UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
FABIO VARGAS-GONZALEZ DOCKET NO. 2:25-cv-00389 REG. # 01492-509 SECTION P
VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
FELIPE MARTINEZ, JR. MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by pro se petitioner Fabio Vargas-Gonzalez (“Petitioner”) on March 26, 2025. Doc. 1. Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Center at Oakdale, Louisiana (“FCIO”). This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. For the following reasons IT IS RECOMMEDED that the petition be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner challenges the “BOP’s denial of applicable earned Time Credits.” Doc. 1, p. 1. Specifically, he argues that the BOP has precluded him from receiving his earned time credits due to a lodged ICE detainer, which he contends would entitle him to supervised release. Petitioner concedes that he has not exhausted his claims. Specifically, he submits that while he did file a BP-8 and BP-9, “further Administrative exhaustion would be futile, because the Warden Mr. Felipe Martinez, Jr., based on Program Statement 532.44 already denied same petition that he would have sought in his BP-10.” Doc. 1, p. 12. II. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Screening of Habeas Corpus Petitions A district court may apply any or all of the rules governing habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to those filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes preliminary review of such petitions, and states that they must be summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. at Rule 4. To avoid summary dismissal under Rule 4, the petition must contain factual allegations pointing to a “real possibility of constitutional error.” Id. at Rule 4, advisory committee note (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Accordingly, we review the pleadings and exhibits before us to determine whether any right to relief is indicated, or whether the petition must be dismissed. B. Application
1. Exhaustion
A petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 “must first exhaust his administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons.” Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1990)); Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to § 2241 relief); United States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992). The BOP has a four-step administrative process for resolving complaints by prisoners. Initially, a prisoner must attempt to informally resolve the complaint with staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If informal attempts are unsuccessful, the prisoner must submit a written complaint to the warden on a prescribed form (BP-9). 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. If the prisoner is not satisfied with the warden’s response, he may appeal to the Regional Director within twenty days after the warden’s response (BP-10). 28 U.S.C. § 542.15. If still unsatisfied, the prisoner may appeal to the Central Office (BP-11). Id. There are time limits for BOP officials to respond at each level of the
administrative remedy process. Petitioner admittedly did not exhaust the claims before this Court. Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when the petitioner proves that exhaustion would be futile. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The petitioner bears the burden of proving futility. Id. The fact that petitioner believes his grievances will be denied does not make the remedy futile. See Adams v. Warden, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124404 at *3 (W.D. La. July 5, 2017). Petitioner points to no extraordinary circumstances that would warrant an exemption from the exhaustion requirement. Petitioner must give the BOP an opportunity to review his claim before pursuing a § 2241 claim in this Court. However, as discussed below, even if Petitioner had exhausted his claims, he
would not prevail on the merits. 2. No Constitutional Right to Confinement in a Particular Place Petitioner may challenge the delay by the BOP in his placement in a halfway house or other less restrictive place of confinement under § 2241 because it impacts the execution of his sentence. Cervante v. United States, 402 Fed. App’x 886, 887 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Rublee v. Fleming, 160 F.3d 213, 214-17 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992)). But he is entitled to § 2241 relief only to remedy a restraint on his liberty which violates the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211-12 & n.11 (1952); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded as an extraordinary remedy, a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness”) (quotation omitted). However, the Supreme Court has consistently held a prisoner has no constitutional right to confinement in any particular place. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled
that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (“[T]he Due Process Clause did not itself create a liberty interest in prisoners to be free from intrastate prison transfers.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (“The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant’s liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons.”). Section 3624(c) grants the BOP Director the discretion to place a prisoner in a residential reentry center for up to twelve months. 18 U.S.C.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
FABIO VARGAS-GONZALEZ DOCKET NO. 2:25-cv-00389 REG. # 01492-509 SECTION P
VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
FELIPE MARTINEZ, JR. MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by pro se petitioner Fabio Vargas-Gonzalez (“Petitioner”) on March 26, 2025. Doc. 1. Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Center at Oakdale, Louisiana (“FCIO”). This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. For the following reasons IT IS RECOMMEDED that the petition be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner challenges the “BOP’s denial of applicable earned Time Credits.” Doc. 1, p. 1. Specifically, he argues that the BOP has precluded him from receiving his earned time credits due to a lodged ICE detainer, which he contends would entitle him to supervised release. Petitioner concedes that he has not exhausted his claims. Specifically, he submits that while he did file a BP-8 and BP-9, “further Administrative exhaustion would be futile, because the Warden Mr. Felipe Martinez, Jr., based on Program Statement 532.44 already denied same petition that he would have sought in his BP-10.” Doc. 1, p. 12. II. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Screening of Habeas Corpus Petitions A district court may apply any or all of the rules governing habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to those filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes preliminary review of such petitions, and states that they must be summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. at Rule 4. To avoid summary dismissal under Rule 4, the petition must contain factual allegations pointing to a “real possibility of constitutional error.” Id. at Rule 4, advisory committee note (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Accordingly, we review the pleadings and exhibits before us to determine whether any right to relief is indicated, or whether the petition must be dismissed. B. Application
