Ex Parte Joseph Blair Brooks v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
• Decided: April 9, 2026
• Docket: 10-25-00217-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00217-CR

Ex parte Joseph Blair Brooks,

On appeal from the 443rd District Court of Ellis County, Texas Judge Faith Johnson, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 52384CR

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Joseph Blair Brooks appeals the trial court’s denial of his

motion for release due to delay pursuant to article 17.151 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151. Brooks contends

article 17.151 mandates his release by requiring the trial court to either grant

him a personal recognizance (PR) bond or reduce his bond to an amount he

could afford based on the record. The trial court’s refusal of Brooks’ request,

according to Brooks, constitutes an abuse of its discretion. We reverse the trial

court’s denial of the motion for release and remand for further proceedings. BACKGROUND

Brooks was arrested on May 10, 2024, on suspicion of solicitation of

capital murder. A grand jury returned an indictment against Brooks on a

charge for solicitation of capital murder with remuneration on October 16,

2024. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(3). Brooks has been continuously in jail

since the date of his arrest.

The trial court originally set bail at $700,000. Brooks filed his first

article 17.151 motion for release on August 14, 2024, and, on September 10,

2024, the trial court reduced Brooks’ bail to $200,000. Brooks subsequently

filed two additional motions for release, one in March of 2025 and one in May

of 2025. Following a hearing on June 11, 2025, the trial court denied Brooks’

request to reduce his bail, stating that Brooks could have posted bond at

$200,000 at the time it was set “if he so chose.” On July 3 of that year, Brooks

filed an application for writ of habeas corpus requesting a reduction in bail,

which the trial court also denied. Brooks appeals the trial court’s denial of his

July 3 writ application.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s decision in a habeas proceeding regarding the

imposition or reduction of bail for an abuse of discretion. Ex parte Gill, 413

S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A trial court abuses its discretion

Ex parte Brooks Page 2 when it acts without reference to guiding principles or rules, or where its act

was arbitrary or unreasonable. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380

(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc).

ANALYSIS

In one issue, Brooks contends that article 17.151 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure is a mandatory provision requiring the trial court either

to release Brooks on a personal bond or to reduce his bail to an amount he can

afford. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151. The trial court’s failure to take

either of these actions, Brooks argues, constitutes an abuse of its discretion.

The parties do not dispute that article 17.151 applies to Brooks’ writ of habeas

corpus. The only issue is whether the trial court was required to provide for

Brooks’ release by granting him a personal bond or reducing his bail.

Article 17.151 is a mandatory provision: where the State is not ready for

trial within 90 days from the commencement of the defendant’s detention, the

defendant must be released either on a personal bond or by reducing the bail

amount. Ex parte Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Where

the trial court chooses to reduce the amount of bail, it must reduce bail required

to an amount that the record reflects a defendant can make in order to

effectuate release. Id.; Rowe v. State, 853 S.W.2d 581, 582 n. 1 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1993). The defendant does not have a burden to establish the amount of

Ex parte Brooks Page 3 bail he can afford, and the trial court is not authorized when setting a reduced

bail amount to consider factors other than the amount of bail the record reflects

the defendant can afford to pay. Ex parte Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d 923, 927-28

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

The record in this case contains conflicting evidence regarding Brooks’

ability to afford bail at $200,000. At his June 11, 2025 hearing, Brooks testified

that he was incapable of posting the $200,000 bail, although he would only be

required to pay 10% of the bail—$20,000—and collateral to effectuate his

release. However, the record establishes that Brooks’ bail had been previously

reduced from $700,000 to $200,000. No attempt to challenge that amount was

made until another motion to reduce bail was filed six months later. Brooks

also testified at the hearing that, after the trial court previously reduced bail

to $200,000, Brooks had received $19,000 from the sale of real property and

continued to receive $4,400 per month in benefits from the Veterans

Administration since his arrest. Brooks stated that the proceeds from the

property sale were used to reimburse his parents for his legal fees, while the

VA funds were used to support his children, although Brooks was not under a

court order to pay child support. Brooks also testified as to having “maybe

$1,000” in a bank account.

The State contends that Brooks’ testimony at the June 11 hearing

Ex parte Brooks Page 4 establishes that he could afford to pay the $200,000 bond at the time his bail

was set at that amount; he simply chose not to spend his funds to post a bail

bond. Brooks’ voluntary failure to pay, the State argues, does not require the

trial court to further reduce his bond to account for Brooks’ expenditure of

funds he could have used to post a bail bond. Further, the State contends that

the trial court was within its discretion in denying Brooks’ release on personal

bond (PR) or a bond reduction because the trial court was entitled to not believe

Brooks’ testimony pertaining to the amount of bail he can afford. 1

This case presents a novel issue in our jurisdiction: whether the

language “must be released” in article 17.151 mandates that a trial court

further reduce bail for a criminal defendant where the defendant, after

receiving an initial reduction in bail under article 17.151, chooses to make non-

obligatory payments to family members instead of posting a bail bond and

subsequently moves for a PR bond or a further reduction in bail. We hold that

the mandatory language of article 17.151 requires a trial court to provide for a

defendant’s release where its prerequisites are met, even if the trial court has

previously reduced the defendant’s bail under the statute.

