Ex Parte Junfang Xie

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 29, 2007
• Docket: 14-07-00199-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 29, 2007

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 29, 2007.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-07-00199-CR

EX PARTE JUNFANG XIE

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 9

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1436522

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from the denial of appellant=s application for a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus.  Appellant is charged with the misdemeanor offense of operating an unlicensed -massage establishment.  Before trial, appellant moved to preclude the state from offering evidence that the police initially investigated appellant=s business for prostitution. The trial court granted the motion in limine.  During the jury trial, a witness for the State alluded to matters in contravention of the trial court=s order.  The trial court then declared a mistrial on its own motion.  Appellant asserts that the Fifth Amendment=s double jeopardy clause precludes a retrial.  We affirm.

The Motion in Limine

Appellant asserts that during voir dire, the State referred on three occasions to appellant=s business^[1] as a Amassage parlor,@ a term not used in the licensing statute under which appellant is charged.  Before the first witness was called, appellant=s counsel orally presented a motion in limine asking the court to exclude evidence that the police initially investigated appellant=s business for prostitution.  The trial court granted the motion as to testimony at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. 

The Mistrial

The State=s first witness was a previous customer of appellant=s business who visited the establishment twice.  He was asked to describe the front of the business and how the ladies were dressed.  He replied that there were drapes or shades on the windows and the ladies were dressed Afairly scantily.@  He testified he had not been back after the second visit.  Even though he still receives massage therapy, he stated, AI won=t go back there.@  On cross-examination, he acknowledged that he had filed a police report on the establishment.  He stated he did not tell the police about his visits to the business because it was Aan embarrassing incident.@

The State=s next witness was the police detective who investigated a report of Aactivities@ occurring at appellant=s business.  He described the premises as Adimly lit.@  When asked what he saw, the detective stated that he saw appellant exit one of the rooms, where a man with no clothes on, but covered by a towel, lay on a table.  The State then returned to questioning about any licenses or diplomas on the walls.

The State=s third witness was a former investigator for the Department of Health Services.  When asked how he came to hear about appellant=s business, he responded:

The Director of the Massage Therapy Program in Austin informed me that she received a call from an officer in Webster, Texas.  She gave me the phone number and asked if I would call this officer which I did.  I made contact with the officer.  He explained to me that there was an establishment in Webster at which time he asked for my assistance.  I agreed to work with him.  We did a joint operation.  I met with him and we made a plan of operation.  I went to the establishment for another reason instead of seeing if it was operating as an unlicensed massage establishment.   Once we got there I went in and met a couple of females for the purpose of obtaining sex for money.  That didn=t occur.

Appellant=s counsel immediately objected and the lawyers approached the bench.  The court stated, AHe has indicated that did not occur.  He should have been admonished.@  The court then immediately granted a mistrial.  When asked if he understood the instruction not to discuss prostitution, the witness replied, AShe asked me, Ma=am . . . I was answering the question.@  The court observed that he Avolunteered a lot more information than needed to be volunteered.@

The State opposed the mistrial, suggesting an instruction would cure any error.  The trial court responded that A[w]e have been dancing around this issue enough that they probably got a feeling already. . . . I was uncomfortable to go back when he said he was investigating . . . prostitution.  I don=t think you can cure it.  I will grant the mistrial.@

The Writ Hearing

At the hearing on the application for habeas corpus relief, no testimony was offered.  The trial court restated the relevant testimony that suggested there was a prostitution investigation initially.  The court stated that a mistrial was ordered because the jurors Awere pretty much smirking about what was going on.@  The State assured the court that the last witness had been properly warned about the motion in limine and that the unresponsive answer was unexpected.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court blamed the last witness for not Areally paying that much attention,@ and specifically found that the State had not intended to cause a mistrial.  The court denied the writ.

Double Jeopardy

The double jeopardy provisions of the federal and Texas constitutions protect a citizen from repeated attempts at prosecution for the same criminal offense.  Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  However, if a defendant requests a mistrial, double jeopardy normally does not bar reprosecution.  Id.  Under the federal double jeopardy clause, a retrial is prohibited after the defendant requests and is granted a mistrial only if the prosecution intentionally commits manifestly improper conduct with the intent to provoke that mistrial.  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S. Ct. 2083 (1982). 

In Bauder v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the double jeopardy provision of the Texas Constitution more expansively, to cover Areckless@ conduct, holding that retrial would also be barred Awhen the prosecutor was aware but consciously disregarded the risk that an objectionable event for which he was responsible would require a mistrial at the defendant's request.@  921 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  The court later reconsidered and overruled Bauder, holding that the proper rule under the Texas Constitution is the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Kennedy, i.e., whether the prosecutor intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.  Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

Two months later, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Ex parte Masonheimer.  There, the court held that the standard enunciated in Oregon v. Kennedy barred retrial Aunder the unique circumstances of that case@ because the State had intentionally failed to disclose exculpatory evidence with the specific intent to avoid the possibility of an acquittal.  Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d 494, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  The Masonheimer court reasoned that Ain a case like this, a defendant suffers the same harm as when the State intentionally >goads= or provokes the defendant into moving for a mistrial.@  Id.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial court=s decision to grant or deny relief on a writ of habeas corpus, appellate courts review the facts in the light most favorable to the trial judge=s ruling and should uphold it absent an abuse of discretion.   Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507.  We afford almost total deference to the trial judge=s determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.  Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

Discussion

Appellant concedes that he did not object to the mistrial and that the trial court considered and rejected a less drastic alternative to mistrial.  Therefore, appellant asserts that the mistrial is properly characterized as a Adefense-requested mistrial.@  Appellant contends that the State was concerned that an acquittal was likely because defense counsel had damaged the credibility of the State=s main witnesses on cross-examination. 

The record does not support appellant=s assertion.  The State pointed out that its witnesses had established two elements of the offense of operating a massage establishment without a license.  The first witness testified he received a massage at appellant=s business, and the second witness testified that appellant lacked a license to operate a massage establishment.  Moreover, the State, not the defense, argued against the mistrial.  The facts of this case are clearly not analogous those that led to the Masonheimer court=s finding of deliberate conduct and specific intent to avoid the possibility of an acquittal.  Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507-08.

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court=s decision, as we must, we conclude the record supports the trial court=s conclusion that the witness, rather than the prosecutor, caused the mistrial.  The court concluded that the witness Ajust kind of went wayward on his own, @ perhaps as the result of inattention.  There is no evidence of intentional misconduct on the part of the prosecution.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant=s application for writ of habeas corpus on double jeopardy grounds.

We affirm the trial court=s order.

PER CURIAM

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed November 29, 2007.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Seymore.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]  Appellant asserts that the State has not established the appellant is the owner of the business in question, Hands Health Care in Webster, Texas.  We express no opinion on ownership and refer to the business as Aappellant=s business@ only for ease of discussion.