Falls Church Airpark Co., Inc. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc.

254 F.2d 920, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4132
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 30, 1958
Docket16995_1
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 254 F.2d 920 (Falls Church Airpark Co., Inc. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Falls Church Airpark Co., Inc. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 254 F.2d 920, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4132 (5th Cir. 1958).

Opinion

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal by Falls Church Airpark Co., Inc., the Bailor, from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for the Bailee, Mooney Aircraft, Inc., makes the frontal attack that the Court erred in not instructing a verdict in the Bailor’s favor-for the total loss of its airplane.

*921 Bailor was a distributor in the Washington, D. C., area for Mooney Aircraft. Included in its inventory of craft for sale was the Mooney Mark 20 numbered N-850 B, a light 150 h.p. single engine plane. Bailee, as manufacturer of these planes, presumably out of its natural business interest in enabling its distributor dealers to sell and service craft of favorable public acceptance, sent out memoranda to the distributors from time to time. Two of these were sent to and received by Bailor. One, dated March 5, 1956, advised that planes of specified manufacturer’s serial numbers (which included N-850 B) if found on the described inspection to have certain holes drilled through the lower tail cone lon-gerons, could be returned to the factory at Kerrville, Texas, for necessary alterations without cost to the airplane owner for material and labor. The other, of March 12, 1956, was an announcement that certain described improvements in the Mark 20 standard equipment were available for specified planes previously delivered. These were in a so-called kit containing necessary parts for the exchange and installation of the new equipment. These improvements were, however, to be done at the expense of the aircraft owner. By long distance telephone conversations arrangements were made for the Bailee to do both of these jobs in Texas. Bailor was to, and did, fly N-850 B from Washington to Kerrville, Texas. The plane performed satisfactorily and was apparently in good condition on arrival there.

Here a minor dispute arises in a record which is otherwise singularly uncontra-dicted. The Bailor claims that upon the arrival of the plane at Kerrville, Bailee stated that one of these two jobs was to be performed at Midland, Texas, approximately 300 miles away and that it would be necessary for Bailor to fly the plane there. On the other hand, the story of the Bailee, which we must now assume was credited by the jury, was somewhat different. In this version, no work was to be done on N-850 B at Midland, but Bailor was told that another new undelivered Mooney Mark 20, previously purchased by Bailor, was then undergoing final outfitting at Midland, and if the Bailor desired to fly N-850 B to Midland to enable its pilot to pick up the new plane for flight to Washington, D. C., Bailee would fly N-850 B back to Kerr-ville, so that the agreed work could be performed.

We regard this evidentiary controversy as of little moment for at least two reasons. First, in either case, the Court below held, as a matter of law, and there can be no substantial attack on it here, that the total circumstances made it out a bailment for the mutual benefit of both parties, cf. Bill Bell, Inc., v. Ramsey, Tex.Civ.App., 284 S.W.2d 244, and not, as Mooney claimed, a mere agency in which it was flying the plane as Bailor’s agent. Second, as we discuss more fully, no repair or alteration or work of any kind was done to the plane at Midland. It was merely kept in the Bailee’s hangar at Midland for a day or two.

On the morning of June 1, 1956, the president of Bailee, an experienced pilot with requisite CAA license undertook to fly the plane from Midland to Kerrville. While making a routine let-down from the cruising altitude of 10,000 feet preparatory to approaching the Kerrville Airport, the engine suddenly froze at about 4,000 feet. The admitted cause of this was a very fine crack in the rigid aluminum oil line extending from the rear of the engine cooling baffle to the rear engine accessory section.

What the pilot did in the next few moments as he hovered over the brink of eternity was fully explained. This included not only his own detailed factual testimony, but expert testimony from an interested fellow-stockholder-director and officer which the jury could fully credit. Whether his handling of the plane in this extremis was prudent, or whether the complete destruction of the plane from the crash landing was because he landed too soon or too late in the emergency field, was the subject of prolonged examination direct and cross, fact and ex *922 pert. By a charge acceptable to both parties using special interrogatories, F.R.C.P. 49(a), 28 U.S.C.A., the area of this controversy was reduced for jury decision to whether the pilot used too limited a portion of the field picked out for the emergency landing and if so, whether that was negligent. The jury’s affirmative answer to the first, and its negative answer to the second, inquiry was an approval of these maneuvers and an exoneration of any charge of fault insofar as it related to the manner in which the plane was being flown or the action taken to extricate plane and pilot from the jaws of disaster by a forced landing in very hilly, rocky terrain.

As the only two possible causes for the destruction of the plane revealed by this full disclosure were either improper handling in flight and the emergency landing or the cracking of the oil line, exoneration by the jury on the former, narrowed the case down to the latter.

As thus narrowed, it sharply emphasizes that in reality what the Bailor seeks by the use of the favorable presumptions arising from the bailment is the equivalent of a breach of warranty apparently long after the expiration of the warranty period on the fortunate coincidence that the Bailee happened to be the manufacturer-seller as well. Indeed, this asserted deficiency in the rigid oil line was called to distributor-dealer’s attention by a memorandum of May 30, 1956, stating “There have been several incidents of oil loss in the Mark 20 due to certain metal oil lines developing cracks * * * ” and suggesting that for planes of the particular serial numbers (which included N-850 B) the plane owner wishing “ * * * to make a similar improvement * * * can order this flexible hosing complete with hardware in kit form from the factory at the list price of $12.93.” After this crash and the near loss of the stoekholder-officer-pilot, a service letter dated June 5,1956, was sent along with the necessary replacement flexible oil line and parts which were billed at material cost only with an urgent request that the letter of instructions “be complied with immediately.”

While the unique combination of Mooney as both manufacturer and Bailee may well have given it some special knowledge which, with respect to the oil line, imposed on it a duty over and beyond that which an unrelated Bailee might have, we must keep carefully in mind that the obligations are distinctly different. Mooney, as Bailee, owed the duty of exercising due care in keeping and operating the plane, in inspecting and making the plane ready for flight. It did not, however, have a duty to make, at its expense or without request of the owner, whatever alterations or repairs might be needed. Whether, with the unique manufacturer’s knowledge, it had a duty to make a special inspection of the rigid oil line before commencing the flight or in the light of it should have refrained from commencing the flight on June was at most a question of fact.

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Bluebook (online)
254 F.2d 920, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/falls-church-airpark-co-inc-v-mooney-aircraft-inc-ca5-1958.