Opinion
NORCOTT, J.
In this appeal, we consider whether a municipal tax lien on a mobile home was extinguished when that mobile home was determined to have been abandoned and then sold at a public auction pursuant to General Statutes § 21-80 (e).
The plaintiff, Fairchild
Heights, Inc., appeals
from the judgments of the trial court denying its motion for an order conveying good title to, and a release of all liens upon, two abandoned mobile homes in the plaintiffs mobile manufactured home park. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the judgments of the trial court were improper because the language of § 21-80 (e) (4) clearly and unambiguously provides that all existing hens on the mobile homes, including the municipal tax hens held by the city of Shelton (city), were extinguished upon the court-ordered sale of the mobile homes. We agree and, accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff is the owner of a mobile manufactured home park in the city that contains in excess of 100 lots available for lease to individual owners of mobile homes. The defendants, Roseann Amaro, and Deena Aiken and Michael Aiken,
each owned a mobile home and leased one of the lots from the plaintiff. In 2007, after the defendants became delinquent in their rent payments, the plaintiff initiated summary process actions against them and obtained judgments of possession with regard to both of the lots. The defendants subsequently vacated the mobile home park, but left their mobile homes—each of which was subject to an outstanding tax lien in favor of the city— unoccupied on the plaintiffs property.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed petitions for a finding of abandonment and for an order of public sale of both mobile homes pursuant to § 21-80 (e). The trial court,
Hon. George W. Ripley II,
judge trial referee, granted the plaintiffs petitions and set a sale date of January 3, 2008, for each of the mobile homes.
Pursuant to § 21-80 (e) (4), the plaintiff gave notice of the sales, including a conspicuous statement that the sales would extinguish all previous ownership and lien rights in the mobile homes, to all existing lienholders, including the city. The plaintiff then conducted the public sales on the scheduled date, where it was the successful bidder for both of the homes.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for conveyance of title and release of liens pursuant to § 21-80 (e) (4), and the city appeared in the action and filed an objection to the motion, asserting that its tax liens on the mobile homes had not been released as a consequence of the sales because the liens had absolute prior
ity under General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 12-172.
The trial court, Tyma,
J.,
approved the sales on January 31, 2008, and ordered that the defendants transfer title of the mobile homes to the plaintiff and that the proceeds of each sale be distributed in accordance with § 21-80 (e) (4).
The court, however, reserved decision on the issue of whether the city’s tax hens had been extinguished by the sales and, after further briefing and argument by the parties, subsequently determined that they had not been extinguished. Accordingly, the trial court denied the plaintiffs motion for an order “that all hens encumbering title to said mobile manufactured home[s] shah be released and extinguished.” This appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court’s denial of its motion for the release of ah hens encumbering title to the mobile homes was improper because the clear and unambiguous language of § 21-80 (e) (4) requires that, once ah of the requirements of that section have been satisfied,
all
previous ownership and hen rights, including tax hens in favor of a municipality, are extinguished, and that the successful bidder receives
good title
to the mobile home free from any encumbrances. The plaintiff further contends that a conclu
sion that the city’s tax liens were not extinguished by the sales would defeat the purpose of § 21-80 (e), and effectively would make the plaintiff the guarantor of its tenants’ tax obligations. In response, the city claims that mobile homes are considered real property for tax purposes and, therefore, that the city’s tax liens on the subject homes were not extinguished by the sales because the liens had absolute priority pursuant to § 12-172.
The city also contends that a conclusion that its liens were extinguished by the sales would lead to unworkable results when § 21-80 (e) is considered in conjunction with General Statutes § 21-67a,
which sets
forth the process by which a mobile home owner may remove a mobile home from the park in which it is located. We agree with the plaintiff and conclude that the city’s tax hens were extinguished by the sales.
Whether a municipal tax lien on an abandoned mobile home is extinguished by a public sale conducted pursuant to § 21-80 (e) “raises a question of statutory construction, which is a [question] of law, over which we exercise plenary review. . . . The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply. . . .
“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § l-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hees
v.
Burke Construction, Inc.,
290 Conn. 1, 10, 961 A.2d 373 (2009).
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Opinion
NORCOTT, J.
