OPINION
MILLER, Judge.
This is a post conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of Art. 11.07, V.A.C.C.P.
Applicant was convicted of capital murder on December 8, 1986, and sentenced to death by the trial judge. Art. 37.071(e), V.A.C.C.P. This Court affirmed applicant’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Baldree v. State, 784 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Applicant’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on May 14, 1990. Baldree v. Texas, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2193, 109 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990).
Applicant presents fourteen allegations in this application challenging the validity of his convictions and sentences. On September 11, 1990, without holding an eviden-tiary hearing, the judge of the convicting court recommended applicant be denied relief. On September 17, 1990, this Court ordered this cause filed and set for submission on only applicant’s first allegation. We also granted applicant a stay of execution pending further orders from this Court.
In his first allegation, applicant claims the issues presented to his sentencing jury pursuant to Art. 37.071(b)(1) and (2) precluded the jury from considering or giving effect to the mitigating evidence he offered at trial. Applicant relies on both Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), and Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (O’Connor, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring), for relief. Applicant did not object to the jury charge at punishment on this basis or raise this issue on direct appeal.1 See Baldree, 784 [215]*215S.W.2d at 678, (no supplemental appellate brief although original brief filed years before Penry was decided and this Court’s opinion rendered months thereafter). Thus, this application presents us with applicant’s “Penry issue” for the first time. Recently, this Court determined this claim is cognizable via a writ of habeas corpus despite an applicant’s failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. Ex parte Goodman (Tex.Cr.App. No. 70,887 delivered May 29, 1991), slip op. at pp. 3-4.2 We therefore will address the merits of applicant’s contention.
In Franklin, 108 S.Ct. 2320, the petitioner contended, inter alia, that his sentencing jury did not adequately consider his good prison disciplinary record. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2328. Franklin argued this mitigating evidence, which was the only such evidence introduced, “had significance independent of its relevance to the Special Issues — as a reflection on his ‘character[,]’ ” and requested a jury instruction which would allow the jury to impose a life sentence even if it answered “yes” to both punishment issues submitted. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2329. A plurality of the Supreme Court concluded the jury’s consideration of Franklin’s mitigating evidence was not improperly limited because the jury was free to give appropriate weight to this evidence through its consideration of the second special issue. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2330. Thus, Franklin was not sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Franklin foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s opinion in Penry, 109 S.Ct. 2934, the following term. Penry argued that his mitigating evidence of mental retardation and child abuse had relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues under Art. 37.071(b), and that the jury was unable to express its “reasoned moral response” to that evidence in determining whether death was the appropriate punishment. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2948. The Supreme Court agreed and stated a special instruction with regard to the mitigating evidence was necessary.3
The Court addressed the need for the additional instruction in light of the three punishment issues. Art. 37.071(b)(1), (2), & (3). As to the first special issue, the Court opined that without this instruction “a juror who believed that Penry’s retardation and background diminished his moral culpability and made imposition of the death penalty unwarranted would be unable to give effect to that conclusion if the juror also believed that Penry committed the crime ‘deliberately’.” 109 S.Ct. at 2949. The Court recognized the double-edged sword characteristic of Penry’s mitigating evidence under the second special issue. That is, the very evidence which may diminish his blameworthiness also indicated there was a probability that he would be a continuing threat to society. Thus, the second special issue did not provide a vehicle for the jury to give mitigating effect to Penry’s “mitigating” evidence. Id. Likewise, the Court found the third special issue addressing provocation, which was given in Penry’s jury charge, failed to allow a juror who believed Penry lacked the moral culpability to be sentenced to death to express that view in this issue if the juror concluded Penry’s action was not a reasonable response to the provocation. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2950. Thus, as applied to Penry, Art. 37.071 was unconstitutional.
Applicant asserts the mitigating circumstances presented during his trial fell into two distinct categories, to-wit: (1) mitigating evidence that was not relevant to the special verdict questions, and (2) mitigating evidence and circumstances that are arguably relevant to the punishment issues but that have relevance to his moral culpability [216]*216beyond the scope of the issues. As to his first assertion, applicant relies upon dicta in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Franklin, 108 S.Ct. at 2333,4 and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Penny, 109 S.Ct. at 2966,5 to support his claim that our capital murder sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to him. Applicant does not indicate which of his mitigating evidence falls into this category, or the other category for that matter. He notes, however, that Penry’s mitigating evidence was relevant to the factual inquiries under the special issues but had mitigating value beyond that, and that Franklin’s mitigating evidence was relevant to his character only as it reflected upon his potential for future dangerousness, the factual inquiry encompassed by the second special issue. After detailing his mitigating evidence, applicant merely asserts that “[t]his mitigating evidence is precisely the kind of evidence that a capital jury is compelled to ignore or undervalue in the sentencing phase when confined to the statutory Special Issues.” Thus, we consider applicant’s mitigating evidence and arguments together.
