F. P. Dow, Inc. v. United States

51 Cust. Ct. 440, 1963 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1266
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedOctober 30, 1963
DocketReap. Dec. 10616; Entry No. 3249
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 51 Cust. Ct. 440 (F. P. Dow, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
F. P. Dow, Inc. v. United States, 51 Cust. Ct. 440, 1963 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1266 (cusc 1963).

Opinion

Donlon, Judge:

The issue before the court in reappraisement is the value, based on cost of production, of a machine described as an automatic bottle blow molding machine, used in the plastics industry. This machine was manufactured in England by E. Shipton & Co., Ltd., sold to Olympic Plastics Co., Inc. (for which plaintiff F. P. Dow, Inc., of Los Angeles, acted as customs broker), shipped from [441]*441Middlesex, England, on June 14, 1957, and entered at the port of Los Angeles on July 24, 1957.

The machine was appraised on the basis of cost of production value, and that is the basis for which plaintiff contends. It may be observed, also, that the parties have stipulated in open court that such or similar merchandise was not freely offered in England for home consumption or for export to the United States, and was not freely offered for sale in the United States, at the time of exportation. I find that the basis of appraisement is properly the cost of production.

What is in issue, is the amount of the value determined by the appraiser as a computation of the cost of production. On the testimony of record, plaintiff contends that it has established the four statutory components of cost of production value, in the following amounts: '

Materials $4,760
Labor 2,464
Sec. 402(f) (1) 7,224
Usual general expenses
Sec. 402(f) (2) 4,435
Costs of packing, etc.
Sec. 402(f) (3) 560
Addition for profit
Sec. 402(f) (4) 1,781 $14,000

The merchandise was appraised at $28,000, and that is the value for which defendant contends. However, defendant has not introduced evidence establishing the several statutory components of value which would support its contention.

Plaintiff adduced the testimony of two witnesses. Mr. David Nome said that, in 1957 (the time of this importation), he was president of Olympic Plastics Co., Inc., a firm engaged in the business of molding plastic materials into various shapes. This presumably is the same concern referred to in the title of this suit and in the official papers as Olympic Plastics Co., Inc. Mr. Bernard Strong said that he had been with E. Shipton & Co. since 1934 and that, in 1957, he was a director and, as such, “was in charge of the selling of the plastics machinery and other equipment in the old country [sic] of the world.” He said that he also was “in charge of the manufacture and cost accounting of this machinery and the production of this machinery.”

Plaintiff also introduced, as exhibits, an agreement between Shipton and Olympic; purchase order for the machine of this litigation; first and second supplements to such purchase order; a memorandum of payments made by Olympic to Shipton, prepared by witness Pome; [442]*442and copies of certain bills of Sbipton rendered to Olympic. In all cases where original documents were introduced, the court consented to substitution of photostatic copies. (Exhibits 1 to 6, inclusive.)

Defendant adduced no testimony and introduced in evidence a report, dated July 18, 1961, by Customs Agent Suttie. (Collective exhibit A.)

Inasmuch as plaintiff has shown by testimony of a director of the manufacturer, who was in charge of production and of cost accounting, amounts that are stated to represent the prescribed components of cost of production value of this machine, viz, the cost of materials and of fabrication, the usual general expenses, the cost of containers and packing, and the usual addition for profit, I can not agree with defendant’s contention that plaintiff has failed, either, to overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to the appraisement or to show a claimed cost of production value. Plaintiff has made a prima facie case. The question is, has defendant rebutted this, either by the proofs it introduced or by testimony elicited on cross-examination of plaintiff’s witnesses.

The report of Customs Agent Suttie (exhibit A) does not at any point refer to cost of production value. It discusses the purchase price. It mentions an allegation that the “molds” were invoiced at 25 per centum of true purchase price. It analyzes parts of an agreement (not attached to exhibit A, although it is stated therein that it is attached), alleged to disclose “that the fully automatic bottle blowing machines would be sold at a value of 28 thousand dollars, FOB factory each, which value would include the license fee.” The agent’s report considers the dutiability of this “license fee,” and states that “it has been determined that the license fee in each case was a license fee paid to operate and use the machines and as such is one of the elements of the cost of ownership, as is cited in C.A.D. 42. Therefore, the license fee is considered to be dutiable.” [Emphasis supplied.]

The report (exhibit A) also states that “it is believed that the violation in this case is of such a serious nature as to warrant action under Part II, page 4, B2 of BCLX203. The penalty under section 592 of the Tariff Act, will make possible the recovery of the actual loss of revenue and will act as a deterrent to any similar violations.” Of course, such statements have no relation whatsoever to cost of production value, but may throw light on the background of this litigation.

Although counsel for defendant stated that he would like to produce Mr. Suttie to testify, it seems that Mr. Suttie was not called.

The agreement discussed by the customs agent is before me, having been put in evidence by plaintiff, (Collectiye exhibit 1.) There are [443]*44317 numbered paragraphs, relating to various aspects of an agreement to license “sole and exclusive” use of a patented process in 11 enumerated Western States, and of tbe machine “purchased from the Licensor [Shipton] in carrying out the said process, as well as the exclusive permission to use the Licensor’s method of printing for printing hollow articles made by” Olympic “under this license,” with specified exceptions and limitations, together with a nonexclusive license “to sell the hollow articles manufactured by the Licensee [Olympic] hereunder anywhere in the United States whatsoever or in any foreign country where no person, firm or corporation has been granted an exclusive license by the Licensor.”

There are other provisions, among them an agreement by Shipton to send an engineer to Olympic’s “works to assist the Licensee in carrying out the process and operating the machine in an efficient manner.”

Besides a royalty of 2 per centum “of the ex-works price of all hollow articles sold or otherwise put into use by the Licensee under the license” granted, with minimum royalties prescribed for stated years, the agreement covered one semiautomatic machine that was ordered for immediate delivery. This is not the machine here in issue. This machine is fully automatic, and was purchased under the provisions of paragraph 13 of the agreement, which reads as follows:

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Related

Cleveland Twist Drill Co. v. United States
60 Cust. Ct. 893 (U.S. Customs Court, 1968)
United States v. F. P. Dow, Inc.
54 Cust. Ct. 751 (U.S. Customs Court, 1965)
Photo Devices, Inc. v. United States
53 Cust. Ct. 349 (U.S. Customs Court, 1964)

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Bluebook (online)
51 Cust. Ct. 440, 1963 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/f-p-dow-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1963.