[156]*156Mr. Justice Hart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On December 22, 1949, one of the District Courts of Dallas County appointed a receiver for the assets of White-Webb Drilling Company, a corporation, and a partnership of the same name, and certain properties of James W. White, and ordered the receiver to take possession of the assets and properties. On February 23, 1950, the receiver filed a complaint in which he alleged that the present relator, James W. White, had failed and refused to deliver specified properties to the receiver and prayed that White be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt to court. An order was entered by the court on February 23 requiring White to appear on March 3 and show cause why he should not be held in contempt. On March 3, White appeared through counsel and filed a motion to quash the notice issued by the clerk, a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss the receiver’s complaint, and a motion for a continuance. The court overruled these pleas and motions and heard evidence on March 3, and then recesses the hearing until March 9, when further evidence was presented. At the end of the hearing, the court on March 9 entered an order which did not hold White in contempt of court but ordered him to turn over to the receiver certain described properties, including a Cadillac automobile and $8,500.00 in cash, and also ordered him to show cause on March 16 why he should not be held in contempt of court for failing to turn over to the receiver those properties.
White’s attorney was present on March 3, and also at the beginning of the hearing on March 9, but left upon being advised by the court that he would not sustain the pleas attacking the court’s jurisdiction. He was not present when the court entered the order of March 9, described above, but a copy of the order was mailed to and received by him before March 16.
On March 16, the court held a hearing as provided in the order of March 9. Neither White nor his counsel was present at this hearing. No complaint of any kind was filed with the court after the entry of the order of March 9. After hearing evidence the court on March 16 entered its order adjudging that White was in contempt of court in disobeying the order of March 9, by failing to deliver to the receiver the two items of property described in the order of that date. White was not found guilty of violating any other order or judgment of the court. White’s punishment was fixed at imprisonment in jail for seventy-two hours, and a fine of $100, and it was ordered that White should be held in jail by the sheriff until the costs [157]*157should be paid and the described properties should be delivered to the receiver.
On March 20, a commitment was issued on the contempt judgment and the relator was taken into custody by the sheriff of Dallas County, by whom he was being held when a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to this court. We granted leave to file the petition and ordered the release of the relator upon bond, pending oral argument by the attorneys for the relator and the receiver.
The first ground of attack upon the judgment holding relator in contempt is that it was not supported by any complaint stating the respects in which the relator was charged with violating the court’s order of March 9. We sustain this contention and it will therefore be unnecessary to consider the other points relied upon by the relator.
In Ex parte Scott, 133 Texas 1, 10; 123 S. W. 2d 306, 311, this Court said:
“It is the rule in this State, as well as the rule generally, that before a court has jurisdiction to punish a person for a contempt committed out of the presence of the court, there must first be filed an information or complaint in writing, duly sworn to, informing the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.”
In stating this rule, the court followed decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Foster, 44 Texas Cr. 423, 71 S. W. 593, 60 L. R. A. 631, 100 Am. St. Rep. 866; Ex parte Landry, 65 Texas Cr. 440, 144 S. W. 962; Ex parte Duncan, 78 Texas Cr. 447, 182 S. W. 313, 2 A. L. R. 222, and Ex parte Sturrock, 80 Texas Cr. 307, 189 S. W. 487, as well as the general statement of the law in 13 C. J. “Contempt” Sec. 89. See also 17 C. J. S. “Contempt” Sec. 71; 12 Am. Jur. “Contempt” Sec. 68; 9 Tex. Jur. “Contempt” Sec. 34; Annotations, 2 A. L. R. 225; 118 A. L. R. 155. The holding in the Scott case has been followed in Ex parte Cox, 133 Texas 152, 127 S. W. 2d 443 and Ex parte Freeman, 144 Texas 392, 191 S. W. 2d 6.
In Ex parte Hill, 122 Texas 80, 82; 52 S. W. 2d 367, 368, there is an indication that it is proper in some instances to start contempt proceedings by a rule nisi, entered by the court, rather than by the filing of a complaint:
“The proceeding should, in some instances, be begun by affidavit duly filed setting forth the matters and things involved [158]*158in the alleged contempt. Also, in some instances, the proceeding may be commenced by judgment nisi, followed by summons, notice, and hearing in open court.”
There is also a statement to the same effect in Ex parte Pyle 134 Texas 148, 133 S. W. 2d 565, in which the decision in the Hill case is cited, but no reference is made to the Scott case or the Cox case. Particular emphasis was laid by the court in its opinion in the Pyle case on the case of Ex parte Kilgore and Johnson, 3 Texas App. 247, which contains statements that the proper way to initiate a contempt proceeding is by rule nisi. See 3 Texas App. 253. This procedure seems to be approved in other jurisdictions. Baumgartner v. Joughin, 107 Fla. 858, 143 So. 436; Hunter v. State, 251 Ala. 11, 37 So. 2d 276; In re Fletcher, 71 App. D. C. 108, 107 Fed. 2d 666.