Applicant sets out in his writ the mitigating evidence which came from the testimony of his sisters during the punishment phase of trial. According to his sister Margie Howard, applicant was one of twelve children in his family and was “always a good child and loving child.” Applicant became deathly ill with spinal polio when he was thirteen years old, which Howard said later affected his personality and behavior.6 Howard testified as to applicant’s character and kindness toward others, specifically his parents, her children, and her nieces.
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OPINION
MILLER, Judge.
This is a post conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of Art. 11.07, V.A.C.C.P.
Applicant was convicted of capital murder on December 8, 1986, and sentenced to death by the trial judge. Art. 37.071(e), V.A.C.C.P. This Court affirmed applicant’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Baldree v. State, 784 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Applicant’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on May 14, 1990. Baldree v. Texas, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2193, 109 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990).
Applicant presents fourteen allegations in this application challenging the validity of his convictions and sentences. On September 11, 1990, without holding an eviden-tiary hearing, the judge of the convicting court recommended applicant be denied relief. On September 17, 1990, this Court ordered this cause filed and set for submission on only applicant’s first allegation. We also granted applicant a stay of execution pending further orders from this Court.
In his first allegation, applicant claims the issues presented to his sentencing jury pursuant to Art. 37.071(b)(1) and (2) precluded the jury from considering or giving effect to the mitigating evidence he offered at trial. Applicant relies on both Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), and Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (O’Connor, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring), for relief. Applicant did not object to the jury charge at punishment on this basis or raise this issue on direct appeal.1 See Baldree, 784 [215]*215S.W.2d at 678, (no supplemental appellate brief although original brief filed years before Penry was decided and this Court’s opinion rendered months thereafter). Thus, this application presents us with applicant’s “Penry issue” for the first time. Recently, this Court determined this claim is cognizable via a writ of habeas corpus despite an applicant’s failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. Ex parte Goodman (Tex.Cr.App. No. 70,887 delivered May 29, 1991), slip op. at pp. 3-4.2 We therefore will address the merits of applicant’s contention.
In Franklin, 108 S.Ct. 2320, the petitioner contended, inter alia, that his sentencing jury did not adequately consider his good prison disciplinary record. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2328. Franklin argued this mitigating evidence, which was the only such evidence introduced, “had significance independent of its relevance to the Special Issues — as a reflection on his ‘character[,]’ ” and requested a jury instruction which would allow the jury to impose a life sentence even if it answered “yes” to both punishment issues submitted. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2329. A plurality of the Supreme Court concluded the jury’s consideration of Franklin’s mitigating evidence was not improperly limited because the jury was free to give appropriate weight to this evidence through its consideration of the second special issue. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2330. Thus, Franklin was not sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Franklin foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s opinion in Penry, 109 S.Ct. 2934, the following term. Penry argued that his mitigating evidence of mental retardation and child abuse had relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues under Art. 37.071(b), and that the jury was unable to express its “reasoned moral response” to that evidence in determining whether death was the appropriate punishment. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2948. The Supreme Court agreed and stated a special instruction with regard to the mitigating evidence was necessary.3
The Court addressed the need for the additional instruction in light of the three punishment issues. Art. 37.071(b)(1), (2), & (3). As to the first special issue, the Court opined that without this instruction “a juror who believed that Penry’s retardation and background diminished his moral culpability and made imposition of the death penalty unwarranted would be unable to give effect to that conclusion if the juror also believed that Penry committed the crime ‘deliberately’.” 109 S.Ct. at 2949. The Court recognized the double-edged sword characteristic of Penry’s mitigating evidence under the second special issue. That is, the very evidence which may diminish his blameworthiness also indicated there was a probability that he would be a continuing threat to society. Thus, the second special issue did not provide a vehicle for the jury to give mitigating effect to Penry’s “mitigating” evidence. Id. Likewise, the Court found the third special issue addressing provocation, which was given in Penry’s jury charge, failed to allow a juror who believed Penry lacked the moral culpability to be sentenced to death to express that view in this issue if the juror concluded Penry’s action was not a reasonable response to the provocation. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2950. Thus, as applied to Penry, Art. 37.071 was unconstitutional.
