In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-25-00362-CV
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EX PARTE RANDY LOUIS DUPREE
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On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 14-08-08850
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2015, Randy Louis Dupree was adjudicated a sexually violent predator and civilly committed.1 Dupree is in a tiered treatment program and has been ordered to wear a GPS while residing in the Texas Civil Commitment Center (TCCC). In his habeas corpus application, he asserted that while in treatment, beginning in June 2025, “TCCO forced Dupree to re-submit to GPS leg-monitor tracking device[.]”
1 We previously affirmed the Final Judgment adjudicating him as a sexually violent predator and addressed his challenge to the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge. See In re Commitment of Randy Louis Dupree, No. 09-15-00269-CV, 2016 WL 1600763, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 21, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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He applied for a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court dismissed as frivolous without a hearing. Dupree appeals, and in one issue asks whether the trial court erred by denying his request for habeas corpus relief to be free from illegal restraint and determining that the Texas Civil Commitment Office’s (TCCO) Policy 3.36 GPS Tracking Removal Determination and Texas Health and Safety Code § 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii) and (iii) Commitment Requirements “are not unconstitutional as applied” to him.2, 3 In the alternative, he also requests that if we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we treat it as a petition for writ of mandamus.
Background
On August 20, 2025, the trial court signed a biennial review order that it had not determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Dupree’s behavioral abnormality changed to the extent that he is no longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence and requiring Dupree’s continued commitment. Shortly before the trial court signed the biennial review order requiring Dupree’s ongoing commitment, he filed Petitioner’s Request for Civil Habeas Corpus Relief from Illegal Restraint of a GPS Leg-Monitor Tracking Device While Indefinitely
2 For the first time on appeal, he also asks for a temporary injunction, which we need not address based on our disposition.
3 Although not raised in the trial court, Dupree also argues in his brief that in the TCCO’s recent self-evaluation report to the Sunset Advisory Commission it concedes GPS tracking equipment in the TCCC no longer serves a clear purpose. Since this was not raised in the trial court, we do not address this argument.
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Detained in a Maximum-Security Facility. He supported his request for habeas relief with the following exhibits: (1) Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) Policy 3.36 and Health and Safety Code section 841.082; (2) Aerial Photo of the TCCC; (3) TCCC Client Communication Form from Dupree asking why he still had to wear a leg monitor; and (4) his declaration.
In his request for habeas relief, he likened the GPS monitor to a “modern-day-
electronic-ball-and-chain” and contended that since he was confined, having to wear the GPS monitor constitutes “a punishment mechanism” under TCCO Policy 3.36 and Texas Health and Safety Code section 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii)–(iii), which are unconstitutional as applied to him. He argued that both violate his constitutional “right of freedom from an excessive illegal restraint.” In his declaration, he stated that having to wear the GPS was a “retaliatory act” for “unproven misconduct.” He asserted, “TCCO forced me to re-submit to a GPS leg-monitor tracking device until I successfully pass[ed] another polygraph test indicating no deception, which is a year or more.”
The State responded that Dupree failed to meet his burden to show he was entitled to relief and show that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, and his request was frivolous and should be dismissed. The State noted that Dupree failed to provide proof of his current treatment level, disciplinary status, that the monitor restricts his liberty, that the statute operates differently as applied to him, or that the
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treatment center is a maximum-security area. It also noted our opinion addressing similar issues in In re Commitment of Michael Marks, No. 09-24-00277-CV, 2025 WL 2416827 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 21, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). The State countered that the statute is presumed constitutional and requires that a person on disciplinary status must submit to a tracking device; further, the State pointed to Dupree’s admission in his affidavit that he showed signs of deception on a polygraph and was placed on GPS monitoring until he passed a polygraph. Among other things, the State attached: a copy of the Marks opinion; the Final Judgment adjudicating Dupree as a sexually violent predator as defined by Texas Health and Safety Code section 841.003 and Order of Civil Commitment including requirement to submit to GPS monitoring; and Agreed Motion to Transfer to Tiered Treatment Program.
The trial court dismissed Dupree’s action as frivolous without a hearing.
Dupree then appealed.
Jurisdiction
Dupree correctly recognizes our lack of jurisdiction over an appeal where the trial court summarily dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus without reaching the merits of the request. See id. at *4-5. That said, here, as alternatively requested by Dupree, we exercise our broad original jurisdiction to consider this a petition for writ of mandamus. See In re Commitment of Renshaw, 672 S.W.3d 426, 427–28 (Tex. 2023) (requiring appellate court under similar circumstances to
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reconsider writ of habeas corpus dismissed for want of jurisdiction as a petition for writ of mandamus per petitioner’s alternative request); Ex parte Poest, No. 09-24- 00072-CV, 2024 WL 3199146, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 27, 2024, mand. denied) (mem. op.).