In this appeal, we consider whether a municipal tax lien on a mobile home was extinguished when that mobile home was determined to have been abandoned and then sold at a public auction pursuant to General Statutes § 21-80 (e).
The plaintiff, Fairchild
Heights, Inc., appeals
from the judgments of the trial court denying its motion for an order conveying good title to, and a release of all liens upon, two abandoned mobile homes in the plaintiffs mobile manufactured home park. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the judgments of the trial court were improper because the language of § 21-80 (e) (4) clearly and unambiguously provides that all existing hens on the mobile homes, including the municipal tax hens held by the city of Shelton (city), were extinguished upon the court-ordered sale of the mobile homes. We agree and, accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff is the owner of a mobile manufactured home park in the city that contains in excess of 100 lots available for lease to individual owners of mobile homes. The defendants, Roseann Amaro, and Deena Aiken and Michael Aiken,
each owned a mobile home and leased one of the lots from the plaintiff. In 2007, after the defendants became delinquent in their rent payments, the plaintiff initiated summary process actions against them and obtained judgments of possession with regard to both of the lots. The defendants subsequently vacated the mobile home park, but left their mobile homes—each of which was subject to an outstanding tax lien in favor of the city— unoccupied on the plaintiffs property.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed petitions for a finding of abandonment and for an order of public sale of both mobile homes pursuant to § 21-80 (e). The trial court,
Hon. George W. Ripley II,
judge trial referee, granted the plaintiffs petitions and set a sale date of January 3, 2008, for each of the mobile homes.
Pursuant to § 21-80 (e) (4), the plaintiff gave notice of the sales, including a conspicuous statement that the sales would extinguish all previous ownership and lien rights in the mobile homes, to all existing lienholders, including the city. The plaintiff then conducted the public sales on the scheduled date, where it was the successful bidder for both of the homes.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for conveyance of title and release of liens pursuant to § 21-80 (e) (4), and the city appeared in the action and filed an objection to the motion, asserting that its tax liens on the mobile homes had not been released as a consequence of the sales because the liens had absolute prior
ity under General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 12-172.
The trial court, Tyma,
J.,
approved the sales on January 31, 2008, and ordered that the defendants transfer title of the mobile homes to the plaintiff and that the proceeds of each sale be distributed in accordance with § 21-80 (e) (4).
The court, however, reserved decision on the issue of whether the city’s tax hens had been extinguished by the sales and, after further briefing and argument by the parties, subsequently determined that they had not been extinguished. Accordingly, the trial court denied the plaintiffs motion for an order “that all hens encumbering title to said mobile manufactured home[s] shah be released and extinguished.” This appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court’s denial of its motion for the release of ah hens encumbering title to the mobile homes was improper because the clear and unambiguous language of § 21-80 (e) (4) requires that, once ah of the requirements of that section have been satisfied,
all
previous ownership and hen rights, including tax hens in favor of a municipality, are extinguished, and that the successful bidder receives
good title
to the mobile home free from any encumbrances. The plaintiff further contends that a conclu
sion that the city’s tax liens were not extinguished by the sales would defeat the purpose of § 21-80 (e), and effectively would make the plaintiff the guarantor of its tenants’ tax obligations. In response, the city claims that mobile homes are considered real property for tax purposes and, therefore, that the city’s tax liens on the subject homes were not extinguished by the sales because the liens had absolute priority pursuant to § 12-172.
The city also contends that a conclusion that its liens were extinguished by the sales would lead to unworkable results when § 21-80 (e) is considered in conjunction with General Statutes § 21-67a,
which sets
forth the process by which a mobile home owner may remove a mobile home from the park in which it is located. We agree with the plaintiff and conclude that the city’s tax hens were extinguished by the sales.
Whether a municipal tax lien on an abandoned mobile home is extinguished by a public sale conducted pursuant to § 21-80 (e) “raises a question of statutory construction, which is a [question] of law, over which we exercise plenary review. . . . The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply. . . .
“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § l-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hees
v.
