Ex Parte Canady

563 S.W.2d 266, 1978 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1082

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 22, 1978
• Docket: 55503
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

PHILLIPS, Judge.

This is an application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Art. 11.07, V.A.C. C.P.

On May 14,1970, petitioner was convicted by a jury of robbery with firearms in Cause No. 10,197 in the 196th Judicial District Court of Hunt County. Punishment was assessed at 45 years’ imprisonment, and the appeal was not perfected.

Petitioner’s application alleges the indictment upon which he was convicted is fundamentally defective, an issue which may be properly raised in a post conviction writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Garcia, Tex.Cr.App., 544 S.W.2d 432; Ex parte Lopez, Tex.Cr.App., 549 S.W.2d 401; Ex parte Fontenot, Tex.Cr.App., 550 S.W.2d 87.

The indictment alleges, in pertinent part, that on or about February 19, 1970, petitioner:

“did then and there unlawfully and wil-fully make an assault upon the person of Pauline Taylor hereinafter styled injured party, and did then and there by the said assault and by violence to the said injured party, and by then and there putting the said injured party in fear of life and bodily injury and by then and there using and exhibiting a fire-arm, to-wit: .32 caliber revolver did then and there fraudulently take from the person and possession of said injured party, corporeal personal property then and there belonging to said injured party; without the consent and against the will of said injured party, and with the fraudulent intent then and there on the part of said defendant to deprive the said injured party of the value of the same, and with the intent to appropriate the same to the use and benefit of said defendant.”

Specifically, petitioner contends the description of the property taken as “corporeal personal property” is insufficient. In Mankin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 451 S.W.2d 236, the defendant’s amended motion for rehearing raised, for the first time, the contention that the indictment was fundamentally defective because the property taken was described only as “corporeal personal property”. In upholding the defendant’s contention, this Court said:

“While the rule as to sufficiency of an indictment to advise the accused with reasonable certainty of the accusation he is called upon to meet at the trial is not applied in later decisions of this court as strictly as it once was, the common law rule that robbery is but an aggravated form of theft, and that in charging the offense or [sic] robbery, as in charging larceny or theft, a description of the property taken is essential has been uniformly applied. Wilson v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 391, 356 S.W.2d 928; Holland v. State, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 384, 10 S.W.2d 561, and cases cited.

“The indictment which is found in the record on appeal contains no description of the corporeal personal property alleged to have been taken in the robbery.

“Wilson v. State, supra, is directly in point and supports appellant’s contention that the indictment herein is fundamentally defective and the conviction thereon cannot stand.” Mankin, supra, at page 241.

The dissent in this case cites and relies upon American Plant Food Corporation v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 598, to stand for the proposition that a property description will not be deemed defective absent a motion to quash unless “the defect be of such a degree as to charge no offense . . . .” American Plant Food Corporation v. State, supra, at 604. We agree with this holding. However, the dissent states that a description of “corporeal personal property” is sufficient to charge an offense absent a motion to quash. With this we cannot agree.

In the recent case of Rhodes v. State, 560 S.W.2d 665 (delivered January 18, 1978), a case not cited by the dissent, we specifically interpreted our holding in American Plant Food with regard to property descriptions under Article 21.09, V.A.C.C.P. In Rhodes, we stated:

“This matter of the degree of deficiency referred to in general terms in American Plant Food is equally appropriate regarding claimed deficiencies in the description of property under Art. 21.09, supra. This line of demarcation between defects of substance and those of form explains why some descriptions of property are fundamentally defective and others must be challenged by motion to quash. ... An examination of the two cases decided after American Plant Food demonstrates proper application of these principles. These cases are Willis v. State, 544 S.W.2d 150 and Moore v. State, 532 S.W.2d 333.

“In Moore, supra, we reversed because the trial court ‘erred in failing to grant the motions to quash the indictment’ for felony theft in which the property was described as, ‘barbed wire of the value of over fifty dollars, the same then and there being the corporeal personal property of and belonging to Morris Peterson.’

“In Willis, supra, a theft indictment was held fundamentally defective in the absence of a motion to quash. The property was described simply as ‘merchandise.’

“ ‘Merchandise’ is so general and non-descriptive as to constitute no allegation of the property at all. It could as well have alleged merely ‘property.’

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“Consequently, we hold that a defect in the description of property under Art. 21.09, supra, must be raised by a motion to quash, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal, unless the description is so deficient as to be no description at all and to constitute a jurisdictional defect, as was the case in Willis, supra.”

It is apparent that “merchandise” is a more specific description than “corporeal personal property”; and yet, we have held “merchandise” a fatally defective description. We adhere to our decision in Rhodes v. State, supra, and Willis v. State, supra. For these reasons, we find the property description in the instant indictment so deficient as to be no description and hold the indictment fundamentally defective.

The relief is granted; the conviction in Cause No. 10197 is set aside and the indictment is ordered dismissed.