Falck v. Household Finance Corp. (In Re Flack)

12 B.R. 835, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3333
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California
DecidedJuly 17, 1981
DocketBankruptcy 80-3259-JD, LA 80-08950-JD
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 12 B.R. 835 (Falck v. Household Finance Corp. (In Re Flack)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Falck v. Household Finance Corp. (In Re Flack), 12 B.R. 835, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3333 (Cal. 1981).

Opinion

OPINION

JAMES R. DOOLEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

The controlling legal issue in this case is whether 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) allows a debtor, who elects exemptions under California law, to avoid a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money security interest in household furnishings, goods, and appliances. However, the issue arises in the context of a debtor husband who claimed the Federal exemptions and a debtor wife who claimed the California exemptions, and a factual dispute as to the value of certain household furnishings, goods, and appliances.

FACTS

On or about September 13, 1979, the defendant, Household Finance Corporation (hereinafter “HFC”), made a loan to the debtors, Melvin S. Falck and Patricia A. Falck, husband and wife; and the debtors granted to HFC a nonpossessory, nonpur-chase-money security interest in various household furnishings, goods and appliances. At the time of trial there was a principal balance due to HFC on the loan of $2,543.85. 1

On September 4, 1980, the debtors filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor husband claimed the Federal exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), while the debtor wife claimed exemptions under the statutes of the State of California.

On October 30, 1980, the debtor husband filed a complaint seeking to avoid, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), HFC’s security interest in his household furnishings, goods, and appliances. HFC filed an Answer To Complaint And Counterclaim in which it alleged, inter alia, that certain items of personal property have a value in excess of $200.00 and therefore HFC’s lien cannot be avoided to the extent to which items exceed $200.00 in value. The items referred to by HFC, the value of each item claimed by HFC, and the value of each item as found by the court are set forth below:

Value Claimed Value Found 2 ./
Item By HFC_ By Court
a. One 8* vinyl light brown sofa, stuffed $600.00 $100.00
b. One 8' X 2' solid rosewood cabinet with doors and three shelves $800.00 $300.00
c.One Marantz #4430 Quadradial 4 Receiver, Rem. Cont. $900.00 $350.00
*837 d. One RCA VT400 Video Tape Recorder $1,050.00 $525.00
e. One Antique Edison phonograph (1913) W/10 cylinders $700.00 $200.00
f. One double bass violin (musical instrument) $400.00 $150.00
g. One Panasonic #NE7910 microwave oven $580.00 $290.00

HFC asked this court to determine that defendant’s security interest in the items described in the preceding paragraph is not avoidable, to dissolve the automatic stay, and to order the debtor to surrender to HFC these items of collateral.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

It was proper for the debtor husband to claim the Federal exemptions and for the debtor wife to claim the California exemptions (See 11 U.S.C. § 522(m); In Re Collins, 5 B.R. 675, 6 B.C.D. 834 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Cal.1980)); and in the view of this court, both exemptions may be utilized, to the extent that they may be applicable, to exempt the debtors’ household furnishings, goods and appliances. Cf. In Re Ancira, 5 B.R. 673 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Cal.1980).

Under the Federal exemptions, the exemption in household furnishings, goods and appliances is limited to the debtors’ interest “not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item” 3 ; while the California exemption statute relating to necessary household furnishings, goods and appliances has no monetary limit. 4

The debtors contend that to the extent that any of the items exceed $200 in value, they are exempt under Section 690.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and that 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) thus allows the debtors to avoid HFC’s lien in its entirety. The court rejects this contention in the *838 light of Section 690.52 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:

“§ 690.52. Judgment for price or of foreclosure; exemption
No article, however, or species of property, mentioned in Section 690.1 to 690.29, inclusive, of this code is exempt from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its price, or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien thereon.”

Under the above-quoted statute, a valid lien may be enforced against property notwithstanding the exemption provisions contained in Sections 690.1 to 690.29, inclusive, of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Danielson v. Stokes, 214 Cal.App.2d 234, 237, 29 Cal.Rptr. 489 (1963); Willen v. Willen, 121 Cal.App. 351, 8 P.2d 942 (1932); Witkin, California Procedure, 2nd Ed., Enforcement of Judgment § 28 (p. 3409); 16 Cal.Jur.3d Creditors’ Rights § 15 (pp. 368-369); Elliott Leighton, “The ‘Care and Feeding’ of Creditors’ Claims Under California Procedure”, 14 Hastings Law Journal 1, 7-8.

11 U.S.C. § 522(f) provides in part as follows:

“(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is—
******
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-mon-ey security interest in any—
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;” [Emphasis Added]

Since the exemption granted by Section 690.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is subordinate to the enforcement of a valid lien, the enforcement of HFC’s security interest in this case would not impair an exemption to which the debtor wife would have been entitled under the statutes of the State of California. Cf. In re Babcock, 9 B.R. 475 (Bkrtcy.W.D.La.1981); In re Panesky, 5 B.R. 201 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1980); contra: In re Curry, 5 B.R.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 B.R. 835, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/falck-v-household-finance-corp-in-re-flack-cacb-1981.