Facebook, Inc. v. OnLineNic Inc

District Court, N.D. California·Decided April 5, 2022·No. 3:19-cv-07071·Unknown

Opinion

FACEBOOK, INC., et al., Case No. 19-cv-07071-SI

Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT v. 35.CN'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE

ONLINENIC INC, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 213 Defendants.

On February 25, 2022, defendant Xiamen 35.com Internet Technology Co., LTD (“35.CN”) filed the instant motion to bifurcate. Having reviewed the parties’ papers, the Court previously VACATED the April 1, 2022 hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, defendant 35.CN’s motion is DENIED. The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges defendant OnlineNIC, a California corporation with its principal place of business in San Leandro, California, is a domain name registrar that sells, registers and transfers domain names for third parties. Dkt. No. 109 ¶ 9 (SAC). The SAC alleges defendant ID Shield, is a Hong Kong, China, limited company that provides a type of domain name privacy service, specifically a proxy service, for OnlineNIC’s customers. Id. ¶ 10. ID Shield registers domain names, as the registrant, and licenses these domain names to OnlineNIC’s customers. Id. Fujian Province, that sells, registers and transfers domain names for third parties. Id. ¶ 11. The SAC alleges 35.CN controls, manages, and runs the operations of OnlineNIC and ID Shield. Id. The SAC alleges plaintiffs, well known social networking sites Facebook and Instagram, own various well-established trademarks. Id. ¶¶ 18-25. Plaintiffs allege defendants, as registrants and as alter egos of each other, have registered domain names (such as hackingfacebook.net) that have been used for malicious activity, including phishing and hosting websites that purported to sell hacking tools. These domain names also have infringed on Plaintiffs’ trademarks….Plaintiffs seek relief from Defendants, as alter egos of each other, who have registered (as the registrant), used, and trafficked in domain names that include Plaintiffs’ trademarks. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The SAC further alleges: 1. Cybercrime is highly dependent on registered domain names, which are used to send spear phishing emails, operate malware, and engage in other types of online abuse… 2. Cybercriminals often rely on domain name privacy registration services, and specifically proxy services, to hide their ownership and control of malicious domains from the public. In exchange for a fee, proxy services conceal the domain name registrant’s identity as listed on publicly available domain name registration records. These proxy services, like the services offered by Defendants, are increasingly used by cybercriminals as they cycle through domain names in order to conceal their identity and evade detection. 3. 35.CN is an ICANN1-accredited domain name registrar. 35.CN’s alter ego, OnlineNIC, also is an ICANN-accredited domain name registrar. 35.CN’s and OnlineNIC’s alter ego, ID Shield, provides a type of domain name privacy service, … According to one internet security group, domain names registered by OnlineNIC were reported for abuse in approximately 40,000 instances. In 2019, one internet security group reported that OnlineNIC was one of the top 20 domain name registrars used for abuse. 4. Defendants have repeatedly failed to take appropriate “steps to investigate and respond appropriately to any reports of abuse” as required by the RAA and have failed to provide abusive domain name registrants’ names and contact information to victims of online abuse as required under the RAA. Dkt. No. 109 ¶¶ 1-4 (SAC). The SAC further alleges defendants registered, used, or trafficked in at least 35 domain

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Facebook, Inc. v. OnLineNic Inc, (N.D. Cal. 2022).

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