Ex Parte Calvillo Amaya

748 S.W.2d 224, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 311, 1988 Tex. LEXIS 31, 1988 WL 29181

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Decided: April 6, 1988
• Docket: C-6873
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

RAY, Justice.

This is an original habeas corpus proceeding brought by Relator, Oscar Calvillo Amaya, seeking release from the custody of the Sheriff of Cameron County from a commitment order of the 103rd Judicial District Court. The commitment order was verbally delivered on Friday, October 2, 1987 at 5:15 p.m. and formally signed on Monday, October 5, 1987. The court held relator in constructive contempt for violating a previous judgment of that court, ordering him to turn over to a corporate receiver certain equipment located in Mexico.

Since it is well settled in this state that a person may not be imprisoned for contempt without a written order of commitment, we hold that a trial court has no authority to verbally order a person confined for contemptuous acts committed outside the presence of the court and, thereafter, unduly delay signing a contempt judgment and commitment order. See Ex Parte Spencer, 508 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. Civ.App.—Texarkana 1974, no writ). A commitment is a warrant, order or process by which a court or magistrate directs a ministerial officer to take a person to jail or to prison and to detain him there. In order to satisfy due process requirements, both a written judgment of contempt and a written commitment order are necessary to imprison a person for civil constructive contempt of court. Ex Parte Puckitt, 159 Tex. 438, 322 S.W.2d 597 (1959); Ex Parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex.1980). An arrest without a written commitment made for the purpose of enforcing a contempt judgment is an illegal restraint from which the prisoner is entitled to be relieved. Ex Parte Puckitt, 322 S.W.2d at 597.

The trial court may cause a contemnor to be detained by the sheriff or other officer for a short and reasonable time while the judgment of contempt and the order of commitment are being prepared for the judge’s signature. Ex Parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d at 257. We hold that a three-day delay is not a “short and reasonable time” while the documents are being prepared for signature.

To hold otherwise would allow the trial court to place a person in jail indefinitely without any method for the prisoner to obtain his release by purging himself of the contempt and perhaps, without knowledge of why he was being held in contempt. Such proceedings would be in violation of due process. See Ex Parte Spencer, 508 S.W.2d at 700. In view of our holding, it is unnecessary to consider relator’s remaining points of error.

We hold that the order in the instant case violates due process and the relator is ordered discharged from custody under the commitment order issued by the 103rd Judicial District in Cameron County.

CULVER, J., files a concurring opinion in which SPEARS, J., joins.