Ezekwo v. Specialized Loan Servicing

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 20, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-01141·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DR. IFEOMA EZEKWO, Plaintiff, 23-CV-1141 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, paid the filing fees to bring this action alleging that Defendant violated her rights. By order dated April 17, 2023, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to replead some of her claims. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on June 15, 2023, and the Court has reviewed it.1 The action is dismissed for the reasons set forth below, with 30 days’ leave to replead. BACKGROUND The Court assumes familiarity with its April 17, 2023 order, which detailed the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s 116-page, single-spaced complaint. Plaintiff lives in New Jersey, and she filed this action against Specialized Loan Servicing (“SLS”), a mortgage servicer located in Colorado. Plaintiff and her husband own, or owned, a single-family house located at 3013 Grand Concourse in Bronx County, New York. (ECF 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleged that SLS approved a loan modification on her mortgage, but abruptly stopped accepting her payments, telling her that she had “to do over the modification again.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleged that SLS violated her right

1 On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and on June 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (ECF 4, 5.) The second amended complaint is the operative pleading. to due process, acted with discriminatory animus, and engaged in “extortion,” in violation of “Title IX”; Plaintiff also invoked the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; and the “Dodd-Frank Act.” (Id. at 1.) In addition, Plaintiff asserted claims arising under state law, including breach of

contract; breach of fiduciary duty; “wrongful threat of foreclosure and lack of authority”; and “fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment.” (Id.) Plaintiff requested injunctive relief and $ 3 billion in damages. (Id. at 98.) In the April 17, 2023, order, the Court dismissed the complaint with leave to replead, for the following reasons: (1) the complaint, which contained an excessive amount of legal boilerplate, case citations, and block quotes of federal statutes, did not comply with federal pleading rules, because it failed to explain in a clear and concise manner what had occurred and why any action taken by SLS had violated Plaintiff’s rights;2 (2) Plaintiff could not assert constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against SLS, a private entity, because it did not act under color of state law; (3) the facts alleged did not appear to give rise to an FDCPA claim;

(4) Title IX bore no apparent relevance to the matter; (5) the Dodd-Frank act does not provide for a private right of action; and (6) insofar as federal question jurisdiction might be lacking,

2 That order also noted that Plaintiff has filed other complaints sounding in discrimination, civil rights violations, improper mortgage servicing practices, and ones invoking diversity jurisdiction, and that she “should be able to file an amended complaint that satisfies federal pleading rules if sufficient facts exist to state any viable claims against SLS.” (ECF 3 at 9) (listing cases.) In addition, the Court instructed Plaintiff that she: need not cite case law or make legal arguments. What the Court requires is a clear and concise recounting of the events giving rise to this complaint, and an explanation of how Defendant was involved in what occurred. (ECF 3 at 8 n.4.) Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to show that the court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the matter. (ECF 3.) Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed on June 15, 2023, is 152 pages and single- spaced. It is substantially similar in form and content to the first amended complaint. Plaintiff

reasserts claims that the Court dismissed as improperly raised, including the constitutional claims, and the claims under Title IX and the Dodd-Frank Act. Plaintiff asserts, for the first time, a claim under the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (“RESPA”). To support this claim, Plaintiff asserts: The Defendant violated RESPA. Defendant carried out illegal acts and created exorbitant payment demands. At no time did the Defendant discuss with the Plaintiff the procedures and processes behind Defendant’s actions. The Defendants are deep criminals. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ Violation of The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) , Plaintiff has sustained injuries and damages such as loss of income, public humiliation, threats to security, loss of prestige in the community, emotional distress, threats to personal safety, irreparable harm, loss of ability to carry out business, shame, loss of revenue, property damage, lack of security, protracted legal problems, financial loss, permanent damage to her reputation and good standing amongst her peers, and much more. These injuries and damages are in the amount of THREE BILLION US DOLLARS and additional damages to be determined at trial. (ECF 5 ¶¶ 107-108.)3 Plaintiff alleges that she “must be fully compensated and Defendant must cease from all actions against the Plaintiff. Defendant must return Plaintiff’s property to Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 343.) DISCUSSION Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

3 Plaintiff repeats these exact facts two additional times in the second amended complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 327-330, 826-830.) 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”’ Strunk v. U.S. House of Representatives, 68 F. App’x 233, 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)); see Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972)

(holding that complaint did not comply with Rule 8 because “it contained a labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied comprehension”).

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Ezekwo v. Specialized Loan Servicing, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

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469 F.2d 691 (Second Circuit, 1972)
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68 F. App'x 233 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)