Mandamus Standard
We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. With those principles in mind, we turn to whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion by summarily dismissing Dupree’s application for writ of habeas corpus.
Analysis
Dupree contends that TCCO Policy 3.36 and Texas Health and Safety Code section 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii)–(iii) are unconstitutional as applied to him because they
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violate his right to be free from illegal restraint and that wearing the GPS is punitive in nature.
A sexually violent predator (“SVP”) is defined as a person who: (1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a). Here, the record shows that a jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dupree is a sexually violent predator as defined in section 841.003. See id. §§ 841.003(a), 841.062 (allowing for trial by jury with beyond a reasonable doubt standard and requiring a verdict in a jury trial to be unanimous). Once a jury or judge determines an individual is an SVP, “the judge shall commit the person for treatment and supervision to be coordinated by the [TCCO].” See id. § 841.081(a). The statutory scheme expressly provides that before entering a civil commitment order, “the judge shall impose on the person requirements necessary to ensure the person’s compliance with treatment and supervision and to protect the community.” See id. § 841.082(a) (emphasis added). Those requirements include, among other things,
(A) submit to tracking under a particular type of tracking service, if the person:
(i) while residing at a civil commitment center, leaves the center for any reason;
(ii) is in one of the two most restrictive tiers of treatment, as determined by the office;
(iii) is on disciplinary status, as determined by the office; or (iv) resides in the community[.]
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See id. § 841.082(a)(4)(A)(i)–(iv). Dupree complains of subsections (A)(ii) and (iii).
In conjunction with this, the TCCO has promulgated certain policies that civilly committed SVPs must comply with. See id. § 841.007 (making the TCCO responsible for providing appropriate and necessary treatment and supervision for committed persons and developing and implementing sex offender treatment program for committed persons). Dupree complains of Policy 3.36, which provides,
II. Clients Required to Submit to GPS Tracking Clients shall submit to GPS tracking when they:
...
B. Are assigned to one of the two most restrictive tiers of treatment, which includes Tier I and Tier 2-1 (Initial Placement or Incident Report). Tier 2-1 is defined as a client in the first six (6) months of Tier 2, or a Tier 2 client with an incident report sustained at a Behavioral Management Review (BMR).
C. Have not yet been assigned to a tier;
...
E. Are program non-compliant as determined by the Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) Management Staff which may include, but is not limited, to the following:
1. Receipt of an incident report that was sustained at a behavior management hearing, within the last 6 months;
2. Placed in the Secure Management Unit (SMU) due to behavioral issues;
3. Delinquent in cost recovery and does not have an established, approved payment plan;
4. A client who has been reduced from Tier Five;
5. A client on package restriction;
6. A client who has privileges suspended or revoked;
7. A client with pending criminal charges or currently under investigation for a criminal offense;
8. Program non-compliance, to include but is not limited to rule violations or refusing to participate in treatment or additional required programming; or
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9. Is considered a flight risk.
Dupree particularly complains of Policy 3.36 II(E).
We review an as-applied constitutional challenge de novo. See Walker v.
State, 659 S.W.3d 43, 57 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2022, pet. ref’d) (citation omitted); see also Modarresi v. State, 488 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (addressing as-applied constitutional challenge). “Under an ‘as applied’ challenge, the party that is challenging the application of the statute contends that the statute, although generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally given the challenging party’s particular circumstances.” In re Commitment of Dodson, 434 S.W.3d 742, 745 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) (citing In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 656 at n.17 (Tex. 2005)). So we must evaluate the statute as it operates in practice against Dupree. See Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. 2002); In re Commitment of Edwards, 443 S.W.3d 520, 522 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied).
In construing the statute and its effect, we consider multiple factors, including:
its purpose; the circumstances of its enactment; the legislative history; common-law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; a particular construction’s consequences; administrative construction of the statute; and the title, preamble, and emergency provision. Edwards, 443 S.W.3d at 522–23
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(citing Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 381). The party attacking the statute bears the burden of showing that the statute is unconstitutional. Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 381; Edwards, 443 S.W.3d at 523.
