Faheem Abdul Jabbar v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: August 20, 2025
• Docket: 24-0088
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0088 Filed August 20, 2025

FAHEEM ABDUL JABBAR, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

Faheem Abdul Jabbar appeals the district court’s order denying his

application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

James S. Blackburn, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and

Mullins, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

MULLINS, Senior Judge.

In September 2022, Faheem Abdul Jabbar and another suspect forced their

way into the garage of a Des Moines residence and attempted to haul away a 1997

Chevrolet Camero. The State charged Jabbar with third-degree burglary, a

class “D” felony. At the time, Jabbar was on parole from a twenty-year prison

sentence for a felony drug conviction. The State filed a separate complaint alleging

a violation of Jabbar’s parole.

A few days before trial in the burglary case, the State offered to drop

Jabbar’s felony charge if he would enter an Alford1 plea to third-degree attempted

burglary, an aggravated misdemeanor. The draft plea agreement also provided

that the State would recommend a sentence running “concurrent to parole

matters.” When Jabbar’s attorney presented him with the State’s proposal, Jabbar

accepted it immediately. His attorney later recalled, “There was no hesitation and

no discussion.” Jabbar was sentenced the same day to a term of imprisonment

not to exceed two years.

According to Jabbar, he leapt at the State’s plea offer because “it was my

understanding . . . that if I got the [burglary] charges dropped to less than a felony,

I would be kept on parole.” But Jabbar was mistaken. In Iowa, conviction and

incarceration for an aggravated misdemeanor triggers the automatic revocation of

parole. Iowa Code § 908.10A(1) (2023); see also Rhiner v. State, 703 N.W.2d

174, 178 (Iowa 2005) (explaining that “revocation occurs by operation of law” when

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). “An Alford plea is different from a guilty plea in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 n.1 (Iowa 2001). 3

the conditions of section 908.10A are satisfied). Everyone agrees that Jabbar and

his attorney never discussed this dimension of the plea deal.

Shortly after his sentencing in the burglary case, the court revoked Jabbar’s

parole and reinstated his twenty-year term of imprisonment. Jabbar filed an

application for postconviction relief, alleging his counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to advise Jabbar about the parole consequences of an

aggravated misdemeanor conviction. The district court held a hearing and denied

Jabbar’s application on the merits. Jabbar now appeals.2

When a postconviction-relief applicant alleges ineffective assistance of

counsel, our review is de novo. Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 521, 522 (Iowa

2021). Jabbar must show his attorney “failed to perform an essential duty” and

that this failure “resulted in prejudice.” Id. (cleaned up). We may affirm the district

court’s denial of relief if either of these elements is lacking. Ledezma v. State, 626

N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). In this case, the court found that Jabbar’s claim

failed the duty prong. Citing our supreme court’s statement that “parole eligibility

is a collateral consequence of a plea,” Sothman, 967 N.W.2d at 523, it found

counsel had no affirmative duty to advise Jabbar about how a third-degree

attempted burglary plea would impact his parole.

2 Jabbar filed this appeal on January 17, 2024. By that time, he had already discharged his sentence for third-degree attempted burglary. We also take notice from the Department of Corrections’ offender database that Jabbar was paroled again from his drug sentence in December 2023. Thus, for the entire time this case has languished on appeal (due to a briefing default by Jabbar and subsequent delays by the State), Jabbar has enjoyed the same parole status he had before his burglary arrest. We question whether there remains a justiciable controversy. But because neither party suggests Jabbar’s appeal is moot, we set that issue aside and proceed to the merits. 4

We decline to reach the duty question.3 Instead, we conclude the district

court’s ruling must be affirmed on prejudice grounds. Even assuming his attorney

failed to perform an essential duty, Jabbar had the burden to show a reasonable

probability that he would have rejected the State’s offer and taken the case to trial

had he not been mistaken about the consequences of his plea. Id. at 526. An

applicant’s bare assertion that he would have changed course is typically not

enough. See Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 714 (Iowa 2021) (noting an

applicant’s “self-serving answers to leading questions” failed to overcome

evidence of his desire to plead).

A bare assertion of prejudice is all that Jabbar offers here. He testified at

the postconviction-relief hearing that his “every intent was to go to trial” and that

he only took the State’s deal because he thought it would allow him to stay on

parole. But the deal came with more advantages than that. By accepting the

agreement, Jabbar dodged a potential class “D” felony conviction and reduced his

prison exposure from five years to two. See Iowa Code § 902.9. He also secured

a recommendation for a concurrent sentence, avoiding the statutory presumption

that his new sentence would run consecutively to the one imposed for his parole

violation. See id. § 908.10A(2). On top of that, the State agreed Jabbar could

receive these benefits without an admission of guilt.

In light of these circumstances, we are not persuaded by Jabbar’s after-the-

fact testimony that, but for his misunderstanding, he would have rejected the

3 We do note that Sothman concerned an attorney’s advice regarding the client’s

prospective eligibility for parole from a sentence imposed under the plea agreement—not an attorney’s failure to warn the client regarding automatic revocation of parole from a prior sentence. See 967 N.W.2d at 523–26. 5

State’s plea offer and proceeded to trial. See Doss, 961 N.W.2d at 714; Sothman,

967 N.W.2d at 526–27. Because Jabbar did not carry his burden on the prejudice

prong of his ineffective-assistance claim, he is not entitled to postconviction relief.

We affirm the ruling of the district court.

AFFIRMED.