Fadalla v. Life Automotive Products, Inc.

258 F.R.D. 501, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88890, 2007 WL 4233550
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedNovember 27, 2007
DocketNo. 3:07-mc-42-J-32MCR
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 258 F.R.D. 501 (Fadalla v. Life Automotive Products, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fadalla v. Life Automotive Products, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 501, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88890, 2007 WL 4233550 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

Opinion

ORDER

MONTE C. RICHARDSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motions to Quash Subpoenas filed by non-parties Oliver & Company, Inc. and Engine Fog, Inc. on September 21, 2007. (Docs. 1 & 3). Defendants filed their responses to the Motions on October 11, 2007. (Docs. 13 & 14). Accordingly, the Motions are now ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND1

Defendant, Life Automotive Products, Inc. (“Life Auto”) manufactures chemical additives used in the automobile “fast lube” industry. Plaintiff Michael Fadalla (“Fadalla”) worked for Life Auto from June 1, 2005 through April 21, 2006, as a national account [503]*503executive. Upon beginning his employment with Life Auto, Fadalla signed an employment contract which included a twenty-four (24) month non-compete clause and a twenty-four (24) month non-solicitation clause. The employment contract also contained a termination clause that allowed either party to terminate the contract with ninety (90) days written notice.

On March 26, 2006, Fadalla provided notice to Life Auto that he would be terminating his employment. Evidently, Life Auto attempted to settle the remaining ninety (90) days with Fadalla, but Fadalla refused to accept a severance package. Life Auto then terminated Fadalla on April 21, 2006, and paid his salary, commissions, and health insurance through the end of May 2006.

Following his departure from Life Auto, Fadalla became associated with Oliver & Company, Inc. (“O & C”), a distributor of automotive chemical additives manufactured by several outside companies. In fact, O & C distributes some products manufactured by Life Auto. Although it is unclear the specific nature of Fadalla’s association with O & C, Fadalla has represented that his responsibilities include marketing and selling automotive chemicals and additives for WGC — one of O & C’s brands.2 (Doc. 15-6, p. 4). Some time after Fadalla’s departure from Life Auto, Fadalla and Bruce Oliver— the President of O & C — met with Paul Hughett, owner of Engine Fog, Inc. (“Engine Fog”) — a company that also manufactures automotive chemical products and a competitor of Life Auto — for the purpose of discussing the possibility of Engine Fog packaging a series of automotive products for O & C under its WGC label. Significantly, WGC and Life Auto market and sell competing products. Specifically, one of the products that WGC markets' — an upper engine or intake cleaner — is a competing product with a product Life Auto sells.3 (Doc. 15-6, p. 18).

On October 10, 2006, Fadalla filed suit against Life Auto in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, claiming, inter alia, that Life Auto breached his employment contract by terminating him without cause before the expiration of the ninety (90) day notice period. Life Auto filed a counter claim against Fadal-la for breach of the non-compete and non-solicitation clause of the employment contract. Life Auto then filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking an order from the court enjoining Fadalla from violating the terms of the non-compete and non-solicitation agreement between the parties. On September 18, 2007, the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied Life Auto’s motion for preliminary injunction. Upon conducting the requisite analysis for determining whether injunctive relief was appropriate, the court specifically found that Fadalla’s conduct likely did not result in a breach of his contractual obligations. (Doe. I, p. 18).

Discovery is currently ongoing and on August 27, 2007, Life Auto served a subpoena duces tecum without deposition on both O & C and Engine Fog. Both entities filed objections to the subpoena (Docs. 7 & 9) and thereafter, filed their respective Motions to Quash Subpoena (Docs. 1 & 3) with this Court.4 O & C and Engine Fog seek an order from this Court quashing the subpoenas because compliance with the subpoenas would require them to produce confidential business information. Additionally, both O & C and Engine Fog argue that complying with the subpoenas would impose an undue burden on them, in light of the fact that the requests are overbroad, vague, and/or seek irrelevant information.

II. ANALYSIS

The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is quite [504]*504broad; albeit, not unlimited and the court has wide discretion when setting the discovery limits. Farnsworth v. The Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). A non-party may invoke the inherent power of the court to secure protection from discovery which seeks confidential or privileged information or which would cause undue burden on the non-party. Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 1318, 1322 (Fed.Cir.1990). Here, 0 & C and Engine Fog, non-parties to the underlying action, seek protection from this Court pursuant to Rule 45(c)(3)(A) and (B) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 45(c)(3)(A) states that on timely motion, the court by which a subpoena was issued shall quash or modify the subpoena if it requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies or if it subjects a person to undue burden. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) and (iv). Additionally, Rule 45(c)(3)(B) authorizes a court to quash or modify a subpoena if it requires disclosure of a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(B)(i) and (iii). Alternatively, the Court may elect to order production of the requested information only upon specified conditions, but before doing so, it must first determine that the party in whose behalf the subpoena is issued has shown a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship and that the person to whom the subpoena is addressed will be reasonably compensated. Id.

The burden of proof in demonstrating that compliance with the subpoenas requires the disclosure of privileged or protected information or that compliance presents an undue burden lies with the moving party and thus, falls upon 0 & C and Engine Fog in this case. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir.2004). It is Life Auto’s burden, however, to prove its requests are relevant. American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. United States, 191 F.R.D. 132, 136 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (noting that the party seeking discovery must demonstrate relevance). In determining whether the subpoenas are due to be quashed, this Court must balance Life Auto’s need for discovery against the burden imposed upon 0 & C and Engine Fog, along with their interest in keeping the requested information confidential. Farnsworth,

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258 F.R.D. 501, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88890, 2007 WL 4233550, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fadalla-v-life-automotive-products-inc-flmd-2007.