F. & AK, INC. v. Sleeper

289 A.2d 905, 161 Conn. 505, 1971 Conn. LEXIS 584
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedOctober 7, 1971
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 289 A.2d 905 (F. & AK, INC. v. Sleeper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
F. & AK, INC. v. Sleeper, 289 A.2d 905, 161 Conn. 505, 1971 Conn. LEXIS 584 (Colo. 1971).

Opinion

Shapiro, J.

The plaintiff, owner of land in Canton, Connecticut, brought this action in two counts against five named defendants of whom three, predecessors in title to the plaintiff, were defaulted by the court for failure to plead. In the first count, the plaintiff sought damages and the reformation of two deeds as to a portion of the boundary line between its land and the adjoining land of the two remaining defendants, Herbert R. Sleeper and Jeanne B. Sleeper, hereinafter referred to as the Sleepers. The plaintiff asked that the deeds be reformed to conform to the actual intent of the parties by amending a call in the description to omit the words “N 57° 11' W” so that the deeds will read: “thence continuing to a point in the boundary line of land now or formerly of C. J. Wakely.” In the second count the plaintiff sought to quiet title to its land. In addition to filing an answer, the Sleepers filed a special defense alleging that they are bona fide purchasers of their land without notice or knowledge of the plaintiff’s claim and a second special defense claiming title to the property therein described. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the first count and for the Sleepers on the second count. The latter have appealed.

*507 The finding, which is not subject to any of the corrections sought, recites the following pertinent facts: By deed of December 5, 1932, Arleigh H. Richardson, deceased, and Russell J. Richardson, a defaulted defendant, acquired title to a farm of approximately 160 acres in Canton. They farmed the land for several years and then agreed to divide it. In 1939, they employed a firm of professional engineers and land surveyors who prepared a description of the division line in which the last call was: “thence continuing N 57° 11' W to a point in the boundary line of land formerly owned by J. T. Soby.” On October 3, 1939, by deeds prepared by an attorney, Russell quitclaimed his interest in the easterly portion of the land to Arleigh and Arleigh quitclaimed his interest in the westerly portion to Russell. The number of acres recited in each deed was a mere estimate made by the Richardsons. The plaintiff is a successor in title to Russell and the Sleepers are successors in title to Arleigh. Prior to the execution of these quitclaim deeds, Russell and Arleigh had agreed on a division line. Since 1939, including the quitclaim deeds executed on October 3, 1939, the last call in the division line in all deeds related to the former Richardson land read: “thence continuing N 57° IP W to a point in the boundary line of land formerly owned by C. J. Wakely.” The course of N 57° 11' W would not strike land formerly of C. J. Wakely.

The division line agreed on between the Richard-sons intersected the former Wakely land at a point between an opening in a barbed wire fence for an old wood road and a grove of pine trees and hemlocks. At the time of trial Russell knew the approximate but not the exact location of such division point. The Richardsons always considered a wire *508 fence, shown as a barbed wire fence on exhibit L, as being the division line between their land and that of Wakely. The broken line along the Wolcott property shown on exhibit L, which is reproduced on the opposite page, was the Wakely line. 1

The trial court concluded that the quitclaim deeds dividing the property between the Richardsons were ambiguous because it was impossible to fulfill the call in the deeds running N 57° 11' W to the land of Wakely, for the course of N 57° 11' W would not strike the Wakely land. The court then concluded that it was intended between the Richardsons that the last course of their division line should run in a northerly direction to the Wakely property. Then, confronted by the general description “to Wakely’s land,” the trial court concluded, first, that the plaintiff failed to show, except by approximation, the point to which the division line should run. Second, since the last course of their division line should run to some point on the Wakely line, that point should be the northwesterly corner of the original 160-acre Richardson farm. Third, that the last call in the description of the division line between the two parcels, as contained in the two quitclaim deeds of October 3, 1939, by and between the Richardsons, should be reformed by substituting the following: “Thence continuing to that point in the boundary line of land now or formerly of C. J. Wakely at the northwesterly corner of the premises owned in common by the grantor and grantee hereof,” or whatever language deemed suitable and sufficiently clear *510 to express the intent of the court that the last call of the division line shall run to the northwest corner of the Arleigh and Russell Richardson land.

*509

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Bluebook (online)
289 A.2d 905, 161 Conn. 505, 1971 Conn. LEXIS 584, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/f-ak-inc-v-sleeper-conn-1971.