1. Exhaustion
A petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 “must first exhaust his administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons.” Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1990)); Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to § 2241 relief); United States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992). The BOP has a four-step administrative process for resolving complaints by prisoners. Initially, a prisoner must attempt to informally resolve the complaint with staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If informal attempts are unsuccessful, the prisoner must submit a written complaint to the warden on a prescribed form (BP-9). 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. If the prisoner is not satisfied with the warden’s response, he may appeal to the Regional Director within twenty days after the warden’s response (BP-10). 28 U.S.C. § 542.15. If still unsatisfied, the prisoner may appeal to the Central Office (BP-11). Id. There are time limits for BOP officials to respond at each level of the
administrative remedy process. Petitioner admittedly did not exhaust the claims before this Court. Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when the petitioner proves that exhaustion would be futile. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The petitioner bears the burden of proving futility. Id. The fact that petitioner believes his grievances will be denied does not make the remedy futile. See Adams v. Warden, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124404 at *3 (W.D. La. July 5, 2017). Petitioner points to no extraordinary circumstances that would warrant an exemption from the exhaustion requirement. Petitioner must give the BOP an opportunity to review his claim before pursuing a § 2241 claim in this Court. However, as discussed below, even if Petitioner had exhausted his claims, he
would not prevail on the merits. 2. No Constitutional Right to Confinement in a Particular Place Petitioner may challenge the delay by the BOP in his placement in a halfway house or other less restrictive place of confinement under § 2241 because it impacts the execution of his sentence. Cervante v. United States, 402 Fed. App’x 886, 887 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Rublee v. Fleming, 160 F.3d 213, 214-17 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992)). But he is entitled to § 2241 relief only to remedy a restraint on his liberty which violates the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211-12 & n.11 (1952); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded as an extraordinary remedy, a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness”) (quotation omitted). However, the Supreme Court has consistently held a prisoner has no constitutional right to confinement in any particular place. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled
that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (“[T]he Due Process Clause did not itself create a liberty interest in prisoners to be free from intrastate prison transfers.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (“The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant’s liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons.”). Section 3624(c) grants the BOP Director the discretion to place a prisoner in a residential reentry center for up to twelve months. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1); United States v. Wessels, 539 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring). It further gives the Director the discretion “to place a prisoner in home confinement for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). It also directs the BOP to issue new regulations to
ensure that placements in community facilities are “(A) conducted in a manner consistent with section 3621(b) of this title; (B) determined on an individual basis; and (C) of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful reintegration into the community.” Id. § 3624(c)(6). A petitioner complaining about a discretionary assignment by the BOP is not entitled to judicial relief for an alleged “violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process because ‘the failure to receive relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest.’” Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mejia-Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1146 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981))); cf. Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A] statute which ‘provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained . . . is not protected by due process.’”) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979)). After reviewing Petitioner’s petition and the applicable statutes, the Court finds even if he had exhausted, his claim would fail as the BOP has the exclusive authority and discretion to determine if and when to assign him to a residential reentry center or home confinement. The Court further finds Petitioner has failed to identify in his petition any restraint on his liberty which violates the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. Hil. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the instant petition be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Considering the foregoing, IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Request for Status [Doc. 5] be DENIED AS MOOT. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections with the Clerk of Court. Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of receipt shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429-30 (Sth Cir. 1996). THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 27th day of October, 2025.
UNITED S ES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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