Ex Parte Suni David Diaz-Martinez v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 26, 2024
• Docket: 05-24-00223-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

REVERSE and REMAND and Opinion Filed July 26, 2024

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-00223-CR

EX PARTE SUNI DAVID DIAZ-MARTINEZ

On Appeal from the County Court Jim Hogg County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1080C

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Smith Opinion by Justice Smith Appellant Suni David Diaz-Martinez is a noncitizen who was arrested under

Operation Lone Star (OLS) and charged with the misdemeanor offense of criminal

trespass.1 Following his arrest, appellant filed an application for a pretrial writ of

habeas corpus in which he requested the issuance of a habeas writ and a dismissal of

the underlying charge.2 Appellant contended he was the subject of selective

prosecution in violation of state and federal constitutional equal protection

1 This appeal was transferred from the Fourth Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court docket equalization order. Accordingly, we apply the Fourth Court of Appeals’ precedent to the extent required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41.3. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 We note the State declined to file an appellate brief or a response to appellant’s writ of habeas corpus. principles. The habeas court denied his application on the merits, and appellant

appealed, arguing the habeas court erred in not granting his requested relief. Based

on the reasoning below, we reverse and remand to the habeas court with instructions

to enter an order dismissing appellant’s criminal case with prejudice.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the merits of a habeas court’s decision to grant or deny habeas

corpus relief, we defer to the habeas court’s assessment of the facts when those facts

turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Ex parte Perusquia, 336 S.W.3d

270, 274–75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref’d); Ex parte Quintana, 346

S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. ref’d). And we view the facts in

the light most favorable to the habeas court’s ruling, upholding it absent an abuse of

discretion. Id.; see also Ex parte Trevino, 648 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2021, no pet.) (recognizing that an appellate court views the facts in the

light most favorable to the habeas court’s ruling). Reviewing courts must also grant

deference to implicit findings of fact that support the habeas court’s ultimate ruling.

Perusquia, 336 S.W.3d at 275 (citing Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 n.23

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). However, “[i]f the resolution of the ultimate question turns

on an application of the law, we review the determination de novo.” Id.; see also Ex

parte Vazquez-Bautista, 683 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet.

filed) (recognizing same in the context of an appeal from a habeas court’s decision

granting an OLS applicant’s pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus).

–2– To prevail on a writ of habeas corpus, the applicant bears the burden of

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts that would entitle him to

relief. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Habeas corpus

is a remedy available to applicants who are “restrained in their liberty.” See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.01.

II. APPELLANT’S ARREST AND APPLICATION FOR A PRETRIAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On March 6, 2021, Governor Greg Abbott directed the Texas Department of

Public Safety (DPS) to initiate OLS “to deter[ ] illegal border crossing and . . .

prevent criminal activity along the border.” Ex parte Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d 696, 701

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. granted).

As part of OLS, appellant, a noncitizen, was arrested for misdemeanor

criminal trespass in Jim Hogg County on November 12, 2022. Appellant then filed

an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking dismissal of the criminal

charge, arguing his rights had been violated under the United States Constitution’s

Equal Protection Clause and the Texas Constitution’s Equal Rights Amendment,

because the State was selectively prosecuting men, and not similarly situated

women, for criminal trespass under OLS. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; TEX.

CONST. art. I, § 3a.

The habeas court conducted a hearing on appellant’s habeas application.

Appellant presented testimony from Trooper Christopher Garcia. The habeas court

–3– took judicial notice of Tracy Segundo’s testimony given during a hearing on a

different habeas applicant’s case.

Segundo works as an assignment coordinator for the Lubbock Private

Defender’s Office, which provides counsel to indigent OLS defendants. Segundo

testified that as of November 2022, she was not aware of a single female charged

with criminal trespass pursuant to the OLS program, and that the LPDO did not

begin appointing females counsel for criminal trespass until January 2023.

Trooper Garcia of the Texas Department of Public Safety testified he arrested

appellant for criminal trespass on November 12, 2022. Garcia stated that appellant

was discovered trespassing with one other male, one female, and one juvenile.

Garcia testified he did not arrest the female for trespassing because he had been

ordered by his field training officer to refrain from arresting females for criminal

trespass. According to Garcia, at the time he arrested appellant, it was DPS’s policy

not to arrest females for criminal trespass.

The State declined to present evidence or testimony from any witnesses. The

habeas court subsequently denied appellant’s habeas application, and appellant filed

a notice of appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the habeas court’s

denial of relief.

III. WE REVERSE AND REMAND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE

Appellant argues the habeas court erred by denying his selective prosecution

claim because he properly raised his claim in pretrial habeas writ, established a prima

–4– facie case of sex discrimination, and the State failed to justify its discriminatory

policy. We agree with appellant and reverse and remand this case to the habeas court

to grant the writ and dismiss with prejudice the misdemeanor criminal trespass

charge against appellant.

A. Appellant’s pretrial selective prosecution equal protection claim is cognizable on habeas.

We start with appellant’s argument that his claim of selective prosecution is

cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. The Fourth Court of Appeals

considered this issue and concluded a “selective-prosecution claim on the basis of

equal protection is the type of claim ‘in which the protection of the applicant’s

substantive rights or the conservation of judicial resources would be better served

by interlocutory review.’” Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d at 709 (quoting Ex parte Ingram,

533 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)). Accordingly, the Fourth Court of

Appeals held the claim was cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding. Id. We follow

the on-point precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals and hold appellant’s pretrial

habeas claim is cognizable. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3 (holding a transferee court must

follow the precedent of the transferor court).