When the Legislature enacted Chapter 841, the Legislature found that:
[A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exists and ... those predators have a behavioral abnormality that is not amenable to traditional mental illness treatment modalities and that makes the predators likely to engage in repeated predatory acts of sexual violence. The legislature finds that the existing involuntary commitment provisions of Subtitle C, Title 7, are inadequate to address the risk of repeated predatory behavior that sexually violent predators pose to society. The legislature further finds that treatment modalities for sexually violent predators are different from the traditional treatment modalities for persons appropriate for involuntary commitment under Subtitle C, Title 7. Thus, the legislature finds that a civil commitment procedure for the long-term supervision and treatment of sexually violent predators is necessary and in the interest of the state.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.001.
We begin with Dupree’s argument that forcing him to wear a GPS monitor while confined in the TCCC treatment facility is punitive. The United States Supreme Court has explained that restraints, such as inpatient confinement, in involuntary civil commitments have historically been treated as civil, not punitive. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997); In re Commitment of Graham, 117 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). “The ‘State may take measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill. This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so
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regarded.’” Graham, 117 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363). Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court has previously rejected the notion that the statutory scheme of the SVP civil commitment statute is punitive in nature and provided detailed reasoning for that conclusion. See Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 645–53; Dodson, 434 S.W.3d at 745. The statute expressly states that the requirements imposed by the judge are those “necessary to ensure the person’s compliance with treatment and supervision and to protect the community.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.082(a) (emphasis added). In other words, the legitimate government purpose of these requirements are two-fold: (1) to ensure the person’s compliance with treatment and supervision; and (2) to protect the community. See id. §§ 841.001, 841.082(a); see also Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 645–53; Dodson, 434 S.W.3d at 745–46. We reject the notion that the statute and policy requiring GPS monitoring are punitive in nature and conclude they serve express and legitimate government purposes as stated. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001, 841.082(a); Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 645–53; Dodson, 434 S.W.3d at 745–46; see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363; Graham, 117 S.W.3d at 515.
Neither does the evidence pointed to in Dupree’s brief convince us that the statute and policy were punitively applied to him, as it shows that despite treatment since 2015, he still struggled to comply with treatment protocols, like polygraph examinations. See 22 Tex. Admin. Code Ann. § 810.64 (requiring licensed sex
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offender treatment providers to use polygraph examinations as part of standard treatment for adult sex offenders). His own declaration states as much.
We next address Dupree’s contention that TCCO Policy 3.36 and Texas Health and Safety Code section 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii)–(iii) are also unconstitutional as applied to him because they violate his right to be free from illegal restraint. Dupree bore the high burden of demonstrating that the SVP statute operates unconstitutionally as applied to him by requiring him to submit to GPS monitoring. See Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 381. Dupree’s evidence is scant and as noted above, includes his own statement that he did not pass a polygraph and would be required to pass one before the GPS would be removed. The record shows that he was civilly committed and adjudicated as a SVP, so he falls into the “small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators” who “have a behavioral abnormality that is not amenable to traditional mental illness treatment modalities and that makes the predators likely to engage in repeated predatory acts of sexual violence[.]” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.001. He does not explain how the GPS inhibits his movement within the treatment facility or why it is unnecessary for him in that environment. He has also failed to show how the statute is applied unconstitutionally to him specifically. Notably, there is no evidence of his compliance with treatment modalities, what level of treatment he is in, or anything else that would show that the GPS monitor does not help to ensure his
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compliance with treatment modalities or to protect the public. Rather, the record seemingly establishes that he had to re-submit to a GPS monitor for his failure to comply with treatment which included passing polygraph examinations. This reflects the legitimate statutory scheme of providing “long-term supervision and treatment of sexually violent predators” and protecting the public from them. Id. Dupree has failed to show that the statute and policy were unconstitutional as applied to him. See Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 381; Edwards, 443 S.W.3d at 523.
Having failed to show the requirement that he wear a GPS monitor was unconstitutional as applied to him—either in illegally restraining his movement or being punitive in nature—Dupree cannot establish the trial court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing his application for writ of habeas corpus. Absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, Dupree is not entitled to mandamus relief. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
Conclusion
We conclude that when the trial court summarily dismissed Dupree’s application, it did not rule on the merits of Dupree’s application seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we lack appellate jurisdiction over Dupree’s attempted appeal of the trial court’s order dismissing Dupree’s application and his appeal is dismissed. That said, after considering Dupree’s brief as a petition for a writ of
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mandamus, we also conclude that Dupree failed to show the trial court clearly abused its discretion; thus, he is not entitled to mandamus relief.
APPEAL DISMISSED; PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on June 4, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.