Burke Construction, Inc.,
290 Conn. 1, 10, 961 A.2d 373 (2009).
We begin our analysis with the applicable language of General Statutes § 21-80 (e) (4), which provides in relevant part: “The order directing sale [of a mobile manufactured home] shall require notice which includes a conspicuous statement that the sale will extinguish
all
previous ownership and lien rights. . . . The court, upon finding compliance with its order, shall issue a conveyance of title and release of liens, if any, to the purchaser for filing in the land records, which shall constitute
good title
to the home, and no execution shall issue on the original summary process action.” (Emphasis added.) “ ‘In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language . . . .’ General Statutes § 1-1 (a). We ordinarily look to the dictionary definition of a word to ascertain its commonly approved usage.”
State
v.
Gelormino,
291 Conn. 373, 380, 968 A.2d 379 (2009). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “all” to mean, inter alia, “the whole amount or quantity,” “the whole extent or duration of,” “the whole number or sum of,” or “every member or individual component of . . . .” Similarly, in its definition of “good title,” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999) references the entry for “clear title,” which is defined as “[a] title free from any encumbrances, burdens, or other limitations.”
The plain meaning of the language of § 21-80 (e) (4), therefore, clearly and unambiguously indicates that the legislature intended to provide the successful bidder at a public sale conducted pursuant to that statute with
clear and good title to the abandoned mobile home, free from any and ah encumbrances, including municipal tax liens.
The statutory language does not provide that “the sale will extinguish all previous ownership and hen rights
except municipal tax liens”
nor does it provide that the purchaser will have “good title to the home
except that the title will remain subject to any outstanding municipal tax liens.”
If the legislature had intended to preclude municipal tax hens from being extinguished through the abandonment process it easily could have done so expressly, and the fact that it did not is strong evidence that it did not so intend.
See, e.g.,
Barton
v.
Bristol,
291 Conn. 84, 100-101, 967 A.2d 482 (2009).
The clear and unambiguous statutory language notwithstanding, the city nevertheless responds that an interpretation of § 21-80 (e) that extinguishes its tax lien would lead to unworkable results when that statute is considered in conjunction with § 21-67a (f) and (g), which together preclude a mobile home owner from removing a mobile home from the park in which it is located unless the owner first obtains a certification from the tax collector of the town “that all property taxes due and payable with respect to the aforesaid mobile manufactured home have been paid in full.” General Statutes § 21-67a (f). More specifically, the city contends that § 21-80 (e) (4) provides only for the extinguishment of
lien rights,
and not the extinguishment of the outstanding tax obligation itself. Thus, the city contends that the legislature could not have intended to extinguish its tax liens because the city remains entitled to receive the outstanding tax debt even after the sale has taken place, and can prevent the successful bidder from removing the abandoned mobile home from the park until that obligation has been satisfied. Although we agree that an interpretation of § 21-80 (e) that provides for the extinguishment of the city’s tax liens would lead to an unworkable result if that statute is considered in conjunction with § 21-67a, we disagree with the city’s claim because the applicable legislative history
leads us to conclude that the removal requirements set forth in § 21-67a do not apply when a park owner takes title to and seeks to remove and dispose of an abandoned mobile home after a sale pursuant to § 21-80 (e).
“[I]t is now well settled that testimony before legislative committees may be considered in determining the particular problem or issue that the legislature sought
to address by the legislation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Jim’s Auto Body
v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
285 Conn. 794, 812, 942 A.2d 305 (2008). A review of such testimony in the present case demonstrates that § 21-80 (e) was enacted, with broad support from the mobile manufactured home industry, consumer groups and municipalities, to address an increasing number of mobile homes that had been abandoned by their owners and left to decay in the park in which they were located, thereby deteriorating the condition of the park and decreasing the value of the other residents’ homes. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 3, 1999 Sess., pp. 905-906, remarks of Joseph Mike, executive director of the Connecticut Manufactured Housing Association; id., pp. 906-907, remarks of Jeffrey Ossen, member of the Mobile Manufactured Home Advisory Council. Prior to the enactment of § 21-80 (e), a park owner’s only legal remedy under such circumstances was to initiate a summary process action against the mobile home owner pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-23 et seq., and ultimately to move the mobile home to the street for removal by the municipality pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-42.