B. Appellant met his burden to establish a prima facie claim of selective prosecution.

We next consider whether appellant met his burden of proving a prima facie

claim of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution,

appellant must show the “prosecutorial policy ‘had a discriminatory effect and that

–5– it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.’” United States v. Armstrong, 517

U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).

To establish a discriminatory effect in a selective prosecution case based on

gender discrimination, appellant had to show similarly situated individuals of the

opposite sex were not prosecuted for the same conduct. See id. (stating standard with

respect to race discrimination); Robles v. State, 585 S.W.3d 591, 597 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (applying Armstrong standard to gender

discrimination). To demonstrate the prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory

purpose, appellant had to show the State’s selection of him for prosecution was based

on an impermissible consideration like gender. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610; Lovill v.

State, 287 S.W.3d 65, 79 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2008), rev’d on

other grounds, 319 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

In Aparicio, the Fourth Court held the State’s policy of prosecuting men but

not women for trespass established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. See

Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d at 713–15. Like the appellant in Aparicio, appellant

introduced evidence demonstrating the State prosecuted men but not women

trespassers as part of OLS and that this policy was in effect when the State arrested

him on November 12, 2022.

Appellant’s evidence—including Segundo’s testimony that as of November

2022, she was not aware of a single female charged with criminal trespass pursuant

to the OLS program as well as Garcia’s testimony that he was instructed to arrest

–6– only males and to turn the females over to border patrol—demonstrates appellant’s

gender was the reason he was prosecuted. Accordingly, we hold appellant

established by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of sex

discrimination by showing OLS had a discriminatory effect and it was motivated by

a discriminatory purpose. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; Ex parte Richardson, 70

S.W.3d 865, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d at 714.

C. The State failed to adequately justify its decision to discriminate.

We now turn to appellant’s final argument in which he asserts the State did

not meet its burden of justifying its discriminatory conduct under the United States

Constitution or the Texas Constitution. See Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d at 716. With

regard to appellant’s claim under the Texas Constitution’s Equal Rights

Amendment, the State had to show that its discriminatory classification is narrowly

tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. With regard to his federal

equal protection claim, the State had to show “that the classification serves

‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’

are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” Miss. Univ. for

Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins.

Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).

The Fourth Court of Appeals has rejected attempts by the State to justify its

policy of gender discrimination under both the United States Constitution and Texas

Constitution. See State v. Compean, No. 04-22-00886-CR, 2023 WL 8104870, at *2

–7– (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 22, 2023, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); State v. Rodas, No. 04-22-00885-CR, 2023 WL 8103194, at *2 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Nov. 22, 2023, pet. filed.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); State v. Gomez, No. 04-22-00872-CR, 2023 WL 7552682 at *5-6 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Nov. 15, 2023, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). In those cases, the Fourth Court of Appeals held although security at

the border may be considered a compelling interest, the State failed to demonstrate

that its actions were narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. Additionally, the

Fourth Court has rejected the State’s attempts to justify “that the classification serves

‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’

are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” Id. Thus, for the

same reasons set forth in those cases, we hold the State failed to justify its policy of

gender discrimination.

D. We direct the habeas court to enter an order of dismissal.

The proper remedy in this case is to reverse the habeas court’s order denying

appellant’s writ application, without the necessity of remanding for any further

proceedings on the merits of his claims and direct the habeas court to enter an order

of dismissal. The sole purpose of an appeal from a habeas court’s ruling is to “do

substantial justice to the parties,” and in resolving such an appeal, we may “render

whatever judgment . . . the nature of the case require[s].” TEX. R. APP. P. 31.2, .3.

–8– And under the circumstances of this case, we do not believe it would do substantial

justice to the parties to remand for any further proceedings on the merits.

Here, the State has not requested we remand this case to the habeas court for

further proceedings to give it the opportunity to present additional evidence or

arguments on the issue. Accordingly, because there is no dispute in the present case,

either in the law or in the facts, on the question of whether the State unjustifiably

engaged in gender discrimination against appellant, we conclude it would be an

“exercise in futility” to remand for further proceedings on the merits. N. Cypress

Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 898 F.3d 461, 479–80 (5th Cir.

2018) (where facts and law were well-settled, court recognized that it would be an

“exercise in futility” and “diminish judicial economy” to remand to the habeas court

for further proceedings, where there was a “high likelihood” that the same issue

would return to the court in a subsequent appeal, thereby further prolonging the

litigation unnecessarily). As well, we find that remanding to the habeas court for

additional proceedings on the merits would unnecessarily cause further delays in

resolving appellant’s habeas claim, which cuts against the principle that habeas

proceedings should be handled in an expedited manner. Ex parte Johnson, 876

S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (finding it appropriate to issue a writ of

habeas corpus, without remanding to the habeas court, by utilizing its habeas corpus

jurisdiction and power to “expedite a fair resolution of the unconstitutional situation

the courts below have created for this applicant”); TEX. R. APP. P. 31.2(b) (providing

–9– that an appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding other than one challenging a

defendant’s conviction or placement on community supervision, “shall be submitted

and heard at the earliest practicable time”).

IV. CONCLUSION

The habeas court erred as a matter of law in denying appellant’s application

for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus on the merits. Accordingly, we reverse the habeas

court’s order and remand to the habeas court to grant the writ and dismiss with

prejudice the misdemeanor criminal trespass charge against appellant.

/Craig Smith/ CRAIG SMITH Do Not Publish JUSTICE TEX. R. APP. P. 47 240223F.U05

–10– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

EX PARTE EX PARTE SUNI On Appeal from the County Court, DAVID DIAZ-MARTINEZ Jim Hogg County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1080C. No. 05-24-00223-CR Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Partida-Kipness and Nowell participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment entered this 26th day of July 2024.

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