When interpreting a statute, we seek to give effect to the intent or

purpose of the legislators who enacted the statute. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d

1 Because this issue turns on statutory construction, we need not address the State’s credibility argument here.

Ex parte Brooks Page 5 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). This requires us to analyze the plain language

of the statute. Id. Only where the statute is ambiguous or application of the

statute’s plain language would lead to an absurd result that the legislature did

not intend can we consult extratextual sources. Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425,

429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Article 17.151 is designed to preserve the presumption of innocence for a

criminal defendant facing prosecutorial delay by protecting the defendant from

“the incidental punitive effect” of pretrial confinement. Jones v. State, 803

S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Ex parte Green, 688 S.W.2d

555, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). This incidental punitive effect of pretrial

detention raises concerns over infringement of the defendant’s due process

rights. See Green, 688 S.W.2d at 556-57; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.

253, 269 (1984) (“It is axiomatic that ‘due process requires that a pretrial

detainee not be punished’”) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16

(1979)). The Legislature secured protection from the punitive effects of

extended pretrial detention by creating a right for criminal defendants to

guarantee their release from custody should the State delay in bringing

prosecution for the period of time prescribed by the statute. State v. Condron,

951 S.W.2d 178, 188 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. dism’d).

Article 17.151 does not provide discretion to the trial court to determine

Ex parte Brooks Page 6 whether the defendant should be released. Rather, the statute’s command is

unequivocal: the defendant must be released. Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425,

430 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“The first sentence of article 17.151 unequivocally

declares that a defendant detained pending trial ‘must be released’ if the State

is not ready for trial”) (emphasis added). The trial court does have some

discretion in determining the mechanism through which the defendant should

be released— by issuing a PR bond or by reducing bail to an amount the

defendant can actually afford to pay. Ex parte Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d 923, 928

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). However, when deciding how to release the defendant,

the trial court must ensure the defendant’s release. See Ex parte McNeil, 772

S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (“To hold

otherwise would allow the State to arrest McNeil, charge her with a crime, and

then simply leave her in jail without bothering to indict her”). The trial court

does not have discretion to deny the defendant’s release when the prerequisites

of article 17.151 have been met, i.e., where the defendant has been detained

for more than 90 days and the State is not ready for trial. Ex parte Lanclos,

624 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

The State concedes that Brooks was held for more than 90 days prior to

his indictment. 2 See Ex parte Avila, 201 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—Waco

2 Further, the State does not contend that any of the exceptions enumerated in § 2 of article 17.151

apply to Brooks.

Ex parte Brooks Page 7 2006, no pet.) (“When there is no indictment, the State cannot announce ready

for trial”). The trial court was required to provide for Brooks’ release either by

issuing a PR bond or by reducing bail to an amount the record established

Brooks could afford. In denying either remedy, the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to adhere to the guiding principles of article 17.151. See

Pharris v. State, 196 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no

pet.) (“Section 17.151 is mandatory”).

It is immaterial that Brooks previously had his bail reduced or that he

failed to post a bail bond following the initial bond reduction. The Legislature

spoke in clear, unambiguous terms in mandating a defendant’s release under

article 17.151. Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Although the State presents a compelling argument about the potential for

abuse of article 17.151, our goal is not to determine what constitutes sound

policy, but rather to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Tijerina v. City of

Tyler, 846 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. 1992) (“But as judges, we are called upon to

apply a statutory command even when it produces a policy of which we

disapprove… we cannot rewrite or… deconstruct a plainly worded statute

because we believe it does not effectuate sound policy”). We will not create an

ambiguity where one does not exist in the plain language of the statute. See

Tex. Dept. of Public Safety v. Kreipe, 29 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. App.—Houston

Ex parte Brooks Page 8 [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (citing Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation

Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999)). Nor do we believe the plain

meaning of the statute creates an absurd result; rather, the Legislature’s

intent to require a defendant’s release—even where the defendant, like Brooks,

acts inconsistent with his right for release—is clear. See, e.g., Ex parte Lanclos,

624 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (stating that article 17.151

“mandates [a defendant’s] release—either on personal bond or by reducing the

required bail amount—period”) (emphasis added); Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d

712, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating the “obvious legislative intent” of

article 17.151 is “to provide assurance that an accused will not be held in

custody indefinitely while the State is not at least prepared to bring him to

trial”). Holding otherwise would obstruct Brooks’ presumption of innocence

and subject him to the incidental punitive effects of pretrial confinement. See

Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 716.

CONCLUSION

Article 17.151 mandates Brooks’ release. Brooks has been in custody

awaiting trial on suspicion of a felony charge for more than 90 days, and the

State was not ready for trial at the time Brooks filed his application for writ of

habeas corpus. In denying Brooks’ release, the trial court abused its discretion

by failing to adhere to article 17.151’s mandate. Brooks’ failure to effectuate

Ex parte Brooks Page 9 his own release after his initial bail reduction does not excuse the trial court’s

action.

Brooks’ sole issue is sustained, and the trial court’s “Order,” signed on

July 10, 2025, is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings on Brooks’ application for writ of habeas corpus by either releasing

Brooks through issuance of a PR bond or by reducing the amount of bail to that

which Brooks can presently afford.

LEE HARRIS Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: April 9, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Reversed and remanded Do Not Publish OT06

Ex parte Brooks Page 10