Applicant asserts the mitigating circumstances presented during his trial fell into two distinct categories, to-wit: (1) mitigating evidence that was not relevant to the special verdict questions, and (2) mitigating evidence and circumstances that are arguably relevant to the punishment issues but that have relevance to his moral culpability [216]*216beyond the scope of the issues. As to his first assertion, applicant relies upon dicta in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Franklin, 108 S.Ct. at 2333,4 and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Penny, 109 S.Ct. at 2966,5 to support his claim that our capital murder sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to him. Applicant does not indicate which of his mitigating evidence falls into this category, or the other category for that matter. He notes, however, that Penry’s mitigating evidence was relevant to the factual inquiries under the special issues but had mitigating value beyond that, and that Franklin’s mitigating evidence was relevant to his character only as it reflected upon his potential for future dangerousness, the factual inquiry encompassed by the second special issue. After detailing his mitigating evidence, applicant merely asserts that “[t]his mitigating evidence is precisely the kind of evidence that a capital jury is compelled to ignore or undervalue in the sentencing phase when confined to the statutory Special Issues.” Thus, we consider applicant’s mitigating evidence and arguments together.
Applicant sets out in his writ the mitigating evidence which came from the testimony of his sisters during the punishment phase of trial. According to his sister Margie Howard, applicant was one of twelve children in his family and was “always a good child and loving child.” Applicant became deathly ill with spinal polio when he was thirteen years old, which Howard said later affected his personality and behavior.6 Howard testified as to applicant’s character and kindness toward others, specifically his parents, her children, and her nieces. As examples, Howard testified applicant took care of his father, who had cancer, by giving him baths and changing his colostomy bags “just like a nurse” and took care of her children when they were young. Howard had never seen applicant hurt anyone and stated he had never been in prison for a violent crime.
Nell Spainhour, another sister, testified regarding applicant’s “family life, [] acts of kindness, good work, and voluntary service.” 7 She too stated applicant was a loving child and was helpful with her children and her household. Applicant cared for her children while Spainhour had multiple operations and was hospitalized. She also had never seen applicant act in a violent manner and stated “he had never been charged with hurting anybody.”
Justice O’Connor observed in her concurring opinion in Franklin that “[ejvidence of voluntary service, kindness to others, or of religious devotion might demonstrate positive character traits that might mitigate against the death penalty.” 108 S.Ct. at 2333 (emphasis added). Applicant asserts this language represents examples of mitigating evidence which is irrelevant under the special issues, thus necessitating an additional jury instruction regarding mitigation. We find, however, that Justice O’Connor cited these examples of mitigating evidence as a comparison to show the [217]*217limited probative value of Franklin’s mitigating evidence of a good prison disciplinary record. That is, Franklin’s good prison disciplinary record had no probative value as to his character outside of the second special issue. Justice O’Connor was speaking globally and hypothetically and, as such, did not state that if a defendant offered this type evidence he or she would be automatically entitled to an additional jury instruction. Justice O’Connor merely indicates this type evidence “might,” in a given case, be probative beyond the scope of our second special issue.
We cannot agree with applicant that the evidence he offered in mitigation of his punishment is relevant beyond the scope of the special issues or irrelevant thereto. Whether applicant has been caring, kind, and nonviolent to others in the past is evidence reflective of his character and bears upon his propensity, or lack thereof, for committing future violent acts. We find the mitigating evidence presented by applicant is directly relevant to special issue two and no further jury instruction was needed to give effect to this evidence.
Because of his objection to the trial court’s failure to define “deliberately,” applicant also argues the first special issue precluded the jury from “considering and crediting mitigating evidence.” We do not agree. Applicant’s sisters testified he was kind and loving toward his family. Since applicant was convicted of killing two persons to whom he was related by marriage, his mitigating evidence went to whether he acted deliberately, and thus we find the jury could adequately consider and give effect to this evidence through the first punishment issue.
Accordingly, we hold Art. 37.071 was not unconstitutionally applied to applicant. The relief sought is denied.