See id., p. 909, remarks of Ossen. This
process, however, was unwieldy and problematic, due in large part to the inability and unwillingness of many municipalities to remove and dispose of the abandoned mobile homes. See id., p. 906, remarks of Ossen (noting that summary process eviction procedure “creates a problem for the municipalities, which may have an obligation to dispose of [abandoned mobile homes]”); id., pp. 919-20, remarks of Marcia Stemm, member of the Connecticut Mobile Home Advisory Council (noting that local sheriff is unable to remove abandoned home from park because city refuses to accept responsibility for evicted home); id., p. 980, written testimony of the
Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (“Municipalities do not have the proper equipment or personnel to remove these large mobile homes. They may have to hire a private company and police escorts to safely fulfill the[ir] legal obligation. . . . Municipalities do not have the resources to remove or store the units and spend a great deal of time and money attempting to store these homes that are in extremely poor and unsafe condition.”).
Accordingly, it is clear that § 21-80 (e) was enacted, as an alternative to the existing summary process eviction procedure, to create “a process by which the home can be found to be abandoned, its sale permitted, and a clear title to the home can be obtained.” Id., pp. 920-21, remarks of Stemm. In the unlikely event that the abandoned home retains any value, the purchaser may refurbish it in order to put it to productive use. See id., p. 906, remarks of Mike; id., p. 921, remarks of Stemm. In the more probable event that the abandoned home has lost all of its value, § 21-80 (e) provides the successful bidder, who most often will be the park owner, with the ability to obtain title to the abandoned mobile home and remove it from the park for disposal, thereby eliminating the role of municipalities in the removal process
and allowing the park owner to rent the underlying lot to a new tenant. See id., pp. 905-906, remarks of Mike (“It takes years to get that home which deteriorates over time out. What we are looking for is an opportunity to either purchase the home, clear the title, or remove the home. If [it is] purchased it can be refurbished or
just removed so that we can bring another home in. Someone could occupy it.”); id., p. 913, remarks of Raphael Podolsky, Legal Assistance Resource Center (“[a]nd so it has . . . a little bit of that tone of foreclosing out other’s interests] so that you could essentially get the home off the lot”); id., pp. 920-21, remarks of Stemm (“This bill provides a process by which the home can be found to be abandoned, its sale permitted, and a clear title to the home can be obtained. With this process, a home can be either refurbished and occupied or scrapped and replaced with a new home.”).
On the basis of the legislative history and the clear purpose behind § 21-80 (e), we conclude that an interpretation of that statute that extinguishes the city’s tax liens does not lead to unworkable results because the removal requirements set forth in § 21-67a do not apply when a park owner seeks to remove and dispose of an abandoned mobile home pursuant to § 21-80 (e). Under the traditional summary process eviction scheme, a park owner, who does not own the mobile homes located on its lots, is permitted to place an abandoned mobile home on the street for removal by the municipality without regard to whether there are outstanding tax debts related to that home. See General Statutes § 21-67a (g) (“[n]o
owner
of a mobile manufactured home . . . shall remove such home from such park or lot without filing a valid removal statement pursuant to this subsection” [emphasis added]). The legislative history makes clear that § 21-80 (e) was intended, in large part, to supplant the summary process eviction procedure with respect to the removal of abandoned mobile homes and, specifically, to provide a more efficient process by which a park owner may remove such homes without having to place that burden on the municipality. It would, therefore, defeat the purpose of § 21-80 (e) if a park owner could be prevented from removing and disposing of an abandoned mobile home that happens
to be subject to an outstanding tax debt simply because the park owner took title to that home pursuant to § 21-80 (e), when it could not have been prevented from doing so had it proceeded alternatively under the summary process eviction scheme.
Indeed, were we to interpret the requirements of § 21-67a to apply in circumstances such as those here, then a park owner likely would be forced to forgo the abandonment process and elect instead to proceed under the traditional summary process procedure, thereby placing the burden of removing and disposing of the abandoned mobile homes back on the municipality and effectively negating the impact of § 21-80 (e). We do not believe that the legislature intended such a result. See
American Pro
motional Events, Inc.
v.
Blumenthal,
285 Conn. 192, 203, 937 A.2d 1184 (2008) (“[i]t is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions” [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Accordingly, we conclude that the city’s tax liens were extinguished upon the court-ordered sale of the abandoned mobile homes and, therefore, that the trial court improperly failed to grant the plaintiffs motions for a conveyance of title and release of all liens.
The judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgments for the plaintiff conveying good title and release of all liens.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.