JESSICA FAGALNIFIN, No. 2:22-cv-00734-DJC-JDP Plaintiff, v. ORDER CREDIT UNION D/B/A FIRST TECH FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, a federal chartered credit union; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive Defendants. After leaving her job with Defendant, Plaintiff alleged that she had been misclassified as an exempt employee and therefore did not receive protections afforded to non-exempt employees under state law. Plaintiff also alleges that when she attempted to exercise her right to family and medical leave under a federal statute, Defendant interfered and retaliated. Defendant argues that Plaintiff received leave under the federal statute and that it did not otherwise retaliate. Defendant also maintains that Plaintiff’s claim regarding alleged violations of labor laws is overly broad and unspecified such that summary adjudication is required as a matter of law. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication (ECF No. 62).
Jessica Fagalnifin (“Plaintiff”) worked for First Tech Federal Credit Union
(“Defendant”) from 2018 to 2021. (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶¶ 16, 29,
ECF No. 15.) Throughout her employment, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
misclassified her and other employees as exempt, which resulted in noncompliance
with state regulations for non-exempt employees regarding breaks and overtime pay. (Id. ¶¶ 4–6.) In May 2019, Plaintiff took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to care for her sick daughter. (Penna Decl. (ECF No. 62-3) ¶ 10; Fagalnifin Decl. (ECF No. 64-2) ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against for using FMLA leave, including by a coworker making “inappropriate comments.” (SAC ¶ 26.) In April 2020, Plaintiff took leave because her daughter’s school was closed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Penna Decl. ¶ 12; Price Decl., Ex. B, Fagalnifin Dep. (ECF No. 62-3) at 176:5–177:1.) Because Plaintiff was told by her supervisors that her absence did not qualify for FMLA leave, she did not submit a formal request and instead utilized paid time off. (Fagalnifin Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant therefore interfered with her FMLA rights, as she argues she was entitled to FMLA leave in April 2020. (SAC ¶¶ 54, 56.) In the operative complaint, Plaintiff brings seven claims: (1) failure to pay overtime wages pursuant to California Labor Code Sections 510 and 558; (2) failure to provide meal breaks pursuant to California Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 512; (3) failure to provide rest breaks pursuant to California Labor Code Section 226.7; (4) FMLA retaliation and interference pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 2615; (5) violation of the Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2698; (6) libel pursuant to California Civil Code Section 45; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (SAC ¶¶ 35–76.) Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Superior Court of California, Placer County. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) Defendant then timely removed the case under federal question jurisdiction. (Id. at 4.) Concurrent with the present motion, Plaintiff requested — and the Court granted — dismissal with prejudice of her libel and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. (Request for Dismissal, ECF No. 61;
Order Granting Request to Dismiss, ECF No. 63.)
Defendant now moves for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s FMLA and
PAGA claims. (Mot. for Summary Adjudication, ECF No. 62.) Specifically, Defendant
seeks summary adjudication as to five noticed issues: (1) the FMLA interference claim fails because Plaintiff received leave under the FMLA; (2) the FMLA retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff received leave under the FMLA; (3) the FMLA retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between an adverse employment action and her FMLA leave; (4) the PAGA claim fails because it cannot be proven in an efficient manner; and (5) the PAGA claim fails because it is overbroad. (Notice of Mot. at 2–3, ECF No. 62.) The matter is fully briefed. On June 12, 2025, the Court heard oral argument from the parties on this motion and took the matter under submission. (ECF No. 69.) Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, read in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, indicates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of fact exists only if “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). I. Evidentiary Objections As an initial matter, Defendant submitted evidentiary objections to the declarations of Charles Raub (ECF No. 65-1) and Jessica Fagalnifin (ECF No. 65-2) on the grounds that these declarations contradict deposition testimony and do not satisfy the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court has reviewed these evidentiary objections
but declines to rule as to each individually, as courts self-police evidentiary issues on
motions for summary judgment and a formal ruling is unnecessary to the determination
of this motion. See Grindstone Indian Rancheria v. Olliff, No. 2-17-CV-02292-JAM-JDP,
2021 WL 3077464, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2021) (citing Sandoval v. Cty. Of San Diego,
985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2021). The Ninth Circuit held, “To survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56.” Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2001). As such, objections are generally unnecessary on summary judgment because they are “duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.” Burch v. Regents of the University of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). “[P]arties briefing summary judgment motions would be better served to ‘simply argue’ the import of the facts reflected in the evidence rather than expending time and resources compiling laundry lists of relevance objections.” Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The only evidentiary rule for summary judgment relevant here is the “sham affidavit” rule, which is that “a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony.” Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court did not consider statements contained in the Declaration of Plaintiff Jessica Fagalnifin (ECF No. 64-2) to the extent that they were irrelevant to the Court’s resolution of her claims or contradict her deposition testimony. See Block, 253 F.3d at 419 n.2; infra Discussion Part II. “The FMLA creates two interrelated substantive rights for employees. First, an employee has the right to take up to twelve weeks of leave . . . . Second, an employee who takes FMLA leave has the right to be restored to his or her original position or to a position equivalent in benefits, pay, and conditions of employment upon return from leave. ” Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). Plaintiff alleges both violations of the FMLA: interference and retaliation.