However, in Ex parte Landry, 65 Texas Cr. 440, 144 S. W. 962, and Ex parte Duncan, 78 Texas Cr. 447, 182 S. W. 313, 2 A. L. R. 222, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that an order to show cause entered by the court was not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to punish for a constructive contempt, where no sworn complaint had been filed. In Ex parte Scott, 133 Texas 1, 123 S. W. 2d 306, this, court deliberately announced its view that proceedings in contempt cases should conform as nearly as practicable to proceedings in criminal cases, and cited Ex parte Landry and Ex parte Duncan, supra, to sustain its holding that a sworn, written complaint must be filed before a court has jurisdiction to punish for a contempt committed out of the presence of the court. We think that this deliberate and carefully considered holding should be controlling over any inconsistent statements contained in Ex parte Hill or Ex parte Pyle, supra. Moreover, on principle we think that the requirement of a written complaint setting out the offense with which the defendant is charged is a sound precaution for the protection of the accused and that it does not unduly hamper the effective administration of justice, in cases of constructive contempt.
The procedure followed in this state in contempt cases is based on judicial decisions, statutes and rules. See 2 Stayton, Annotated Texas Forms (1948) ss. 1621-1631. In a case of constructive contempt, the first step to be taken is the filing of an affidavit or complaint. In most cases the complaint must be verified; but exceptions have been made in cases where the complaint is made by the public prosecuting officer, Ex parte Kahn, 90 Texas Cr. 41, 232 S. W.
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[156]*156Mr. Justice Hart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On December 22, 1949, one of the District Courts of Dallas County appointed a receiver for the assets of White-Webb Drilling Company, a corporation, and a partnership of the same name, and certain properties of James W. White, and ordered the receiver to take possession of the assets and properties. On February 23, 1950, the receiver filed a complaint in which he alleged that the present relator, James W. White, had failed and refused to deliver specified properties to the receiver and prayed that White be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt to court. An order was entered by the court on February 23 requiring White to appear on March 3 and show cause why he should not be held in contempt. On March 3, White appeared through counsel and filed a motion to quash the notice issued by the clerk, a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss the receiver’s complaint, and a motion for a continuance. The court overruled these pleas and motions and heard evidence on March 3, and then recesses the hearing until March 9, when further evidence was presented. At the end of the hearing, the court on March 9 entered an order which did not hold White in contempt of court but ordered him to turn over to the receiver certain described properties, including a Cadillac automobile and $8,500.00 in cash, and also ordered him to show cause on March 16 why he should not be held in contempt of court for failing to turn over to the receiver those properties.
White’s attorney was present on March 3, and also at the beginning of the hearing on March 9, but left upon being advised by the court that he would not sustain the pleas attacking the court’s jurisdiction. He was not present when the court entered the order of March 9, described above, but a copy of the order was mailed to and received by him before March 16.
On March 16, the court held a hearing as provided in the order of March 9. Neither White nor his counsel was present at this hearing. No complaint of any kind was filed with the court after the entry of the order of March 9. After hearing evidence the court on March 16 entered its order adjudging that White was in contempt of court in disobeying the order of March 9, by failing to deliver to the receiver the two items of property described in the order of that date. White was not found guilty of violating any other order or judgment of the court. White’s punishment was fixed at imprisonment in jail for seventy-two hours, and a fine of $100, and it was ordered that White should be held in jail by the sheriff until the costs [157]*157should be paid and the described properties should be delivered to the receiver.
On March 20, a commitment was issued on the contempt judgment and the relator was taken into custody by the sheriff of Dallas County, by whom he was being held when a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to this court. We granted leave to file the petition and ordered the release of the relator upon bond, pending oral argument by the attorneys for the relator and the receiver.
The first ground of attack upon the judgment holding relator in contempt is that it was not supported by any complaint stating the respects in which the relator was charged with violating the court’s order of March 9. We sustain this contention and it will therefore be unnecessary to consider the other points relied upon by the relator.
In Ex parte Scott, 133 Texas 1, 10; 123 S. W. 2d 306, 311, this Court said:
“It is the rule in this State, as well as the rule generally, that before a court has jurisdiction to punish a person for a contempt committed out of the presence of the court, there must first be filed an information or complaint in writing, duly sworn to, informing the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.”
