling $6,500 per month and was only awarded $3,000 per month. She argues that the evidence submitted, while not clear on some points, adequately supported the $3,000 per month awarded by the trial court. Accordingly, Ms. Falterman contends that there was no error in the trial court judgment finding that she was entitled to alimony in the amount of $3,000 per month until May of 1999, or until she graduates from college, whichever comes first.

A trial court is vested with great discretion in making alimony determinations, and its rulings should not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds an abuse of sound discretion. Middleton v. Middleton 535 So.2d 466 (La.App. 5th Cir.1988). A trial *1026 court's discretion in granting alimony may be disturbed when there has been a clear abuse of this discretion or manifest error in the factual determinations. Hogan v. Hogan 549 So.2d 267 (La.1989); Mabry v. Mabry, 522 So.2d 699 (La.App. 5th Cir.1988). After reviewing the record, briefs and applicable law in this case, we find no such abuse of discretion or manifest error by the trial court in its judgment.

Under La. C.C. art. 112, the trial court may award alimony out of the property and earnings of the other spouse, which shall not exceed one-third of his or her income, if it is determined that the spouse is not at fault and has not sufficient means for support. La. C.C. art. 112 goes on to provide factors which the trial court must consider in determining entitlement to alimony, like the income, means and assets of the spouses, the liquidity of such assets, the financial obligations of the spouses, including their respective earning capacities, the time necessary for the recipient to acquire appropriate education, training, or employment, the health and age of the parties and their obligations to support or care for dependent children and any other relevant circumstances. La. C.C. art. 112.

As fleshed out by the jurisprudence, the purpose of post divorce alimony is to provide a spouse in need with sufficient means for support, including expenses for food, clothing, shelter, transportation, medical attention, medicine, utilities, household expenses and income tax liability generated by the alimony payments. Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So.2d 903 (La.1974); Jordan v. Jordan, 432 So.2d 314 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983), writs denied, 438 So.2d 1111 (La.1983).

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Bluebook (online)
726 So. 2d 1023, 1999 WL 11233, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/falterman-v-falterman-lactapp-1999.