Ezor v. State Bar of California

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 20, 2025
• Docket: 23-3083
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 20 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

A. EDWARD EZOR, No. 23-3083 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:22-cv-00840-JVS-AGR v. MEMORANDUM* STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, et al.;

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 17, 2025**

Before: SANCHEZ, H.A. THOMAS, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

A. Edward Ezor’s former clients sought reimbursement of misappropriated

funds from the State Bar of California’s Client Security Fund Commission (“CSF”).

Their requests were granted in two final administrative decisions. Ezor challenged

the constitutionality of those decisions in a prior 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit, which

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, claim preclusion, Eleventh Amendment and

quasi-judicial immunity, and failure to state a claim. See Ezor v. State Bar of Cal.,

No. 3:17-cv-05338-WHO, 2018 WL 489035, at *5–*9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2018)

(“Ezor I”), aff’d, 754 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2019). In this subsequent Section 1983

lawsuit, Ezor again challenges the CSF’s final decisions and raises claims against

the State Bar, State Bar officers, and Betty Yee, whom Ezor alleges is the “Director

of the Franchise Tax Board.” Ezor appeals the dismissal of his claims without leave

to amend. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.1

1. We review the district court’s dismissal on sovereign immunity

grounds de novo. Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153,

1158 (9th Cir. 2021). Ezor’s claim against the State Bar and its officers in their

official capacity is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.2 See Kohn v. State

Bar of Cal., 87 F.4th 1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (affirming that the

California State Bar is “an arm of the state” and thus entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (holding that official

capacity suits should be “treated as suits against the State” and officers sued in their

1 The State Bar’s motion to take judicial notice (Dkt. 14) is granted. 2 “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

2 23-3083 official capacity are entitled only to the immunities that the “governmental entity

possesses”); see also Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Ct. of State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708,

715 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (extending the immunity of state entities to

individual defendants acting in their official capacities). Even if we liberally

construe Ezor’s allegations to support an individual-capacity suit, the defendants are

still protected by quasi-judicial immunity because his allegations pertain to the

officers’ performance of quasi-judicial functions in the underlying CSF proceedings.

See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that individuals who

perform “functions that are judicial in nature, or who have a sufficiently close nexus

to the adjudicative process” are entitled to “quasi-judicial immunity”).

Ezor’s claim against Yee in her official capacity is likewise barred by

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The State Bar referred the matter to the

Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”) for debt collection, and state law authorizes the FTB

to collect court-ordered debts on behalf of the State. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §

19280(a)(1)(A). Thus, the FTB acts as an arm of the state.

2. “We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint on claim

preclusion grounds.” GP Vincent II v. Est. of Beard, 68 F.4th 508, 514 (9th Cir.

2023). Res judicata “applies if the earlier litigation (1) reached a final judgment on

the merits, (2) involved the same claim or cause of action as the later lawsuit, and

(3) involved the same parties or their privies.” Id. Here, Ezor’s claims are barred by

3 23-3083 Ezor I.3

First, Ezor I is a final judgment on the merits because the district court found

that Ezor failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Stewart v. U.S.

Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “dismissal for failure to

state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’ to which res judicata

applies” (quotation omitted)). Second, Ezor alleges infringement of the same right

based on a common nucleus of operative facts. See Brownback v. King, 592 U.S.

209, 215 n.3 (2021). In both lawsuits, Ezor claimed that the underlying CSF

decisions violated his due process rights and were retaliatory. See Ezor I, 2018 WL

489035, at *3. Finally, Ezor sues the State Bar and its officers occupying the same

positions as those in Ezor I. And although Yee was not a party in Ezor I, the FTB is

aligned in interest with the State Bar with respect to debt collection efforts against

Ezor. In re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that for two

parties to have privity, they must be “so identified in interest . . . that [they]

represent[] precisely the same right” (quotation omitted)).

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ezor leave to

amend his complaint because he is unable to overcome the immunity and claim

preclusion bars to his lawsuit. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d

3 Ezor’s present claims are also barred by the preclusive effect of the CSF decisions. See Trujillo v. Santa Clara Cnty., 775 F.2d 1359, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985).

4 23-3083 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a district court may dismiss without leave

to amend where amendment would be futile). We also reject Ezor’s meritless

challenges to the district court’s denial of his motion to disqualify the district judge

and magistrate judge, motion to stay the action, and motion to disqualify the State

Bar Defendants.

AFFIRMED.

5 23-3083