Fain v. United States Ex Rel. Tennessee Valley Authority

145 F.2d 956, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 2713
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedDecember 8, 1944
Docket9667, 9677
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 145 F.2d 956 (Fain v. United States Ex Rel. Tennessee Valley Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fain v. United States Ex Rel. Tennessee Valley Authority, 145 F.2d 956, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 2713 (6th Cir. 1944).

Opinion

ALLEN, Circuit Judge.

These two cases are before us on appeal from separate awards made by three United States District Judges in condemnation proceedings brought by the United States for the use and benefit of the Tennessee Valley Authority (hereinafter called TV A), pursuant to § 25 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, Title 16 U.S.C., § 831x, 16" U.S.C.A. § 831x. The property was condemned for the Cherokee Reservoir in Tennessee. The sole question in each case is whether the award of the three judges represents the fair market value of the land; but as the cases present different issues of fact they will be considered separately.

Case No. 9667 involves the condemnation of a farm of 234 acres for which the TVA paid into court $30,000. The three commissioners appointed by the District Court valued the land at $35,500. On exceptions being filed, a hearing was held before three United States District Judges, who awarded the landowner the sum of $32,000.

The farm is situated on a state highway one and a half miles from Jefferson City, Tennessee, a town of about 2,000 population and the site of a college of some 600 students. The tract contains about 180 acres of cleared land, with the remainder in timber, of which 153,800 board feet were merchantable. The farm, which is excellently watered, included about 54 acres of bottom land which in an average year produced three and a half to five tons of alfalfa, 25 to 40 bushels of barley, and 25 to 50 bushels of corn to the acre. The farm was used mainly for raising dairy cattle, beef cattle, sheep and hogs, and for raising some tobacco. Most of the feed for the cattle was raised on the farm. While some Johnson grass was found on the bottom land, it did not interfere with crops of alfalfa and barley, and certain witnesses said it was excellent for fodder.

There were three residences on the land. The main residence, a large brick house built in 1870 but remodeled at a cost of $6,000 in 1925, had eleven rooms, three bathrooms and five cedar-lined closets, and hardwood floors. The kitchen was electrically equipped, but a wood-burning furnace supplied heat only to half the house. A brick tenant-house dating from the Civil War was equipped with running water and a bathroom and plastered throughout. In addition there was a frame tenant-house in habitable condition. There were two barns on the premises, one a dairy barn constructed by adding a wing to a brick cotton mill which had been built during the Civil War. The barn had concrete flooring and had attached to it a large concrete silo. There was another large barn with a concrete base and a reenforced concrete floor. Smaller buildings included a two-story brick storage house, cattle scales in a concrete pit, chicken houses, garage, tool house, storage cellar, and a laying and brooder house. The outside fences were in good condition, but were eighteen years old, while the inside fences were described as only “fair” or “adequate.” There were several hundred shrubs on the place, and the main house was pleasantly set among trees on a hill. The premises also included two orchards with over forty good apple trees, grape vines, dewberries, raspberries and strawberries.

Numerous witnesses testified as to the value of the property. Witnesses for the landowner estimated the value at from $43,000 to $65,000, the figure arrived at usually being in the neighborhood of $45,-000, while witnesses for the TVA fixed the value at from $21,000 to $27,000, to- which should be added $1,691.10, the conceded value of the timber.

The landowner contends in effect that certain testimony of witnesses for the TVA has no probative value on the ground that they based their estimates on recent sales of other properties. He concedes the correctness of the rule as stated by this court in Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F.2d 95, certiorari denied Welch v. United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority, 309 U.S. 688, 60 S.Ct. 889, 84 L.Ed. 1030, that sales at arm’s length of similar property are the best evidence of market value. However, he contends that the tracts of land compared with his farm were not similar because of differences of location, improvement, soil, etc., and because owing to his desire to spend his last years *958 in his old family home he had improved the land for estate, rather than for strictly farm purposes. It is true that the various properties differ in detail. The Cantwell farm is not located near a college town, and it is two miles farther from Rutledge than the landowner’s farm is from Jefferson City. The Baer, Peck, Mathis and Turley farms do not have modern residences. The Peck farm is not located on a paved road, and is eight miles from any town, while the Turley farm is ten miles from the nearest town and high school. The Taylor farm has a railroad track through its entire length, and the house is' “just a good average farm home.” The Mathis farm is some twelve miles from the nearest town.

We think the objection that this evidence throws no light on the question of fair market value is untenable. The properties compared with the Fain farm are in the vicinity, partly bottom land and partly upland, suitable for dairy farming. The sales were of farms at least somewhat similar and relatively close to the Fain farm, and were properly considered within the ruling of Jones v. United States, 258 U.S. 40, 42 S.Ct. 218, 66 L.Ed. 453, which holds that the admissibility of such evidence is largely within the discretion of the court.

The TVA, on the other hand, claims that the values set by the landowner’s witnesses have little or no probative force because they were based on a summation theory or reached by improper capitalization of income. Several of the landowner’s witnesses stated, among other things, that they arrived at their estimates by making separate valuations of land and buildings, and adding up the total. This is held to be an improper way of estimating the market value of property involved in condemnation proceedings. Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 6 Cir., 91 F.2d 884; Devou v. City of Cincinnati, 6 Cir., 162 F. 633; United States v. Meyer, 7 Cir., 113 F.2d 387, certiorari denied 311 U.S. 706, 61 S.Ct. 174, 85 L.Ed. 459.

One of the objections to the use of the summation theory is the usual failure in making estimates based on reproduction cost, to make adequate allowance for depreciation of improvements. Here various witnesses for the landowner allowed depreciation of from 35% to 45% or 50%, in their estimates of the value of the buildings.

We do not, however, read the testimony offered by the landowner as being based solely on the summation theory. The landowner’s witnesses were thoroughly familiar with the land. Three of them had known'it for forty or fifty years. Some of them had worked on it or hunted over it repeatedly, and had examined the crops on many occasions.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
145 F.2d 956, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 2713, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fain-v-united-states-ex-rel-tennessee-valley-authority-ca6-1944.