A. Interference
Plaintiff argues that Defendant interfered with her use of FMLA leave during the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. (Opp’n at 5, ECF No. 64.) To establish a claim for FMLA
interference, among other factors, a plaintiff must show that she was entitled to leave under the FMLA. Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2011). Because there is no evidence showing that Plaintiff was entitled to FMLA leave, her claims fails. An employee is entitled to FMLA leave: (A) because of the birth of a child; (B) because of the placement of a child for adoption or foster care; (C) to care for a spouse or child who has a serious health condition; (D) because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of their position; or (E) because of any qualifying exigency arising from a family member on active duty in the Armed Forces. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Plaintiff does not provide any evidence demonstrating that she satisfied one of these statutory provisions. Rather, she states that she took leave in 2020 because her daughter’s school was closed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Fagalnifin Dep. at 176:5–177:1, 180:2–10, 276:11–278:6.) The only other statutory provision available at the time Plaintiff took leave was a temporary expansion of the FMLA to cover employees who took leave because their children’s schools were closed because of the pandemic. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(F); 29 U.S.C. § 2620(a)(2). While at first glance Plaintiff falls within the intended beneficiaries of this temporary expansion, the amendment did not apply to her. The temporary expansion only covered employers with fewer than 500 employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2620(a)(1)(B). As of April 15, 2025, Defendant has approximately 1,650 employees. (Penna Decl. ¶ 5.) At oral argument, Defendant represented — and Plaintiff conceded — that Plaintiff was ineligible for the temporary expansion because Defendant was not covered by the amendment, as Defendant employed more than 500 employees when Plaintiff requested leave.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff provides no evidence showing she was entitled
to leave under the FMLA, her claim necessarily fails and the Court grants Defendant’s
motion as to the issue of FMLA interference. See Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778.
B. Retaliation
Plaintiff argues that she suffered adverse employment actions following her FMLA leave in 2019 because another employee made “snide comments” and because she received an admonishment in an official performance review. (Opp’n at 6.) To establish a claim for retaliation under the FMLA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she engaged in a protected activity under the FMLA; (2) she suffered some adverse employment action by the employer following the protected activity; and (3) the adverse employment action was causally linked to the protected activity.” Perata v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 21-CV-02819-TSH, 2023 WL 4537695, at *24 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2023) (quoting Yphantides v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 21CV1575- GPC(BLM), 2023 WL 2438916, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2023)). Regarding an adverse employment action, the Ninth Circuit held, “Although the type of sanction need not be particularly great in order to find that rights have been violated, the plaintiff must nonetheless demonstrate the loss of a valuable governmental benefit or privilege. Mere threats and harsh words are insufficient.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 875 (9th Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). First, regarding another employee’s remarks, Plaintiff states that Erika Cantrell, a senior member of Defendant’s staff, “expressed derisive incredulity” by “mocking the health” of Plaintiff’s daughter. (Fagalnifin Decl. ¶ 10.) As a matter of law, these comments cannot form the basis of an adverse employment action because “harsh words are insufficient.” See Nunez, 147 F.3d at 875. Second, as to her admonishment, Plaintiff states that she was critiqued for excessive absences in her quarterly performance review in July 2021. (Fagalnifin Decl. ¶ 12; see also id., Ex A.) Defendant argues Plaintiff’s declaration should be stricken because she previously testified that she received a positive performance review that
resulted in a pay increase in July 2021. (Fagalnifin Dep. at 220:19–221:13.) The Court
strikes Plaintiff’s declaration to the extent it states that Plaintiff was admonished in a
performance review in July 2021. See Block, 253 F.3d at 419 n.2. However, the “sham
affidavit” rule only applies to sworn statements, not proffered evidence that
