OPINION
HUDSON, Justice.
Appellant, Gerard Irving Faerman (“Faer-man”), was charged by indictment with possession of less than 28 grams of cocaine. Although Faerman entered a plea of guilty, the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed him under the terms and conditions of probation for a period of five years in accordance with the terms of a plea bargain agreement. Two years later, the trial court adjudicated Faerman’s guilt for failing to abide by the conditions of probation and sentenced him to confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for 12 years and assessed a $500 fine. Faerman raises five points of error regarding the omission of a formal punishment hearing, the denial of an effective appeal, and the trial court’s refusal to set an appeal bond. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In his first and second points of error, Faerman complains (1) the trial court erred in failing to conduct a punishment hearing before sentencing him to the penitentiary; and (2) his counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the absence of a punishment hearing. The record reflects that both sides presented evidence at the hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt. After the parties had rested and presented argument, the trial court found the allegations in [846]*846the State’s motion to be trae, adjudicated Faerman’s guilt, and immediately assessed punishment. The trial court then inquired whether Faerman had anything to say, and when he had nothing to say, the court remanded him to the custody of the sheriff.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “when a trial court finds that an accused has committed a violation as alleged by the State and adjudicates a previously deferred finding of guilt, the court must then conduct a second phase to determine punishment.” Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).1 Here, the trial court failed to conduct a “second phase.” The State contends that Faerman waived the error by failing to object. However, in Issa, the court observed that where there is no opportunity to object, ie., when the trial court adjudicates guilt and immediately assesses punishment, the error can be preserved by a motion for new trial. See id. Here, the trial judge immediately proceeded to assess appellant’s punishment after adjudicating his guilt, but he also asked Faerman if he had any response.2 Moreover, Faer-man did not file a motion for new trial. Accordingly, the error, if any, has not been preserved for review.
Faerman also argues, however, that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to preserve the issue for review. The standard of review is whether, after examining the totality of the representation, appellant received reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Ex parte Walker, 794 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Counsel does not mean errorless counsel, nor does it mean counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 514 n. 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Caraway v. State, 417 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex.Crim.App. 1967).
The record reflects that Faerman’s attorney called numerous witnesses at the adjudication hearing who testified that (1) Faerman was previously employed in the installation of laminates using glues and solvents which affected his memory; (2) he is a hard worker; (3) he has an alcohol problem; (4) his alcohol problem will not likely be corrected in the penitentiary; (6) his alcohol addiction could be remedied by attending an alcohol abuse program known as Houston Recovery; (7) he contributes $400 a month to the support of his minor son; and (8) family members would provide employment and supervision for Faerman. Accordingly, it appears that counsel effectively presented evidence that was aimed at mitigating Faerman’s punishment. Faerman does not contend there was additional evidence which could have been presented at a formal punishment hearing. Appellant’s first and second points of error are overruled.
In his third and fourth points of error, Faerman contends the statutory scheme which prevents him from appealing the trial court’s adjudication of guilt violates the equal [847]*847protection clause of both the federal and state constitutions. The legislature has provided:
On violation of a condition of community supervision under Subsection (a) of this section, the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Section 21 of this article. The defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this determination.
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). Faerman argues that because this prohibition applies to those defendants who are granted deferred adjudication, but does not apply to those who have their sentences suspended, the statute creates an unjustifiable distinction that renders it unconstitutional.
It is well settled that the Equal Protection Clause allows the Legislature considerable leeway to enact legislation that may appear to affect similarly situated people differently. Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Absent an interference with the exercise of a “fundamental” right or a burden on a “suspect” class, classifications will not be set aside on equal protection grounds if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. The right to appeal does not create a suspect class or infringe on a fundamental right. Burger v. State, 920 S.W.2d 438, 437 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Unlike a defendant who is placed on community supervision after his guilt has been adjudicated and his sentence suspended, a defendant who is granted deferred adjudication will have no record of conviction if he successfully completes the term of community supervision. This is a valuable benefit, and the legislature could rationally have chosen to condition the award of such a benefit on the relinquishment of a right to appeal, thereby conserving the judicial and prosecutorial resources of the State. Rocha v. State, 903 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.); Burger, 920 S.W.2d at 438.