In stating this rule, the court followed decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Foster, 44 Texas Cr. 423, 71 S. W. 593, 60 L. R. A. 631, 100 Am. St. Rep. 866; Ex parte Landry, 65 Texas Cr. 440, 144 S. W. 962; Ex parte Duncan, 78 Texas Cr. 447, 182 S. W. 313, 2 A. L. R. 222, and Ex parte Sturrock, 80 Texas Cr. 307, 189 S. W. 487, as well as the general statement of the law in 13 C. J. “Contempt” Sec. 89. See also 17 C. J. S. “Contempt” Sec. 71; 12 Am. Jur. “Contempt” Sec. 68; 9 Tex. Jur. “Contempt” Sec. 34; Annotations, 2 A. L. R. 225; 118 A. L. R. 155. The holding in the Scott case has been followed in Ex parte Cox, 133 Texas 152, 127 S. W. 2d 443 and Ex parte Freeman, 144 Texas 392, 191 S. W. 2d 6.
In Ex parte Hill, 122 Texas 80, 82; 52 S. W. 2d 367, 368, there is an indication that it is proper in some instances to start contempt proceedings by a rule nisi, entered by the court, rather than by the filing of a complaint:
“The proceeding should, in some instances, be begun by affidavit duly filed setting forth the matters and things involved [158]*158in the alleged contempt. Also, in some instances, the proceeding may be commenced by judgment nisi, followed by summons, notice, and hearing in open court.”
There is also a statement to the same effect in Ex parte Pyle 134 Texas 148, 133 S. W. 2d 565, in which the decision in the Hill case is cited, but no reference is made to the Scott case or the Cox case. Particular emphasis was laid by the court in its opinion in the Pyle case on the case of Ex parte Kilgore and Johnson, 3 Texas App. 247, which contains statements that the proper way to initiate a contempt proceeding is by rule nisi. See 3 Texas App. 253. This procedure seems to be approved in other jurisdictions. Baumgartner v. Joughin, 107 Fla. 858, 143 So. 436; Hunter v. State, 251 Ala. 11, 37 So. 2d 276; In re Fletcher, 71 App. D. C. 108, 107 Fed. 2d 666.
However, in Ex parte Landry, 65 Texas Cr. 440, 144 S. W. 962, and Ex parte Duncan, 78 Texas Cr. 447, 182 S. W. 313, 2 A. L. R. 222, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that an order to show cause entered by the court was not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to punish for a constructive contempt, where no sworn complaint had been filed. In Ex parte Scott, 133 Texas 1, 123 S. W. 2d 306, this, court deliberately announced its view that proceedings in contempt cases should conform as nearly as practicable to proceedings in criminal cases, and cited Ex parte Landry and Ex parte Duncan, supra, to sustain its holding that a sworn, written complaint must be filed before a court has jurisdiction to punish for a contempt committed out of the presence of the court. We think that this deliberate and carefully considered holding should be controlling over any inconsistent statements contained in Ex parte Hill or Ex parte Pyle, supra. Moreover, on principle we think that the requirement of a written complaint setting out the offense with which the defendant is charged is a sound precaution for the protection of the accused and that it does not unduly hamper the effective administration of justice, in cases of constructive contempt.
The procedure followed in this state in contempt cases is based on judicial decisions, statutes and rules. See 2 Stayton, Annotated Texas Forms (1948) ss. 1621-1631. In a case of constructive contempt, the first step to be taken is the filing of an affidavit or complaint. In most cases the complaint must be verified; but exceptions have been made in cases where the complaint is made by the public prosecuting officer, Ex parte Kahn, 90 Texas Cr. 41, 232 S. W. 797, and in child support cases, under Rule 308-a, T. R. C. P., as amended effective March 1, 1950. [159]*159Upon the filing of a proper complaint, the court may enter a judgment or rule nisi, or an order to show cause; or under Rule 692, T. R. C. P., in cases of a claimed disobedience of an injunction, the court may order the issuance of a writ of attachment instead of entering an order to show cause. The defendant in the contempt proceeding must be given notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to be heard, and the court must hear evidence which will sustain its judgment before the defendant can be held in contempt.
In the present case it is not controverted that the alleged contempt is constructive and not direct. Therefore, the filing of a verified complaint was essential to the court’s jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The complaint of February 23 is not sufficient to meet the legal requirements, because it was filed before the order was entered which the relator is accused of violating, aside from other defects which are claimed by the relator. Ex parte Cox, 133 Texas 152, 127 S. W. 2d 443.
The judgment of contempt is therefore void and it is ordered that the relator be released from custody. This judgment, however, is without prejudice to the power of the district court to enforce its orders in the receivership case by proper proceedings.
Opinion delivered May 17, 1950.