contradicts prior testimony. Plaintiff introduced the performance review itself, which states that she “had a pattern of excessive unscheduled absences.” (Fagalnifin Decl., Ex A.) The Court can therefore consider this evidence. The Court finds that no reasonable trier of fact would find a causal connection between Plaintiff’s FMLA leave in 2019 and her performance review in 2021. Plaintiff’s supervisor noted on the performance review that it was not discussed with Plaintiff as she already had resigned from her job. (Id.) Plaintiff presents no evidence explaining how a performance review created after she resigned from her job is related to FMLA leave she took two years prior. Because there is insufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that Plaintiff’s admonishment was causally related to her FMLA leave, Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim fails. See Perata, 2023 WL 4537695, at *24. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion as to the FMLA retaliation claim. As such, the Court dismisses the entirety of Plaintiff’s FMLA claim.1 Unlike a more typical lawsuit where a plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for their injuries, a PAGA plaintiff recovers civil penalties on behalf of the California Labor Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”). L Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2014). As such, “PAGA plaintiffs are private attorneys general who, stepping into the shoes of the LWDA, bring claims on behalf of the state agency.” Id. To establish a PAGA cause of action, a plaintiff must have been
1 Though the Court dismisses the only federal claim in this action, it chooses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 940 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)). employed by the alleged violator and have experienced at least one violation.
Williams v. Alacrity Sols. Grp., LLC, 331 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 883–84 (2025). Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s PAGA claim should be dismissed because its scope is too wide
and it cannot be efficiently tried. (Mot. at 10–15.) The Court addresses these issues in
turn.
A. The Scope of the Claim Defendant argues that the scope of the PAGA claim is overbroad regarding the PAGA time period and the underlying Labor Code violations. (Mot. at 13–15.) 1. The PAGA Period Defendant asks the Court to limit the PAGA period (i.e. limit the timeframe of alleged Labor Code violations that Plaintiff can present at trial) to June 15, 2021, through July 30, 2021. (Mot. at 13.) Plaintiff filed a PAGA notice of claims on June 15, 2022. (Price Decl., Ex. D.) Defendant argues that “the penalty period for PAGA actions is one year prior to the date of filing the PAGA notice.” (Mot. at 6 (citing Cal. Code Civ. P § 340; Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3).) Neither of the cited statutory provisions support Defendant’s contention that a PAGA penalty period is one year prior to the filing of notice. Code of Civil Procedure Section 340 states that the statute of limitations for actions like PAGA is one year.2 Cal. Code Civ. P § 340; see also Williams, 331 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 884 (“[T]he statute of limitations period for a PAGA action is one year.”). Labor Code Section 2699.3 lists the requirements a PAGA plaintiff must satisfy before filing action, such as giving written notice and allowing the LWDA an opportunity to investigate.3 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3. Defendant presents no caselaw, nor can the Court find any, holding that the time period of a PAGA claim is one year before the filing of notice. On the contrary, “a PAGA action accrues when the Labor Code violation last occurred; as applied here, 2 Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff satisfied the statute of limitations. 3 Defendant also does not contest that Plaintiff complied with these statutory requirements. when a PAGA plaintiff is no longer employed by the violator-employer, the violation
last occurred (and the cause of action accrues) on the PAGA plaintiff’s last day of
employment.” Williams, 331 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 884. Because Plaintiff’s last day of
employment with Defendant was July 30, 2021, her PAGA action did not accrue until
then. See id.; Fagalnifin Dep., Ex. 18. The Court holds that because Plaintiff’s PAGA
claim had not accrued until her last day of employment, Plaintiff is not prohibited from introducing evidence of violations that occurred before June 15, 2021. The Court therefore declines to limit the timeframe of alleged violations that Plaintiff can introduce at trial. 2. Whether the Underlying Claims are Overbroad and Unspecified Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is overbroad because she cannot sustain the underlying claims for violations of the Labor Code. (Mot. at 13–15.) The crux of Plaintiff’s theory of Defendant’s Labor Code violations is that she and other employees were misclassified as exempt workers. (Opp’n at 8–10.) To be classified as exempt, an employee must earn no less than two times the state minimum wage for full-time employment, which is defined as 40 hours per week. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11040. California’s Department of Industrial Relations calculates this threshold for exemption as two times the minimum wage, multiplied by 40 hours per week, and then multiplied by 52 weeks per year.4 In 2021, the minimum wage was $14.00 per hour.5 Thus, to be considered exempt in 2021, an employee needed to earn at least $58,240. This salary threshold is a floor for an employee to be non-exempt, as an employee earning less than the threshold cannot be classified as exempt. Cal. Code 4 State of California Department of Industrial Relations, The Labor Commissioner’s Office Reminds Employers that California’s Minimum Wage Increases to $16.50 Per Hour on January 1, https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2024/2024- 107.html#:~:text=An%20employee%20must%20earn%20no (last visited June 17, 2025) (calculating the threshold amount for exemption as two times the minimum wage multiplied by 40 hours per week and 52 weeks per year).