Finding that there is a rational and legitimate state interest in curtailing appeals from hearings where guilt is adjudicated under Article 42.12, § 5(b), we conclude the statute is not unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of either the federal or state constitutions. Accordingly, Faerman’s third and fourth points of error are overruled.
In his final point of error, Faerman claims the trial court erred in refusing to set an appeal bond. After his guilt was adjudicated, Faerman requested the trial court set bond pending appeal in his Written Notice of Appeal.
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OPINION
HUDSON, Justice.
Appellant, Gerard Irving Faerman (“Faer-man”), was charged by indictment with possession of less than 28 grams of cocaine. Although Faerman entered a plea of guilty, the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed him under the terms and conditions of probation for a period of five years in accordance with the terms of a plea bargain agreement. Two years later, the trial court adjudicated Faerman’s guilt for failing to abide by the conditions of probation and sentenced him to confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for 12 years and assessed a $500 fine. Faerman raises five points of error regarding the omission of a formal punishment hearing, the denial of an effective appeal, and the trial court’s refusal to set an appeal bond. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In his first and second points of error, Faerman complains (1) the trial court erred in failing to conduct a punishment hearing before sentencing him to the penitentiary; and (2) his counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the absence of a punishment hearing. The record reflects that both sides presented evidence at the hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt. After the parties had rested and presented argument, the trial court found the allegations in [846]*846the State’s motion to be trae, adjudicated Faerman’s guilt, and immediately assessed punishment. The trial court then inquired whether Faerman had anything to say, and when he had nothing to say, the court remanded him to the custody of the sheriff.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “when a trial court finds that an accused has committed a violation as alleged by the State and adjudicates a previously deferred finding of guilt, the court must then conduct a second phase to determine punishment.” Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).1 Here, the trial court failed to conduct a “second phase.” The State contends that Faerman waived the error by failing to object. However, in Issa, the court observed that where there is no opportunity to object, ie., when the trial court adjudicates guilt and immediately assesses punishment, the error can be preserved by a motion for new trial. See id. Here, the trial judge immediately proceeded to assess appellant’s punishment after adjudicating his guilt, but he also asked Faerman if he had any response.2 Moreover, Faer-man did not file a motion for new trial. Accordingly, the error, if any, has not been preserved for review.
Faerman also argues, however, that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to preserve the issue for review. The standard of review is whether, after examining the totality of the representation, appellant received reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Ex parte Walker, 794 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Counsel does not mean errorless counsel, nor does it mean counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 514 n. 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Caraway v. State, 417 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex.Crim.App. 1967).
The record reflects that Faerman’s attorney called numerous witnesses at the adjudication hearing who testified that (1) Faerman was previously employed in the installation of laminates using glues and solvents which affected his memory; (2) he is a hard worker; (3) he has an alcohol problem; (4) his alcohol problem will not likely be corrected in the penitentiary; (6) his alcohol addiction could be remedied by attending an alcohol abuse program known as Houston Recovery; (7) he contributes $400 a month to the support of his minor son; and (8) family members would provide employment and supervision for Faerman. Accordingly, it appears that counsel effectively presented evidence that was aimed at mitigating Faerman’s punishment. Faerman does not contend there was additional evidence which could have been presented at a formal punishment hearing. Appellant’s first and second points of error are overruled.
In his third and fourth points of error, Faerman contends the statutory scheme which prevents him from appealing the trial court’s adjudication of guilt violates the equal [847]*847protection clause of both the federal and state constitutions. The legislature has provided:
On violation of a condition of community supervision under Subsection (a) of this section, the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Section 21 of this article. The defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this determination.
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). Faerman argues that because this prohibition applies to those defendants who are granted deferred adjudication, but does not apply to those who have their sentences suspended, the statute creates an unjustifiable distinction that renders it unconstitutional.
