Boozer v. Kennesaw Finance Co. (In Re Boozer)

4 B.R. 524, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 435, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5086, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 529
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedMay 23, 1980
Docket19-40195
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 4 B.R. 524 (Boozer v. Kennesaw Finance Co. (In Re Boozer)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boozer v. Kennesaw Finance Co. (In Re Boozer), 4 B.R. 524, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 435, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5086, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 529 (Ga. 1980).

Opinion

ORDER

HUGH ROBINSON, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

A. “Complaint to Avoid Section 522 Lien” filed by Plaintiffs Billy Frank Boozer and Stella Louise Boozer on February 29, 1980 initiated the above-styled adversary proceeding. This matter came on regularly to be heard before this Court on March 26, 1980. The Court having considered the pleadings and briefs in the case file and having heard the arguments of the parties, makes the following entry:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On January 9,1980, Billy Frank Boozer and Stella Louise Boozer (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiffs”) filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.

2. A “Complaint to Avoid Section 522 Lien” was filed by Plaintiffs on February 29, 1980.

3. A hearing on this matter was held before this Court on March 26, 1980.

4. Plaintiffs borrowed money from defendant Kennesaw Finance Company (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant”).

5. As security for the debt, a security agreement was entered into granting Defendant a security interest in Plaintiffs’ personal property which consisted of household furnishings, household goods and appliances.

6. As of the date of filing the bankruptcy petition the amount of defendant’s claim was approximately $760.00.

*526 7. Plaintiffs seek to exempt the aforementioned household furnishings, household goods and appliances pursuant to section 522(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. Plaintiffs also want to utilize Section 522(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code to exempt any interest they have in said properties which exceeds $200.00 in value.

8. Defendant contends that any interest of plaintiffs’ in the household goods, household furnishings and appliances which exceed $200.00 in value may not be exempted under Section 522(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

APPLICABLE LAW

Plaintiffs are seeking to exempt the property involved herein pursuant to Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. A debtor, may choose to exempt property under this Section unless prohibited from doing so by State Law. Section 522(b)(1) provides:

“(b) Notwithstanding Section 541 of this title an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either — (1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State Law that is applicable to the debtor under Paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; . . ”

The Georgia Legislature passed Senate Bill 249 which prohibits a debtor from utilizing the provisions of Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code in connection with exempting property from his or her estate. Ga.Code Ann. § 51-1601. Section 6 of Senate Bill 249 provides that this Act become effective upon its approval by the Governor or upon its becoming law without his approval. The Governor of Georgia approved this legislation on March 24, 1980.

Paragraph 2(A) of Section 522(b) indicates that the State Law which governs the exemption of property is that which is in effect on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. The pertinent part of this section reads:

“(b) Notwithstanding Section 541 of this Title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either . (2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal Law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or Local Law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition . ”

It was held in In Re: Crump, 2 B.R. 222, 1 CBC 2d 378 (S.D.Fla.1980) that the value and status of exempt property is determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed.

When Plaintiffs filed their petitions there was no State Law in existence prohibiting them from choosing to exempt property pursuant to Section 522(d). In 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th Edition) Paragraph 522.-02, p. 522-11 it is said:

“Representative Butler, accompanying the House vote remarked that Section 522(d)(1) should be construed to allow states to exercise the veto power only by affirmative act i. e., as a specific prohibition against such a choice. The state may not exercise a veto by failure to act.”

Because at the time Plaintiffs filed their bankruptcy petition the Ga. Legislature had not enacted legislation prohibiting debtors from exempting property under Section 522(d), the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs involved herein may exempt property under Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Under Section 522(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code a debtor may exempt his interest, not to exceed $200.00 in value in any particular item, in household furnishings, household goods, appliances and other specifically enumerated items that are held primarily for the personal, family and household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. Defendant does not dispute the Plaintiffs’ right to this exemption. However, Plaintiffs want to exempt any interest in their household goods, household furnishings and appliances under Section 522(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

*527 Section 522(d)(5) reads:

“(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section: ... (5) the debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400.00 plus any unused amount of the exemption provided under Paragraph (1) of this subsection, in any property.”

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs may not use the spillover exemption provided for in Section 522(d)(5) to exempt Plaintiffs’ interest in household goods, household furnishings or appliances which exceeds $200.00 in value.

According to the terms of Section 522(dX5), the exemption provided therein may be applied to any property. There is no limitation or restriction of any kind with regard to the type of property which may be exempt under this section.

Although case law concerning this issue is sparse, the Courts which have interpreted Section 522(d)(5) have given it a liberal construction. In the case of In Re: Bagley, 1 B.R. 116, 5 B.C.D. 901 (E.D.Pa.1979) the debtor was allowed to exempt a car valued at $2,500.00. The Court permitted the debt- or to use the allowance in Section 522(d)(5) to exempt the excess value over the $1,200.00 exemption in one motor vehicle provided for in Section 522(d)(2).

In the case of In Re: Upright, 1 B.R. 694, 5 B.C.D. 1124 (N.D.N.Y.1979) the debtor was allowed to use Section 522(d)(5) to exempt business inventory. The court held that there was no limitation in Section 522(d)(5) with respect to the character of the property eligible for the spillover exemption.

The Court agrees with the holding of In Re: Bagley, supra and In Re: Upright, supra and accordingly concludes that Plaintiffs may exempt their interest in the household goods, household furnishings and appliances which exceeds $200.00 in value under Section 522(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

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Bluebook (online)
4 B.R. 524, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 435, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5086, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 529, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boozer-v-kennesaw-finance-co-in-re-boozer-ganb-1980.