5 State of California Department of Industrial Relations, Labor Commissioner’s Office Minimum Wage Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_minimumwage.htm (last visited June 17, 2025). Regs. tit. 8, § 11040. Upon Plaintiff’s request, Defendant furnished a list of employees
who were exempt salaried employees earning less than $58,240 in 2021. (Price Decl.
(ECF No. 62-3), Ex. E.) Defendant’s list identifies seven employees, including Plaintiff,
who were salaried exempt workers in 2021 that earned less than $58,240. See id.
Accordingly, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Defendant misclassified these
employees as exempt. Plaintiff alleges that by misclassifying her and other employees as exempt, Defendant violated three provisions of the Labor Code. First, she alleges that Defendant failed to pay overtimes wages in violation of Labor Code Section 510. (Compl. ¶ 59.) This provision does not apply to exempt workers, and thus Plaintiff alleges she was unlawfully deprived of this protection because she was misclassified as exempt. See Cal. Lab. Code § 515. Second, Plaintiff states that Defendant failed to provide rest breaks in violation of Labor Code Section 226.7. (Compl. ¶ 59.) This provision also does not apply to exempt workers, and thus Plaintiff alleges she was not provided this right because she was misclassified. Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide meal breaks in violation of Labor Code Section 512. (Compl. ¶ 59.) This provision applies to exempt and non-exempt workers alike. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant violated this provision is independent from her allegation that she and others were misclassified as exempt. In support of these alleged violations, Plaintiff states that she was denied overtime pay, meal breaks, and rest breaks. (Fagalnifin Decl. ¶ 2.) Accordingly, a reasonable trier of fact — already finding that Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and other employees as exempt — could further find that Defendant violated all three provisions of the Labor Code. Defendant argues it did not violate any provision of the Labor Code because it provided Plaintiff and other employees with a handbook detailing its policies. (Mot. at 13–14.) Regarding meal breaks, the handbook states, “As a general rule it is expected that employees scheduled to work at least 6 hours in one day should receive a lunch break of 30 minutes in addition to a schedule break(s).” (Penna Decl., Ex. A.) The
handbook’s California addendum explains that it is Defendant’s policy to relieve
employees of all duty during meal periods so that they can use the break as they wish.
(Id.) However, Plaintiff states that she was denied meal breaks because she was
“repeatedly asked to run errands for [her] superiors.” (Fagalnifin Decl. ¶ 2.) There
thus is a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant impeded or discouraged employees from taking their meal breaks. See Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1040 (2012). As for rest breaks, the handbook clearly states that Defendant “provides non- exempt employees with the opportunity to take” such breaks. (Id. (emphasis added).) Similarly, regarding overtime, the handbook states that Defendant “will pay non- exempt employees overtime as required by federal and state law.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Defendant therefore cannot argue that its handbook put Plaintiff and other allegedly misclassified employees on notice of their rights as non-exempt employees under the Labor Code. Defendant’s final argument is that because Plaintiff cannot establish liability as to all employees, the PAGA claim should be dismissed. (Mot. at 15.) Defendant explains that Plaintiff cannot prove liability as to all employees because at least two of the seven employees allegedly misclassified as exempt “never complained to First Tech about any unpaid wages.” (Id.) To support this proposition, Defendant presents two declarations, each from a supervisor of an employee allegedly misclassified as exempt. (See Kaut Decl. (ECF No. 62-3); Jensen Decl. (ECF No. 62-3).) These declarations only show that two of Defendant’s supervisory employees have not personally seen or learned of any violations of the Labor Code. (See Kaut Decl. ¶¶ 14, 23; Jensen Decl. ¶¶ 14, 21.) This evidence does not show that Defendant never violated the Labor Code, or that it is not liable as to the two employees allegedly misclassified as exempt. As such, this evidence is not dispositive and does not establish that the PAGA claim is overbroad. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication
as to the issue of the breadth of the PAGA claim.