It is well settled that the Equal Protection Clause allows the Legislature considerable leeway to enact legislation that may appear to affect similarly situated people differently. Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Absent an interference with the exercise of a “fundamental” right or a burden on a “suspect” class, classifications will not be set aside on equal protection grounds if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. The right to appeal does not create a suspect class or infringe on a fundamental right. Burger v. State, 920 S.W.2d 438, 437 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Unlike a defendant who is placed on community supervision after his guilt has been adjudicated and his sentence suspended, a defendant who is granted deferred adjudication will have no record of conviction if he successfully completes the term of community supervision. This is a valuable benefit, and the legislature could rationally have chosen to condition the award of such a benefit on the relinquishment of a right to appeal, thereby conserving the judicial and prosecutorial resources of the State. Rocha v. State, 903 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.); Burger, 920 S.W.2d at 438.
Finding that there is a rational and legitimate state interest in curtailing appeals from hearings where guilt is adjudicated under Article 42.12, § 5(b), we conclude the statute is not unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of either the federal or state constitutions. Accordingly, Faerman’s third and fourth points of error are overruled.
In his final point of error, Faerman claims the trial court erred in refusing to set an appeal bond. After his guilt was adjudicated, Faerman requested the trial court set bond pending appeal in his Written Notice of Appeal. The trial court responded to Faer-man’s request with the notation “Denied — is not entitled to appeal Mo Adj” and the further reply that appeal bond shall be set at “none.” Faerman later filed another request for the setting of bond and the trial court denied this request without further comment.
A trial court is under no obligation to give its permission for an appeal. Nevertheless, it may not deny or affirmatively interfere with a defendant’s pursuit of an appeal no matter how futile it may appear. Campos v. State, 818 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). Even if the defendant has waived his appeal or has no statutory right to appellate review, the trial court has no authority to prevent him from giving notice of appeal to the court of appeals. Id.
Neither may the trial court summarily deny a defendant’s request for bail pending appeal unless his punishment exceeds 15 years confinement or is assessed for certain repeat offender drug offenses. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(b) (Supp.1998); Shockley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 922, 926-27 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Thus, we find the trial court erred in failing to consider Faerman’s request for bail. However, the error committed by the trial court does not relate to the validity of its judgment and is not a proper basis for a reversal of the conviction.
While we sustain appellant’s fifth point of error, there is no meaningful relief that we can provide under the peculiar facts of this case. Ordinarily, we would grant relief by abating the appeal and remanding the cause to the trial court .to consider appellant’s request for bail. Here, however, an abatement [848]*848would not hasten the relief sought and would unnecessarily delay the disposition of the appeal.
The object of bail is to permit the defendant to retain some measure of liberty until there has been a final disposition of the accusations brought against him. In regard to bail pending appeal, the issue should be resolved at the inception of the appeal when the defendant can still derive some benefit from a bond. The legislature has, therefore, expressly accorded the defendant a preferential right of review in the court of appeals from any order or judgment entered by the trial court regarding his right to bail pending appeal. Tex.Code Chim. PROC. Ann. art. 44.04(g) (Supp.1998).3 To provide meaningful review, an accelerated appeal under Article 44.04(g) from an order denying bail is separate and distinct from a defendant’s general appeal from a judgment of conviction.4 Here, the issue was not brought to us as a separate appeal under the authority of Article 44.04(g). Rather, Faerman simply included the matter as a point of error in his general appeal. A bail issue, presented in this manner, is ineffectual for two reasons: (1) the appeal is not accelerated; and (2) when the bail issue is finally considered by the appellate court, the appeal is at its conclusion.
As Chief Justice Murphy observes in his dissenting opinion, Faerman may choose to seek review in the Court of Criminal Appeals and thereby extend the time of his appeal. While this is certainly true, the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction over a defendant’s bail even after the cause has been appealed.5 The trial court neéd not wait for the conclusion of Faerman’s appeal before conducting a hearing on his request for bail. Therefore, if Faerman chooses to seek discretionary review and renews his request for bail, we trust the trial court will, in light of this opinion, consider his request for bail and, if there is no good cause to deny bail, set bail pending the remainder of his appeal.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.