Fairgreen Capital, LLC v. City of Canton

Court of Appeals of Georgia·Decided January 26, 2016·No. A15A2184·Published

Opinion

SECOND DIVISION ANDREWS, P. J., BRANCH and PETERSON, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules

January 26, 2016

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A15A2184. FAIRGREEN CAPITAL, LLC v. CITY OF CANTON.

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.

Fairgreen Capital, LLC, a property developer, sued the City of Canton for

breach of contract claiming the City failed to repay $564,312.44 in funds that

Fairgreen advanced to the City under a written agreement governing construction of

a public road on City property benefitting a Fairgreen development. The trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of the City on grounds that, under the Georgia

Constitution (Art. IX, Sec. V, Par. I), the funds owed by the City under the agreement

constituted an illegal and void debt.1 Fairgreen appeals. For the following reasons, we

affirm in part and reverse in part.

1 Fairgreen also sued the City on the basis of negligent misrepresentation. 1. Article IX, Section V, Paragraph I (a) of the Georgia Constitution prohibits

“any county, municipality, or other political subdivision” of Georgia from incurring

liability for any “new debt without the assent of a majority of the qualified voters of

such county, municipality, or political subdivision voting in an election held for that

purpose as provided by law.” Under this provision, “new debt” is a liability that is

“not to be discharged by money already in the treasury, or by taxes to be levied during

the year in which the contract under which the liability arose was made.” Greene

County School Dist. v. Circle Y Constr., Inc., 291 Ga. 111, 112 (728 SE2d 184)

(2012). “Therefore, if a municipality undertakes an obligation that extends beyond

a single fiscal year, then a new ‘debt’ has been incurred within the meaning of the

Georgia Constitution and requires voter approval.” Barkley v. City of Rome, 259 Ga.

355, 355 (381 SE2d 34) (1989). A contract incurring such “new debt,” which is

entered into by a municipality without voter approval, is void as a matter of law.

Greene County School Dist., 291 Ga. at 112.

The agreement at issue between Fairgreen and the City – called a “Cost

Participation and Reimbursement Agreement” – provided that Fairgreen was the

owner of a development which stood to benefit from a road, Reservoir Drive, to be

constructed by the City on City property as a “system improvement” included in the

2 “Capital Improvement Plan of the City . . . Road Impact Fee Program.” The

agreement recognizes that the City has a “Road Impact Fee Program which allows it

to collect impact fees from builders for placement in a Road Impact Fee Fund and

which allows [the City] to reimburse developers and owners with funds from said

Fund when those developers and owners advance funds to [the City] for the purpose

of paying [the City’s] share or the developers’ or owners’ share of the cost of building

a system improvement included in the City[‘s] . . . Capital Improvement Plan for

Roads.” The agreement provided that the City was responsible for paying the cost of

constructing the portion of Reservoir Drive located on City property; that Fairgreen

agreed to advance funds to the City necessary to pay the cost of constructing

Reservoir Drive on City property, an amount estimated to be $2,088,403.00; and that

the City agreed to reimburse Fairgreen for the funds advanced for the construction of

Reservoir Drive on City property. The agreement states that the City “has allocated

$2,500,000.00 of its Road Impact Fee Fund for construction of Reservoir Drive;” that

the City “agrees that it shall be . . . responsible for paying the cost of construction of

Reservoir Drive on [City] [p]roperty up to $2,500,000.00;” and that “[the City] agrees

to reimburse Fairgreen from the Road Impact Fee Fund for the actual amount of funds

advanced by Fairgreen up to a maximum of $2,500,000.00 for construction of

3 Reservoir Drive on the [City] [p]roperty.” As to the method of advancing funds, the

agreement provides that, every 30 days, the City shall submit to Fairgreen invoices

that the City has received from the road contractor for completed road work, and that,

within 15 days of receipt of those invoices, Fairgreen shall advance to the City funds

to pay the invoices. As to the method of reimbursement, the agreement provides that

the City will make monthly reimbursements to Fairgreen “up to a maximum of fifty

percent of the funds then available in the Road Impact Fee Fund.” The agreement

recognizes that “there will be months when fifty percent of the funds in the Road

Impact Fee Fund will be insufficient to reimburse Fairgreen for the total payments for

invoices previously advanced by Fairgreen.” In that case, the agreement provides that

“[the City] may make up any shortfalls in future monthly reimbursement payments

made to Fairgreen.” The agreement provides that [the City] “agrees to fully reimburse

Fairgreen for all advance payments made by Fairgreen to [the City] for construction

of Reservoir Drive on the [City] [p]roperty not later than five (5) years from the

Construction Start Date.” Finally, the agreement provides that, when the City has

fully reimbursed Fairgreen for funds advanced to the City to construct Reservoir

Drive on the City property, the City shall determine how much, if any, of the

4 $2,500,000.00 Road Impact Fee Fund for Reservoir Drive remains unspent, and pay

Fairgreen an amount of money equal to 33 percent of the unspent funds.

The construction start date for Reservoir Drive was October 1, 2006.

Fairgreen’s September 2014 complaint shows that, pursuant to the agreement, it

advanced the City $1,146,529.53 to construct Reservoir Drive, and that Fairgreen

remained entitled to reimbursement for advancements made pursuant to the

agreement in the amount of $546,312.44. It is undisputed that from September 18,

2007 to March 4, 2011, the City made four payments to Fairgreen which totaled

$498,592.19.

In response to Fairgreen’s amended complaint, the City moved for summary

judgment on the breach of contract claim on the basis: (1) that funds advanced by

Fairgreen to the City, which the City had not reimbursed, constituted “new debt”

within the meaning of Article IX, Section V, Paragraph I (a) of the Georgia

Constitution and required voter approval; (2) that no such voter approval was

obtained;2 and (3) that the contract creating the “new debt” without voter approval

was void as a matter of law. Fairgreen contended in response to the City’s motion for

2 Fairgreen does not dispute facts produced by the City in an affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment showing that no voter approval was obtained for the debt liability incurred by the City pursuant to the agreement.

5 summary judgment that the debt incurred by the City under the agreement was not

illegal or void “new debt” within the above-stated constitutional provision because

the agreement was a private impact fee agreement enforceable under the Georgia

Development Impact Fee Act (DIFA) (OCGA §§ 36-71-1 to 36-71-13).

We find that, regardless of whether the agreement at issue was authorized by

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Fairgreen Capital, LLC v. City of Canton, (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).

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