B. The Manageability of the Claim
Finally, Defendant argues the PAGA claim should be dismissed because it
cannot efficiently be tried. (Mot. at 10–13.) Defendant states that, to determine
whether it improperly classified employees as exempt, the trier of fact would need to examine the salary and job characteristics of each employee.6 (Id. at 11–12.) Defendant claims that this process cannot be done in an efficient manner. (Id. at 12.) Defendant furthers that even if Plaintiff could establish that she and other employees were misclassified, Plaintiff would then have to show that Defendant violated the Labor Code, which would also involve an individual-level analysis that would be cumbersome. (Id.) Defendant therefore asks the Court to hold that the PAGA claim fails as a matter of law. Ironically, Defendant relies on a California Supreme Court decision that forecloses its argument. See Mot. at 10–11 (citing Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc., 15 Cal. 5th 582 (2024)). In Estrada, the California Supreme Court held that “trial courts lack inherent authority to strike a PAGA claim on manageability grounds.” Estrada, 15 Cal. 5th at 619. Instead, the court emphasized that “trial courts have numerous tools that can be used to manage complex cases” like PAGA cases, such as “[r]epresentative testimony, surveys, and statistical analysis.” Id. at 618 (citations omitted). “Indeed, given that the purpose of the recovery of civil penalties in a PAGA action is to remediate present violations and deter future ones rather than to redress employees’ injuries, statistical methods designed to reveal generalized characteristics of a population seem particularly appropriate for use in adjudicating such claims.” Id. at 619 (cleaned up). The Estrada court clarified that although a trial court may not
6 In addition to the salary threshold, California regulations dictate whether an employee is exempt by determining if their job responsibilities fall under the purview of an Executive, Administrative, or Professional exemption. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11040. dismiss a PAGA claim on manageability grounds, a court still may limit the evidence
that a party can present at trial. Id.
Defendant requests summary adjudication on the PAGA claim not because
there is no genuine issue of material fact, but because Defendant believes the claim
would be too complicated for the Court to adjudicate. This argument is substantively
the same as asking the Court to do what is explicitly prohibited under controlling state law: strike or dismiss a PAGA claim on manageability grounds. See id. Accordingly, the Court holds it cannot grant summary adjudication as to this claim. After Plaintiff correctly discussed the import of Estrada, Defendant made a final effort at seeking dismissal by focusing on a single line in the court’s ruling. (See Opp’n at 11; Reply at 10–11.) The Estrada court held that “a trial court may issue substantive rulings, including those . . . on motions for summary judgment . . . to fairly and efficiently adjudicate an action in cases in which a plaintiff pleads the claim in such an overbroad or unspecific manner that the plaintiff is unable to prove liability as to all or most employees.” Estrada, 15 Cal. 5th at 619–20. Defendant cites this holding but fails to state what it wants the Court to limit in terms of Plaintiff’s evidence. (See Reply at 10–11.) Rather, Defendant simply asks the Court to find that “Plaintiff cannot establish liability as to all or most of the employees without individually speaking with them.”7 (Id. at 11.) As explained above, the Estrada court only left authority for a district court to limit evidence that could be presented at trial, not dismiss a PAGA claim on manageability grounds. See Estrada, 15 Cal. 5th at 619. According, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the issue of the efficiency of the PAGA claim.8 7 Throughout its briefing, Defendant makes much ado about Plaintiff’s statement in her deposition that the only way to determine if an employee experienced a Labor Code violation “would be to go person by person and ask them.” (See e.g., Mot. at 15 (citing Fagalnifin Dep. at 199:3–20).) Defendant’s argument does not persuade the Court. After all, Plaintiff is not a lawyer or expert on how courts handle PAGA claims. Considering the case law discussed herein, the Court attributes no weight to Plaintiff’s statement in determining this motion.
8 At oral argument, Defendant represented that the California Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”) list For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion for Summary Adjudication (ECF No. 62). Specifically, the Court grants Defendant's Motion as to the FMLA interference and retaliation claims, such that Plaintiff can no longer pursue a claim based in the FMLA. The Court denies Defendant's Motion as to the PAGA claim. Dated: _June 20, 2025 “Darel A Ch brett Hon. Daniel alabretta " UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE — SSS manageability as an element of a PAGA claim that a plaintiff must prove at trial. The Court is unable to locate any CACI instructions for PAGA actions and therefore disregards this argument. 14