F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States

82 F. Supp. 338, 113 Ct. Cl. 29, 1949 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 26
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedFebruary 7, 1949
Docket47291
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 82 F. Supp. 338 (F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 338, 113 Ct. Cl. 29, 1949 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 26 (cc 1949).

Opinion

WHITAKER, Judge.

1. On August 3, 1944, plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant to erect an outside oveihead pipe line for the conveyance of steam and air to various build *339 ings on the Badger Ordnance project at Baraboo, Wisconsin. Some of the pipe was 20 inches in diameter, some 18 inches, some 16 inches, and some 10 inches. The 18-inch and 20-inch pipe were to be supported by concrete piers sunk into the ground, and the 16-inch and 10-inch pipe were to be supported by single, double, or four-pole structures.

The defendant or its agents were to furnish the drawings for the several piers and poles and were to determine their location from time to time as the work progressed. They were also to furnish the materials necessary for their erection.

The contract called for completion of the work by December 1, 1944. Plaintiff claims the defendant and its agents failed to furnish it with drawings for the poles and piers and failed to designate their location in time for it to complete its work by the contract completion date, December 1, 1944, and that as a result it was compelled to erect some of these piers and poles in frozen ground, which increased its costs, for which it sues.

Plaintiff worked under the supervision of the Mason and Hanger Company, who had previously entered into what is called an Architect-Engineer-Construction Management contract with the defendant. This company is referred to in the record as the A-E-M. The contract made it the authorized representative of the contracting officer and required plaintiff to work under its direction. It was its obligation as defendant’s agent to furnish plaintiff with the necessary drawings for the piers and poles and to designate ¡the places at which they were to be placed. There is no doubt that this company failed to furnish plaintiff with the necessary drawings in time for it to complete its work by December 1, 1944, and there is no doubt that this increased plaintiff’s costs.

The contract called for the erection of 3,854 poles. By November 29, 1944, the plaintiff had been furnished with drawings for only 1,891 piers and poles, and all of these had been erected. On November 29, 1944, it was furnished with the drawings for 187 additional poles and piers. By December 1, 1944, all but 34 of these had been erected. The balance of 1,810 had to be erected after December 1, 1944, because of defendant’s failure to furnish plaintiff with the necessary drawings.

Since December 1, 1944 had been set as the completion date, it was undoubtedly the duty of defendant or its agents to furnish the necessary drawings in time for plaintiff to complete its contract ’by that date. George A. Fuller Company v. United States, 69 F.Supp. 409, 108 Ct.Cl. 70, 94, et seq. And, if plaintiff’s costs were increased by defendant’s failure to do so, plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess, unless additional facts excuse such failure.

But defendant says that the original contract was modified by several supplemental contracts which extended the completion date to September 1, 1945, and that this correspondingly extended the time defendant was obligated to furnish the drawings. The Government relies on provisions in the several supplemental contracts, of which articles 2 and 3 of the first supplemental contract are typical. These articles read:

“Article 2. The time for completion of the work provided for in the contract as modified by this Modification No. 1 shall be and is hereby extended to 1 February 1945.

“Article 3. It is mutually understood and agreed that all other terms, conditions and provisions of the contract shall be and remain the same.”

These supplemental contracts covered additional work such as the installation of outside process piping and inside process piping. They, together with certain change orders, increased the total amount of the contract price from $466,975.30 to $1,170,-857.09. The extensions of time were granted because of the additional work to be done.

Although the terms of the supplemental contracts are susceptible of the construction that plaintiff was thereby granted additional time for the installation of the piers and poles covered 'by the original contract, we are satisfied from a reading of the testimony that this was not the intention of the parties. Both plaintiff’s district manager in charge of this project and its *340 job engineer testified that it was not possible for them to defer the installation of the additional piers and poles until the frost was out of the ground, because the A-E-M demanded that this work be completed at the earliest possible minute, “regardless of weather conditions.” The defendant does not dispute this testimony.

One of two things is true: If the parties intended to extend the time for the completion of the work covered by the original contract to September 1, 1945, then the defendant breached the modified contract by requiring plaintiff to work under adverse conditions in order to complete this work before the time fixed for its completion, as extended. If the parties did not intend to extend the time for the completion of the work under the original contract, then defendant is liable for having failed to furnish drawings in time for plaintiff to complete it by the original completion date, December 1, 1944.

Defendant cannot escape its responsibility for having failed to furnish the drawings on time by extending the time for completion of the work, at least in a case where defendant insisted upon completion ahead of the extended date. Henry Ericsson v. United States, 62 F.Supp. 312, 104 Ct.Cl. 397, 428. Plaintiff based its bid on doing the work prior to December 1, 1944. Since defendant prevented it from completing the job by that time and it cost plaintiff more to do it thereafter, plaintiff in equity and good conscience and in law is entitled to recover the excess.

The proof as to the excess cost of digging these holes in winter weather is unsatisfactory. Plaintiff, to prove its excess costs, undertakes to prove the cost of digging the holes for these piers and poles in warm weather and in winter weather, and by taking the difference. However, plaintiff does not give us the cost of digging all the holes in warm weather, but only the cost óf a selected sample; nor does it give us the cost of digging all the holes in winter weather, but again only the cost of a selected sample. Comparing the samples selected it says the cost in warm weather was $15.29 a hole, and the cost in winter weather $37.30 a hole, an excess of $22.01 a hole.

It is difficult to believe it should be about 2^4 times as expensive to dig these holes in winter weather as in warm weather. More expensive it undoubtedly was, but 2j/£ times as expensive seems to us so far out of line that we would have to have very cogent proof to accept it. Plaintiff does not give us the actual figures; we cannot accept this substitute computation that produces a result that seems to us so unreasonable. Indeed, plaintiff itself was loath to claim an excess of $22.01; it claims only $17.00.

The only proof of plaintiff’s excess costs introduced by the Government was a statement by one of defendant’s witnesses that an engineer of the A-E-M had estimated that the excess cost was $8.25 a hole.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
82 F. Supp. 338, 113 Ct. Cl. 29, 1949 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 26, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/f-h-mcgraw-co-v-united-states-cc-1949.